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## Spring 1989

Everett Carll Ladd — The 1988 Elections: Continuation of the Post-New Deal System

Demetrios Caraley — Elections and Dilemmas of American Democratic Governance: Reflections

David S. Mason — Solidarity as a New Social Movement

Robert Y. Shapiro
John T. Young — Public Opinion and the Welfare State: The United States in Comparative Perspective

Richard Rose — How Exceptional Is the American Political Economy

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# Political Science Quarterly

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## *From the Editor:*

*In this issue. . .*

EVERETT C. LADD analyzes the outcomes of the 1988 presidential and congressional elections. He argues that their results display in full form the new party and electoral system that has consigned that of the New Deal era to the history books.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY reflects on the role of American elections as a means of selecting rulers and delivering policy mandates from the voters. He offers prescriptions for changing the electoral system so as to make officials more accountable to the voters.

DAVID S. MASON examines the extent to which Poland's independent trade union Solidarity functioned as a social movement. He finds that while Solidarity may have been unique within the Soviet bloc, it fit many of the criteria of "new social movements" in the West and as such reflects a trend that may transcend East-West boundaries.

ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO and JOHN T. YOUNG examine public opinion toward different social welfare policies in the United States and other countries. They show that public support for social welfare policies in the United States has generally remained solid from the 1970s to the early 1980s, with the exception of increased opposition to income maintenance programs.

RICHARD ROSE attempts to explode the myth that America has a big government. He shows that it is relatively small compared to the average advanced industrial nation, primarily because government in America has been growing more slowly in the past quarter century.

WILLIAM T. TOW surveys the recent U.S.-ANZUS dispute. He argues that strong differences between the U.S. and New Zealand's Labour Government were left unresolved when both sides proved unable to compromise their respective interpretations of valid extended deterrence strategy in the Pacific.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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# The 1988 Elections: Continuation of The Post-New Deal System

EVERETT CARLL LADD

Predictability was the most striking feature of the 1988 election. It had two separate bases. First, 1988 was an incumbents' election. Conditions prevailing throughout the year strongly encouraged a "no" response to the question, "is it time for a change?" A second basis for its predictability is that the election took place well into the latest of our country's great partisan transformations—this one having begun in the late 1960s. When major change is first evident in the parties and elections system, its central features—shifts in group ties to the political parties, issues cutting in novel directions, etc.—often startle us. But after we have seen them over a series of elections we take them as givens. That's what happened in 1988. The election told us little we didn't already know. Instead, it was confirming, or reaffirming. The New Deal era now seems as remote as the age of McKinley.

## The Immediate Setting

From its beginning the 1988 presidential contest was waged against a backdrop that favored the Republicans. One element of this setting involved the status of the two-term incumbent president. During the last months of his presidency, Ronald Reagan was more popular than when he first took office. In the twelve months or so following the Iran-contra revelations, which broke with such political fury in November 1986, Reagan's popular standing clearly suffered. But by the end

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of 1987 he had largely recovered. The *Los Angeles Times* Election Day poll on 8 November 1988 found 60 percent of all voters approving Reagan's presidential performance. Such popularity is partly transferable to the party—as Franklin D. Roosevelt proved half a century ago. Under Reagan, Republicans have drawn close to the Democrats in party identification and have pulled ahead among young voters. And no American president ever committed himself as fully to the election of his successor as Reagan did to George Bush.

A second facet of the setting for the 1988 election was the public's response to current conditions in the economy, foreign affairs, and the like. Presidential elections are always in part referendums on national performance. In 1988, most voters thought things were going fairly well and were thus inclined to give the "ins" another chance.

### *Time for a Change?*

To be sure, many analysts had thought that after eight years of Reagan conservatism the public was ready to try something new. The persistence of a clear majority in opinion polls saying that they wanted the next president to change direction in dealing with the nation's problems, rather than follow "the same policies as the Reagan administration," helped form these expectations. In fact, this poll finding was highly misleading. Virtually every time a variant of the question has been asked, going back to the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, a majority has endorsed a shift from the incumbent's policies. This has not meant, however, support for *some specific alternative* to the incumbent—only that all possible "something elses" are preferred to him.

Testing specific alternatives yields a very different picture. In early August 1988, for example, the CBS News/*New York Times* poll asked whether "you think the Reagan administration has been too conservative, or not conservative enough?" Of those with an opinion, 17 percent volunteered that the administration's approach was about right. Forty-three percent said it had been too conservative—but 42 percent found it insufficiently so. In the context of a Bush-Dukakis race, the latter were simply not "voters for change."

Views on the economy always influence the electorate's conclusions on whether it's time to change; and in the final months of Campaign '88 these views were both positive and becoming more so. The University of Michigan's Index of Consumer Sentiment was 97.4 in August 1988—not the highest figure in the last 35 years but near the high end of modern experience and the highest it had been in more than two years.

### *Assessing the Economy*

By a margin of 69–26 percent, respondents to an early August 1988 CBS News/*New York Times* poll said they considered themselves better off than they had been

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"eight years" earlier. By 40–16 percent in an early September Roper Organization survey, respondents declared themselves better off than they had been "four years" previously. Fifty-seven percent in this latter poll expected to be better off four years hence than they are now, just 6 percent worse off. A survey taken 8–11 September by CBS News and the *New York Times* found 68 percent describing the nation's economy as good, 31 percent as bad. Seventy-four percent said their family's financial position was good, just 15 percent bad.

In a question favored by many analysts, respondents are asked whether they think things in general are moving in the "right direction" or are off on the "wrong track." Surveys showed the former response increasing over the summer and fall of 1988. Stanley Greenberg, who polls for many Democratic candidates, told the presidential campaign *Hotline* in early September that "in every statewide and every congressional poll that we've done in the last two weeks, more people thought the country was moving in the right direction than off on the wrong track, whereas two months ago we barely had a district or state—including ones with low unemployment like Delaware and Connecticut— where the right direction exceeded the wrong track." Greenberg concluded that the shift "is part of a general mood in which people are reevaluating where the economy is—beginning to believe that the Reagan years brought positive gains at the economic level that are real. . . . " The type of assessment of the economy that Greenberg described in the late summer persisted throughout the fall campaign.

Democrats are again debating the lessons of the 1988 presidential balloting. "Did we just run a bad campaign, or is our problem deeper?" Part of the answer is that a third alternative has to be factored in to explain what happened in 1988: when an out-of-power party must contend for the presidency in a period of peace and relative prosperity, it is likely to lose. That was the Democrats' problem in 1988. The election results were not inevitable, but they were both likely and predictable. Bush's final margin of roughly 8 percentage points seems to me to be at the low end of the likely range, given the setting in which the contest was waged. Polls in fact suggest that a higher turnout would have resulted in a bigger Republican margin. The CBS News/*New York Times* post-election survey showed Bush preferred over Dukakis by 12 points among all registered nonvoters interviewed, by 16 points among unregistered nonvoters.

## The Context for the Congressional Voting

The United States had, of course, another set of elections on 8 November 1988 that came out very differently than did the presidential contest. The Democrats made net gains of one seat in the Senate, two in the House, and one governorship; and they maintained their commanding position in the state legislatures. Thus continued the two-tier electoral system evident for the last quarter century: one partisan outcome for the presidency and another elsewhere. 1988 was a good year for incumbents—not just for the incumbent party seeking four more years in the

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White House. The lack of any strong sense across the electorate that it was time for a change presumably aided congressional incumbents as well.

*Cognitive Madisonianism*

Much more is at work, however, accounting for the extraordinary, historically unprecedented divergence of presidential and congressional voting. Some observers speculate on how much the contemporary electorate is being guided by a kind of cognitive Madisonianism. The many variants of this interpretation all start from the fact that with two centuries of experience with a political philosophy and attendant institutions that raise checked-and-divided governmental authority to a lofty status as an instrument for preserving individual liberty, Americans are less likely than their counterparts in other democracies to be troubled by a Republican White House and a Democratic Congress. Never before the last quarter century had Americans regularly experienced sustained divided party control of their national executive and legislative institutions, but their entire history had prepared them for the underlying idea of divided government.

Has a new ideological element been added to the historic mix? Are Americans now seeking a new form of divided power—a Republican executive and Democratic legislature—to express some new set of perspectives or objectives? Certainly the public is saying that they like the idea of divided party control. For example, in a survey taken 23–26 October 1988, NBC News and the *Wall Street Journal* asked: "In general, do you think it is better for the same political party to control both the Congress and the presidency, or do you think it is better to have different political parties controlling the Congress and the presidency?" Only 32 percent opted for unified party control, 54 percent for divided authority. In a survey taken in Connecticut from 29 November through 6 December 1988, the University of Connecticut's Institute for Social Inquiry asked: "The way the election came out, the Republicans control the White House but the Democrats control both Houses of Congress. Do you think this is good for the country, or would it be better if one party had both the presidency and the Congress?" Sixty-seven percent of those interviewed said the prevailing divided arrangements were desirable. By a margin of 55 to 36 percent, those who had voted for George Bush on 8 November and who declared themselves pleased with his victory endorsed as "good for the country" a Democratic congressional majority.

I have often noted that contemporary public opinion research in the United States shows a public highly ambivalent on many major questions of public policy. For example, Americans endorse high levels of governmental protections and services, and at the same time they describe government as too big, expensive, and intrusive.[1] The public wants somewhat contradictory things of the modern state. And

[1] See, for example, Everett Carll Ladd, "Politics in the 80s: An Electorate at Odds with Itself," *Public Opinion* 5 (December/January 1983): 2–6; Ladd, "The Reagan Phenomenon and Public Attitudes Toward Government" in Lester M. Salamon and Michael S. Lund, eds., *The Reagan Presidency and*

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we know it sees the Democrats and Republicans differing significantly on the issue of government's role. Would it be surprising, then, if a kind of cognitive Madisonianism in modern guise emerged: Let's set the two parties' views of government's proper role more actively in (hopefully) creative tension, with a Republican executive pushing one way and a Democratic legislature the other.

S.M. Lipset argues that it is by no means chance that leaves the Republicans advantaged in the White House and the Democrats on Capitol Hill. "The Republicans are assisted on the national level by the fact that the presidency is perceived as an elected monarch, as a symbol as well as a leadership position for the entire country, which ideally is above narrow interest conflicts and is heavily involved with domestic moral values and foreign and defense policies. The office is inherently linked to nationalism. . . . Democratic liberals look weak in this context. Reagan and Bush appear strong. Congress, on the other hand, is the place where cleavages get fought out. Members perform services, act as ombudspeople, and represent interests. They appeal narrowly, rather than broadly. And the Democrats, with their links to mass groups and popularly-based interest organizations, are in a better position to fullfill these functions."[2]

*Incumbency, et al.*

Even those most inclined to see cognitive Madisoniansim in the two-tier voting must acknowledge, however, that much else is now at work. The fact is that virtually all incumbents of both parties who seek to win reelection to the U.S. House of Representatives now typically do so by overwhelming margins. A main source of this result and the burgeoning uncompetitiveness is the virtually complete separation of House voting from judgments about the proper course of public policy. While I will not discuss it here, much the same thing seems to be happening in state legislatures, for the same basic reasons.

Political scientist David Mayhew was one of the first to call attention to the "vanishing marginals"—House seats where the winner's margin was small enough that the contest could be seen as competitive.[3] In 1960, while both parties had plenty of safe seats, 203 of the 435 contests were at least marginally competitive, with the winner being held to less than 60 percent of the vote. By 1980, though, only 140 House races saw the winner under 60 percent.

House voting in 1988 was the most uncompetitive in U.S. history. The winner was either unopposed or beat his opponent by 70 to 30 percent or more in 242

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*the Governing of America* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1984); and Ladd and Karlyn H. Keene, "Attitudes Toward Government: What the Public Says," *Government Executive*, January 1988, 11-16.

[2] Seymour Martin Lipset, "A Reaffirming Election: 1988," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 1 (January 1989).

[3] David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Election: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," *Polity* 6 (Spring 1974): 295-317.

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districts. A respectable showing for a challenger has become holding the victor to just 60 to 69 percent of the vote, a result obtained in 128 districts in 1988. The losing candidate got as much as 40 percent of the vote in just 65 contests, and he came within 10 percentage points of the winner—that is, losing by 55-45 or less—in only 29 of the 435 House races (Table 1).

Open seats—those where no incumbent is running—are often quite competitive, but in 1988 there were just twenty-six of them. Only six incumbents seeking reelection lost, and five of them had been tinged by some form of scandal.

What accounts for the virtual disappearance of competitiveness in U.S. House elections? One big part of the story is the enormous advantage incumbents typically enjoy in resources for promoting their candidacies. Staff provided to House members was tripled in the 1960s and 1970s, and members of Congress have put many of their new assistants to work on matters back home in their districts. They have found this useful in serving constituents' needs, of course—but, not incidentally, useful in a narrowly self-serving sense as a little electoral machine made available to them year-round at public expense. Few challengers can match this resource for self-publicizing.

Incumbents generally enjoy a large advantage as well in campaign contributions. Knowing that current office-holders are likely to be reelected and that they will have to deal with them in advancing their legislative objectives, the political action committees (PACs) of the various interest groups heavily back them, regardless of party. In the 1985-1986 election cycle, PAC dollars went to congressional incumbents over their challengers by about $96 to $20 million; and incomplete tabulations for 1987-1988 suggest an even greater margin. Even challengers in races targeted by their political parties for special effort usually have less financial support than the members of Congress they seek to unseat.

In races for governor and U.S. senator—as well, of course, as that for president—many voters know something substantial about the candidates' policy stands or

TABLE 1

*Competitiveness of the U.S. House of Representatives' Districts, 1960–1988*

| *Winner's Margin* | *No. of Districts in Which Winner's Margin in 1960 was:* | *No. of All Districts in Which Winner's Margin in 1980 was:* | *No. of Districts in Which Winner's Margin in 1988 was:* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unopposed | 54 | 27 | 57 |
| 75–99% | 43 | 94 | 91 |
| 70–74% | 27 | 64 | 94 |
| 65–69% | 49 | 60 | 62 |
| 60–64% | 59 | 50 | 66 |
| 55–59% | 112 | 61 | 36 |
| 52–54% | 56 | 39 | 17 |
| 51% + less | 35 | 40 | 12 |

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records. In these contests, even well-funded incumbents who are better known than their opponents may readily be defeated when the electorate is in the mood for policy change. But members of Congress simply don't have the policy visibility of governors and senators. Most voters know next to nothing about their representative's voting record. They are, though, more likely to have some vaguely favorable image of him or her than they are of his or her opponent.

### *Decline of Party Voting*

Political party ties are the one thing that could upset this dynamic. That is, a voter might not know anything about a member of Congress's voting record but still vote against him or her in favor of a less-well-known challenger because the voter preferred the challenger's party. This is, of course, exactly what happened historically. But over the last quarter century, as incumbents have accumulated election resources greater than ever before, the proportion of the electorate bound by strong party ties has declined precipitously. Better educated and drawing their political information largely from the communications media, today's voters feel they need parties less than did their counterparts of times past.

In highly visible races like those for president, senator, and governor, voters typically acquire enough information to make up for the decline of the guidance that party ties long provided. At the other end of the spectrum, in elections of school board members, aldermen, etc., voters often have enough close-up, personal knowledge of the candidates to reach informed judgments. House races are where we have our problem. Party voting is no longer decisive, but substantive knowledge of the candidates' records is usually insufficient to furnish a substitute base for substantive choice. Enjoying huge advantages in resources for self-promotion, incumbents in such contests are now winning reelection routinely by escalating margins.

## THE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENCY

A complex structure is at work producing the outcomes that distinguish the contemporary parties and elections system. Returning to the presidential component, the Republicans won the presidency in 1988 in substantial part because they were the incumbent party in a time of peace and relative prosperity. But clearly more than that was at work. Just as the Democrats' ascendancy in the Congress has persisted over an extended span, so has the GOP's presidential dominance. In the last six presidential elections—1968-1988—the Republicans garnered 53 percent of all the ballots cast, the Democrats just 43 percent (Table 2). Only one previous extended set of elections was decided more decisively: the five from 1932 through 1948, when the Democrats won 55 percent of the vote to the Republicans' 43 percent.

All manner of short-term factors enter into presidential election outcomes. But margins of the magnitude piled up in the New Deal and in the contemporary cycle

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TABLE 2

*The Parties' Share of the Popular Vote for President, 1932–1948 and 1968–1988*

| | *Democrats* | *Republicans* | *Other* | *All* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1932–1948:* | | | | |
| Votes: | 127,553,650 | 98,757,589 | 5,588,148 | 231,899,387 |
| Percentage: | 55 | 43 | 2 | 100 |
| *1968–1988:* | | | | |
| Votes: | 216,166,407 | 265,343,131 | 21,731,370 | 503,240,908 |
| Percentage: | 43 | 53 | 4 | 100 |

Note: For the 1988 presidential election, the latest data available were provided by the Federal Election Commission, 12 January 1989.

show something more than an accumulation of short-term forces. The Democrats' 12 point lead in the Roosevelt era occured in part because their approach to governing was more popular than the GOP's. Likewise the Republicans 10 point margin over the last six contests reflects an edge grounded in voters' decisions on the broad reach of public policy.

*The Role of Government*

Analysts differ as to the precise mix of developments in public policy that has given the Republicans their presidential majority of the modern period. I would identify three components. One results from the tremendous real growth of government over the 1960s and 1970s. In response to this growth, governmental actions came increasingly to be seen as problems, not just as solutions to problems. "Government causes inflation" is one part of this. "Government taxes too much" is another part. The actual tax burden on most citizens increased dramatically after the 1950s. In 1953, families with incomes around the national average paid 11.8 percent of their income in taxes; in 1966 they paid 17.8 percent, and in 1980, 22.7 percent.[4] Incomes rose, but the proportion paid out in taxes rose much faster. Taxes claimed about twice as much of the average family's earnings in 1980 as they had twenty-five years earlier.

This ushered in an era of populist protests against big government quite different from anything that occurred in the New Deal era. A substantial segment of the lower-middle and working classes came to resent the amount they had to pay and to be receptive to appeals from conservative politicians on the plank of tax reduction. A similar development occurred in the United Kingdom. In his brilliant account of the rise of Thatcherism, Peter Jenkins describes how in the late 1970s

[4] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism," 1980–81 (Washington, D.C.: December 1981), 48.

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Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan perceived the threat to his party's standing. He told the Labour party's national executive committee: "If you want to retain power you have got to listen to what people—our people—say and what they want. If you talk to people in the factories and in the clubs, they all want to pay less tax. They are more interested in that than the Government giving money away in other directions."[5] Unfortunately for the party, not many of its leaders were prepared to act on this insight. Jenkins stresses Margaret Thatcher's economic appeal to broad segments of British working class.

### *Social Issues*

A second set of issues that challenged the Democratic Party nationally involved a diverse array of social questions. The New Deal coalition, Christopher Jencks has observed, was held together by economic interests. Rural white southerners and the northern working class could unite on greater governmental intervention in the marketplace.

> Neither group had "liberal" views on issues like race, patriotism, capital punishment, or abortion. Once these issues became politically salient, as they did in the 1960s, Democratic presidential candidates faced, and still face an almost insoluble problem. If they took liberal positions on such issues they estrange the white South and part of the white working class. If they took conservative positions they risked estranging the educated liberals who ran their campaigns and raised their money. Democratic candidates for Congress can often sidestep this problem because most congressional districts are relatively homogenous. . . . This strategy does not work as well in statewide elections, especially if the state is socially diverse. . . . It doesn't seem to work at all in national elections.[6]

### *Foreign Policy*

The third set of issues is in foreign and defense policy. It is easy to forget these days that the Democrats were in the New Deal era the party of the more assertive foreign policy. Indeed, the charge made the rounds in some Republican circles that the United States "got wars" when the Democrats were in office. Certainly the United States got in the 1930s and 1940s from the Democrats a kind of foreign policy nationalism that was the intellectual equivalent of the "new nationalism" that the party pushed in domestic economic affairs—in both cases, following the earlier lead of Franklin's Republican cousin, Theodore Roosevelt. The United States, Democratic leaders insisted, had broad responsibilities for advancing both spe-

[5] Peter Jenkins, *Mrs. Thatcher's Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 26.

[6] Christopher Jencks, "Lessons for Liberals," *The New York Review of Books*, 22 December 1988, 21–22.

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cific national interests and the cause of democracy through a major assertion of American power into world affairs.

Important segments of the Democratic party would probably have modified this New Deal-era approach in any case, but the Vietnam war served at once to quicken and heighten the reassessment. The Republicans were thus given an enormous opportunity to establish themselves as the more tough-minded of the two parties on foreign policy issues, the one more prepared to maintain a strong national defense and to resist Communist expansion.

The Democrats continued to bring important assets to their policy confrontations with the Republicans, including the widespread perception across middle-class America that they were better than the Republicans in responding to claims for needed protections and services. But the combined disadvantages that accrued to the party from the developments noted in foreign policy, social issues, and taxes and related big government issues was more than their New Deal majority could withstand.

## The Generational Component of Party Change

The new policy cleavages made themselves felt in partisan attachments. But the impact was hardly a bolt from the blue. We need to see how changes in the mix of party ties have gradually emerged. In forming party attachments, individuals gain a frame of reference from the decisive events of the period when they first came to political consciousness—usually in their late teens or early twenties—which then shape their subsequent values and actions.[7] Some political leaders are decidedly more respected and popular than others—and sometimes these ascendent politicians are Republicans and sometimes they are Democrats. In the last decade, the Carter-Reagan comparison has been very helpful to the GOP—especially among new voters without a lot of past political experience. Similarly, a distinctive mix of issues dominates political argument as these new voters come of age politically. If the mix generally favors one party over the other—as it did the Democrats in the 1930s and the Republicans in the 1970s and 1980s—the impact of persons without much previous personal political experience is apt to be substantial. This makes young people a key early-warning indicator of major partisan change. As the group ages, it begins to have new and sometimes conflicting political experiences, but these are filtered through an established pattern of party loyalties that are likely to persist, unless and until the mix of new experiences produces a sustained break.

Do available data support this general interpretation? Let's begin by looking

[7] See Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936); Mannheim, "The Sociological Problem of Generations" in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 276–322; Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942); Rudolf Heberle, *Social Movements* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951).

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TABLE 3

*Party Identification of Americans by Age, in 1952 and 1985*

| | 1952 | | | 1985 | | | Democratic Percentage (–) Republican Percentage | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *D* | *R* | *Ind.* | *D* | *R* | *Ind.* | *1952* | *1985* |
| 18–21 yrs. old | 40% | 25% | 35% | 30% | 40% | 30% | +15% | –10% |
| 22–25 yrs. old | 42 | 27 | 31 | 31 | 35 | 34 | +15 | –4 |
| 26–29 yrs. old | 43 | 26 | 31 | 31 | 35 | 33 | +17 | –4 |
| 30–33 yrs. old | 45 | 26 | 29 | 34 | 31 | 35 | +19 | +3 |
| 34–37 yrs. old | 43 | 29 | 28 | 37 | 30 | 33 | +14 | +7 |
| 38–41 yrs. old | 45 | 30 | 26 | 38 | 32 | 30 | +15 | +6 |
| 42–45 yrs. old | 38 | 36 | 25 | 37 | 32 | 31 | +2 | +5 |
| 46–49 yrs. old | 39 | 36 | 25 | 37 | 33 | 30 | +3 | +4 |
| 50–53 yrs. old | 42 | 32 | 25 | 35 | 36 | 28 | +10 | –1 |
| 54–57 yrs. old | 39 | 38 | 24 | 41 | 32 | 27 | +1 | +9 |
| 58–61 yrs. old | 41 | 37 | 21 | 42 | 35 | 23 | +4 | +7 |
| 62–65 yrs. old | 39 | 39 | 22 | 48 | 32 | 21 | 0 | +16 |
| 66–69 yrs. old | 37 | 45 | 18 | 46 | 35 | 19 | –8 | +11 |
| 70–73 yrs. old | 40 | 43 | 17 | 47 | 35 | 17 | –3 | +12 |
| 74–77 yrs. old | 36 | 49 | 14 | 41 | 41 | 18 | –13 | 0 |
| 78–81 yrs. old | 34 | 50 | 16 | 40 | 41 | 19 | –16 | –1 |
| 82 yrs. and over | 31 | 57 | 12 | 40 | 42 | 18 | –26 | –2 |
| ALL AGES | 41 | 33 | 26 | 37 | 34 | 29 | +8 | +3 |

Source: Gallup polls conducted April through July 1952 (seven in number) and January through July 1985 (eight in number).

Similar analysis done by Helmut Norpoth using CBS News/*New York Times* surveys yields the same basic picture. See Helmut Norpoth, "Changes in Party Identification: Evidence of a Republican Majority?" paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association meetings, New Orleans, La, 1985.

at the party preferences of different age groups in the United States as shown by Gallup surveys taken in 1952 and in 1985 (Table 3). The first thing we see is a striking difference in the party preferences of the age groups in the two periods. In 1952 the Democrats' best groups were the young and middle-aged, while the Republicans had large leads among elderly voters. In 1985, however, the Republicans were strongest among the young and the very old, while the Democrats had their greatest strength among people in their fifties, sixties, and early seventies.

Let's translate these data more directly into the frame of generational experience, showing groups by the time when they came of age politically rather than by current age. "Coming of age politically" will be expressed here as reaching 18 years, which seems adequate as a rough standard. Looking at Table 4, we see a broad array of groups, from those who reached 18 years of age way back in the early 1890s (who were still part of the electorate in 1952) to people who reached voting

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TABLE 4

*Percent Republican and Democratic of Major Party Identifiers by Years in Which Respondents Reached Maturity (18 Years), 1952 and 1985 Gallup Polls*

| | 1952 Gallup Polls | | 1985 Gallup Polls | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | % Republican | % Democratic (−) % Republican | % Democratic (−) % Republican | % Republican |
| 1890–93 | 63% | −26% | | |
| 1894–97 | 54 | −8 | | |
| 1898–1901 | 51 | −2 | | |
| 1902–05 | 54 | −8 | | |
| 1906–09 | 49 | +2 | | |
| 1910–13 | 48 | +4 | | |
| 1914–17 | 47 | +6 | | |
| 1918–21 | 46 | +8 | | |
| 1922–25 | 48 | +4 | 0% | 50% |
| 1926–29 | 46 | +8 | 0 | 50 |
| 1930–33 | 41 | +18 | +14 | 43 |
| 1934–37 | 39 | +22 | +14 | 43 |
| 1938–41 | 37 | +26 | +20 | 40 |
| 1942–45 | 39 | +22 | +10 | 45 |
| 1946–49 | 39 | +22 | +12 | 44 |
| 1950–53 | | | 0 | 50 |
| 1954–57 | | | +6 | 47 |
| 1958–61 | | | +6 | 47 |
| 1962–65 | | | +10 | 45 |
| 1966–69 | | | +10 | 45 |
| 1970–73 | | | +6 | 47 |
| 1974–77 | | | −6 | 53 |
| 1978–81 | | | −6 | 53 |
| 1982–85 | | | −14 | 57 |

Note: Since the object of this table is to focus on the relative Republican vs. Democratic strength in each generation, independents have been excluded from the calculations. To take an example of how the data should be read, among those who reached 18 years of age in the 1982–85 span, who identify with one or the other major party, 57% are Republican (and hence 43% Democratic).

age just in the last few years. Using both the 1952 and the 1985 surveys extends the range of our generational examination. Some groups are represented in both the 1952 and the 1985 polls. Those who were just coming of political age in 1952 were in their fifties by the mid-1980s.

The relative standing of the major parties varies substantially across generational groups in a fashion that corresponds in rough terms to what we know of decisive political experiences. For example, both the 1952 and the 1985 Gallup polls

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show the Democrats' margin over the Republicans' greatest among those who came of age politically at the height of the Democrats' New Deal ascendancy. Since static enters into polling and poll responses, it is especially impressive that the picture provided by the two batches of surveys separated by thirty-three years is so consistent.

People who reached political maturity in the late 1930s and early 1940s were in 1952 unusually pro-Democratic—and they are so today. Republicans had a big edge in the 1890s, but they began to lose this among new voters coming of age in the early twentieth century—reflecting in part the impact of immigration on the makeup of the population. In the 1930s the Democrats began achieving an overwhelming generational advantage over the Republicans; this was not interrupted until the 1950s, when various developments, among them Dwight Eisenhower's personal popularity, cut significantly into the Democrats' edge among new voters. The heyday of John Kennedy's New Frontier and Lyndon Johnson's Great Society saw the Democrats recover among new entrants, but over the last decade the GOP has, for the first time in a long while, taken the lead among those just coming into the electorate. This new Republican margin widened during the Reagan presidency.

Surveys taken in 1988 show the pattern sketched in Tables 3 and 4 continuing. For example, the combined results of four national surveys taken for the Americans Talk Security project (ATS) between February and June 1988 found the Democrats' best age cohort people between 60 and 75 years of age, who had come of age politically in the 1930s and 1940s. The Republicans' best group was those 18-29, the children of the Carter and Reagan years. The Gallup Youth Surveys taken in 1988 showed Republicans doing well in the 13-17 age cohort. These surveys ask: "When you are old enough to vote, do you think you will be more likely to vote for candidates of the Republican party or for candidates of the Democratic party?" Forty-four percent of those interviewed in the three 1988 surveys said the Republicans, 36 percent the Democrats.[8]

These data help us understand why in recent years no dramatic overall swing to the Republicans has occurred in party identification, though the Democrats' lead has been diminished. The Democrats put together a long string where they bested the Republicans among new voters, and they continue to reap the benefits: People who came of age politically from the 1930s through the 1960s remain a large part of the electorate, and the impressive Democratic base among these age groups has by no means been obliterated. The Democrats are down from their once clear ascendancy, but they still have a lot of generational capital. In recent years, the Republicans have reversed the trend among new entrants; should they continue to have this success, they will in time shift the underlying partisan base decisively in their favor.

[8] Robert Bezilla, ed., *America's Youth 1987–88* (Princeton, N.J.: The Gallup Organization, 1988), 108–9.

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TABLE 5

*Party Identification of White Southerners*

| Spring | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1979 | | | 1983 | | | 1984 | | | 1985 | | | 1988 | | | |
| D | R | I | D | R | I | D | R | I | D | R | I | D | R | I | |
| 46% | 21% | 33% | 42% | 23% | 35% | 43% | 29% | 28% | 36% | 39% | 25% | 32% | 34% | 34% | |
| Dems. +25% | | | Dems. +19% | | | Dems. +14% | | | Reps. +3% | | | Reps. +2% | | | |

Source: Combined Gallup polls in the years shown, except for 1988. The 1988 data are from four surveys taken for the Americans Talk Security project, February through June.

## *The Exceptional Case of the White South*

On occasion, amidst the many cases of gradual change in the partisan preferences of social groups, there is a really dramatic shift. White southerners are the prime example of such a dramatic change in the contemporary partisan experience. The new issue mix, with a racial component more powerful than elsewhere, has had an explosive impact on this group.

The swing-over in professed party identification was especially sharp in the mid-1980s. According to Gallup data, the percentage of white southerners identifying as Republicans in the January-July 1985 span was 10 points higher than it had been in the spring of 1984, and 18 points higher than in 1979, an unprecedentedly rapid swing. Other polls confirm the picture Gallup provides: The partisan balance was tipped significantly in favor of the Republicans during the 1984 campaign. We don't know precisely why this shift occurred when it did. We can hypothe-

TABLE 6

*Vote in 1988 of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics*

| | *Whites* | | *Blacks* | | *Hispanics* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *% Bush* | *% Dukakis* | *% Bush* | *% Dukakis* | *% Bush* | *% Dukakis* |
| *U.S.* | *57* | *43* | *11* | *89* | *31* | *69* |
| Alabama | 76 | 24 | 7 | 93 | NA | NA |
| Florida | 63 | 37 | 8 | 92 | 68 | 32 |
| No. Carolina | 67 | 33 | 8 | 97 | NA | NA |
| Texas | 65 | 35 | 10 | 90 | 21 | 79 |
| Arkansas | 63 | 37 | 10 | 90 | NA | NA |
| Louisiana | 75 | 25 | 10 | 90 | NA | NA |
| Mississippi | 80 | 20 | 13 | 87 | NA | NA |
| So. Carolina | 78 | 22 | 10 | 90 | NA | NA |
| Tennessee | 67 | 33 | 13 | 87 | NA | NA |
| Georgia | 74 | 26 | 10 | 90 | NA | NA |

Source: The 1988 election day surveys taken by NBC News and the *Wall Street Journal*. The national sample included 11,703 voters, and large independent samples were polled in each of the states shown.

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size, however, that Ronald Reagan's popularity had much to do with it, coming after various events over the past quarter century had already eroded Democratic loyalties (Table 5).

## GROUPS AND THE 1988 BALLOTING

The presidential voting on 8 November further testified to the dramatic shift that has occurred in the partisanship and electoral behavior of white southerners. According to the election day polls of NBS News and the *Wall Street Journal*, for example, Bush received 57 percent of the white vote nationally; but his margins in the South ranged from a low of 63 percent in Florida to a high of 80 percent in Mississippi (Table 6). According to the *Los Angeles Times* exit poll, an extraordinary 74 percent of southern white Protestants voted for George Bush, just 25 percent for Michael Dukakis. In the New Deal era, white southerners' overwhelming support for the national Democratic Party had two main sources: racial tension and memories reaching back to the Civil War, and the fact that white southerners were the most liberal – that is, New Deal policy supporting – regional group in the country. In the contemporary alignment, things have become almost exactly reversed. White southerners have become the most Republican regional group in presidential voting, because of the racial division that finds blacks overwhelmingly Democratic and because they are now generally the most conservative regional group.

Elsewhere, looking at key groups, the changes that have occurred from the New Deal era to the present are surely far less dramatic. Taken together, though, many of these other changes are impressive and together define an electoral universe vastly different from that of the 1930s through the 1950s. Tables 7-9 document

TABLE 7

*1988 Vote for Selected Social Groups*

| | *Presidential Vote* | | *Congressional Vote* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Bush* | *Dukakis* | *Republican* | *Democrat* |
| So. White Protestants | 74% | 25% | 52% | 40% |
| High Status Males | 66 | 33 | 55 | 36 |
| WASPs | 62 | 36 | 58 | 36 |
| Born-Again Christians | 60 | 38 | 49 | 43 |
| Young Affluents | 57 | 41 | 45 | 44 |
| **Everyone** | **53** | **45** | **46** | **46** |
| White Ethnics | 52 | 47 | 45 | 48 |
| High Status Females | 50 | 49 | 42 | 52 |
| Blue-Collar White Catholics | 45 | 55 | 37 | 55 |
| Hispanics | 37 | 62 | 42 | 52 |
| Blacks | 11 | 86 | 9 | 78 |

Note: 6,043 voters were interviewed as they were leaving polling stations around the country.
Source: *Los Angeles Times* Election Day Poll, 8 November 1988.

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TABLE 8

*Party Identification of 1988 General Election Voters*

| | *Republican* | *Independent & "Something Else"* | *Democratic* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Born-Again Christians | 51% | 20% | 29% |
| Southern White Protestants | 48 | 20 | 29 |
| WASPs | 55 | 21 | 24 |
| High Status Males | 48 | 24 | 28 |
| Young Affluents | 44 | 22 | 34 |
| **Everyone** | **38** | **21** | **42** |
| High Status Females | 38 | 21 | 40 |
| White Ethnics | 32 | 22 | 46 |
| Blue-Collar White Catholics | 22 | 21 | 58 |
| Hispanics | 23 | 12 | 65 |
| Blacks | 7 | 10 | 83 |

Source: ABC News Election Day Poll, 8 November 1988. 23,030 voters were interviewed as they left polling stations around the country.

this by comparing the presidential and congressional vote in 1988 of ten key groups and by showing the party identification (and self-described ideological orientations) of group members who went to the polls on election day.

In the New Deal years, men and women had voted almost identically. In 1988, however, according to the CBS News/*New York Times* exit poll, the gender gap was 15 percentage points: Men favored Bush over Dukakis by a 16 point margin, women by just 1 percentage point. The NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* poll put the gap at 14 points. Analysis of the exit poll data show that the gap between men and women was especially great among those of high socioeconomic status. The *Los Angeles Times* exit poll found, for example, high status males (college grads, family incomes of $50,000 a year and higher) went for Bush over Dukakis by 2 to 1, while high status women split evenly between the two candidates. High status men are also more likely than their female counterparts to identify as Republicans and to describe themselves as conservatives.

Election day poll data show that the pattern of voting among Hispanics evident in recent past elections persisted almost entirely unchanged in 1988. Nationally, the GOP is the minority party among the nation's Hispanic voters, but it gets a healthy minority share. One group of Hispanics, those of Cuban background concentrated in Florida, is heavily Republican. The GOP's position overall within the rapidly-growing Hispanic population is roughly equivalent to its position among the nation's black voters in the New Deal era. The present overwhelming black support for the Democrats is, of course, yet another product of the shifts of the past quarter century.

Northern white Protestants of British ancestry, of high social status—the storied WASP—remain today, as in the past, heavily Republican and conservative. But rivaling the WASPs on both counts are members of another group of a quite

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TABLE 9

*Ideological Self-Identification of 1988 General Election Voters*

| | *Conservative* | *"Somewhere in between"* | *Liberal* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Born-Again Christians | 64% | 23% | 13% |
| Southern White Protestants | 60 | 25 | 15 |
| WASPs | 64 | 19 | 17 |
| High Status Males | 58 | 20 | 23 |
| Young Affluents | 48 | 23 | 29 |
| **Everyone** | **43** | **32** | **25** |
| High Status Females | 40 | 25 | 35 |
| White Ethnics | 39 | 33 | 29 |
| Blue-Collar White Catholics | 32 | 43 | 25 |
| Hispanics | 30 | 40 | 30 |
| Blacks | 19 | 19 | 40 |

Source: ABC News Election Day Poll, 8 November 1988. 23,030 voters were interviewed as they left polling stations around the country.

Note for Tables 7–9:

How the above groups are constructed from the exit poll survey data, where it is not evident from the categories themselves.

*High Status:* College graduates, family income of $50,000 and higher.

*Blue-Collar:* (ABC) No college training; paid hourly.
(LAT) No college training; head of household identified by respondent as blue-collar worker.

*Young Affluents:* Under 40 years; college grads; family incomes of $50,000 and higher.

*WASPs:* Whites of British ancestry; residing outside the South; college graduates; Protestants.

*White Ethnics:* Irish Catholic, Greek, Italian, Polish, and other Slavic.

*Born-Again:* (ABC) The questionnarie presented respondents with a long list of groups and asked the respondents: "Do any of the following apply to you? Check all that apply." (Born-Again Christian was the 11th item in a list of 14). Fifteen percent of the sample indicated thus that they were "Born-Again Christians."
(LAT) The questionnaire approached this matter of religious identification very differently. The questionnaire contained the following free-standing question: "Have you had a born-again experience—a turning point in your life when you committed yourself to Jesus Christ?" Twenty-eight percent of the entire sample answered yes.

different social position: those who say they have had a "born-again experience—a turning point in your life when you committed yourself to Jesus Christ." Born-again Christians are a far larger segment of the contemporary Republican electorate than are WASPs.

In noting these and other elements of change in group voting that help define the contemporary alignment, I should stress that many things have not changed. Every major change in group alignments incorporates important features of its predecessor. The relative voting patterns of various white ethnic groups have, for example, remained remarkably constant. The ABC News exit poll this year showed, for example, Protestants of German ancestry 15 percentage points more Repub-

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lican in their presidential vote than were German Catholics; Irish Protestants 14 points more Republican than Irish Catholics. Nonetheless, the overall group alignment of the contemporary system differs subtantially from that of the New Deal era.

*The Contemporary Parties/Elections System*

Our present-day electoral alignment, the product of a quarter-century of change, has five principal components: The group basis of the present system has shifted markedly from that of the New Deal years; the new voting alignments reflect profound changes in the mix and cut of issues, which cumulatively have worked to the Democrats' disadvantage in national contests; the Republicans have emerged as the majority party in presidential electioneering; the new alignment displays a split personality—one face evident in presidential balloting, another in state and local contests (where the Democrats predominate); dealignment—the weakening of voters' ties to the parties—is evident throughout the current system, as party-less voting now occurs to an historically unprecedented degree.

Do these features, and changes from the previous system to which they point, constitute a realignment? I remain inclined to say they do. But argument over the term's meaning is simply not worth the candle. For over three decades, political scientists have been engaged in an exceptionally unproductive debate over just what criteria must be met before a proper realignment may be officially declared. As this debate has dragged on, the world of American political parties has been transformed. Let's bury the concept and get on with a precise charting of the new arrangements and their implications. A transformed parties and election system is firmly in place in the United States. It has no historic counterpart, and it seems to this observer to impart as much of consequence to contemporary politics as any of its predecessor systems did to theirs.

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# Elections and Dilemmas of American Democratic Governance: Reflections

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

I take as a central dilemma of American democratic governance that while all the adult citizenry have gained the opportunity to vote freely in elections on *who* the president and members of Congress are to be, they seem to be losing influence on *what* those officials do on questions of policy once in office. The 1988 election campaigns produced more criticism both of the process of choosing these officials and of the lack of policy mandates than any others in recent memory. This article attempts to organize that criticism under three headings, reflect upon it, and offer some prescriptions for change.

The bill of particulars being leveled against the American democracy is, as I would summarize it: First, presidential and congressional election campaigns have become much more like popularity or beauty contests, con games, and television spectacles than a means of choosing the best persons to rule or producing a policy mandate to our highest officials from the voters. Second, voters cannot fix responsibility for successful or unsuccessful governmental policies because of the constitutional separation of powers between the presidency and Congress and because, of the high frequency in the past thirty-four years of different parties controlling the two branches. Third, appointive federal justices with life tenure on the Supreme Court have the power to nullify the policy preferences of voting majorities working through the president and Congress.

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## Functions of Elections

Elections are important. According to the Founding Fathers—who did not claim to be democrats—elections were the main guarantee against oppressive government. In the Declaration of Independence, the Founders argued as a "self-evident" "truth" that governments derived "their just powers from the consent of the governed." Even before the Revolutionary War, colonists had argued that the lack of opportunity to vote for representatives to Parliament made its laws illegitimate. Moreover, the colonists had experience with elections; they had been voting for at least one house of the normally two-house colonial legislatures.

In the Constitution, the Founders provided for direct election of the members of the House of Representatives by those eligible in each state to vote for the lower house of the state legislature—a large franchise for the time, though it excluded women and people of color. The Founders made members of the Senate appointive by their state legislatures, which contained representatives elected directly by the people. In the clumsy electoral vote system of choosing the president, the Founders did not make him a popularly elective official.[1] But they also did not give the appointment of the president to Congress. If they had, the chances of Congress agreeing later to a constitutional amendment for the almost direct election of the president that we have now would have been zero.

The Founders deliberately left open for each state to decide how its presidential electors were to be selected. As early as Thomas Jefferson's election in 1800, the electors did not act as sets of elites who, as the Founders intended, used independent judgment to cast their ballots for the person the electors felt best fit to become president. By 1800, the electors had become slates of party rubber stamps who promised if elected to cast their electoral votes for one or the other party's informal nominee—John Adams for the Federalists and Jefferson for the Jeffersonian-Republicans. By Andrew Jackson's presidency, the electors were chosen by essentially universal white, male suffrage.

Today we take the choosing of rulers in elections for granted, but this was not the case in 1787. The most "election-based" government of the time was that of the British. And while Britain had restricted its king to reigning rather than ruling and was governed by a cabinet and Parliament, the right to vote for members of Parliament was extended to only about one-fifth of the adult male population.

The Founders, on the other hand, insisted it was "essential" (their word) that the right to vote be extended to:

> the great body of the society, not . . . an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic.[2]

[1] Hamilton had argued with his typical modesty that with respect to "the mode of selection of the Chief Magistrate, . . . I affirm that if the manner of it not be perfect, it is at least excellent." *Federalist Papers*, No. 68.

[2] *Federalist Papers*, No. 39 (Madison).

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The Founders were proud that in the House of Representatives they provided the strongest restraint to would-be oppressive rulers—frequent elections, every two years.[3] Alexander Hamilton asked:

> Is it not natural, that a man who is a candidate for the favor of the people, and who is dependent on the suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the continuation of his public honors, should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and inclinations. . . ? This dependence [creates] strong chords of sympathy between the Representative and the constituent.[4]

The Founders never said they were building a "democracy." To them, a "democracy" meant "direct democracy," "a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person" and where there would be "nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual."[5] In short, the Founders saw democracy as equivalent to tyranny of the majority or even mob rule, which would expropriate the rights and property of the minority of the better-off and oppress unpopular individuals, as for example the Athenian democracy had done in executing Socrates. The Founders preferred what they called a "republic," because in a republic "the scheme of representation takes place" and the government is delegated "to a small number of citizens." This small number would be able "to refine and enlarge the public views" and their wisdom could "best discern the true interest of their country."[6]

### *Elections and Public Policy*

Today, as a result of the 15th, 17th, 19th, and 26th amendments, plus the Voting Rights Act of 1965, senators are directly electable and the suffrage for all offices has been extended to every citizen over the age of eighteen, regardless of race or gender. The influence of majorities of the general public on who is to govern is thus controlling. But what does that mean about the public's influence on the content of governmental policies?

Theoretically the vote on candidates can be used to have an impact on policy. At election time the voter can compare the policy positions of all the available candidates on the issues on which the voter feels strongly. The voter can then cast his or her ballot for the candidates whose policy views most coincide with the voter's own. The actual way that the average voter makes up his or her mind does not coincide with this civics textbook theory of voting. All the voting studies available show that the average voter does not differentiate the specific issues being discussed by the competing candidates very much and does not have sufficient information to make the connection between the candidate's stands and the voter's own

[3] *Federalist Papers*, No. 37 (Madison).
[4] *Federalist Papers*, No. 35.
[5] *Federalist Papers*, No. 10 (Madison).
[6] *Federalist Papers*, No. 10 (Madison).

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preferences. These studies also show that a candidate's personality and party may influence the vote as much or more than stands on the issues.

There are also intrinsic difficulties with policy voting, such as the crosscutting nature of issues. For in any real election, each candidate stands for more than a single policy position. Unless the voter happens to have exactly the same set of policy preferences as one of the candidates, he or she will find only some issue positions appealing, but the rest unappealing and unpersuasive. The issue-oriented voter can cast his or her vote only for what I call a "market basket" of preferred policy positions that suits him or her more than any other market basket that happens to be available in that election. Almost never can a voter find a candidate who offers the precise market basket of positions that the voter would have chosen if he or she could have selected from the shelves all the items with which it is filled. Furthermore, even if issues were fully debated in presidential campaigns, they could not be the actual full agenda of a new administration. For unforeseen problems force themselves on a president's agenda, and the president and other elected officials must have freedom of action to deal with new situations as they come up, given the facts and circumstances at the time.

Given these intrinsic difficulties of issue voting, one could hope that in the interests of democracy, candidates and their staffs, television producers, editors, and reporters—who together today *dominate* campaigns—would try to help the voters understand the issues. But the way presidential campaigns are run and the way they are covered by the mass media, especially television—personality at the expense of issues—all but prevents the possibility of policy-oriented, mandate-giving elections.

### *Elections as Evaluations of Candidate Personalities*

Although not much interested in the specifics of issues, voters are greatly interested in the personality characteristics and style of the candidates—their apparent sincerity, warmth, intelligence, commitment, speaking ability, family life, war record, sex life, ethnic background, polish, glamour, charisma, and general likability. Television provides most people with the opportunity to view presidential and Senate candidates and to develop impressions about their personalities seemingly at first hand. Television thus has greatly increased the weight that personality characteristics—both real ones and those manufactured by the ad agencies and by the candidates' handlers—have in shaping the vote.

Some aspects of the candidate's personality—competence, honesty, commitment to the Constitution and the rule of law, keeping his or her word, etc.—are relevant for a policy-oriented vote. Such characteristics bear on whether that candidate will have the ability or the commitment to implement the particular policy point of view that he or she espouses. But even these qualities must be evaluated in conjunction with policy stands, and often they are not. And when they are taken by themselves, neither characteristics such as ability or integrity, nor totally irrelevant ones like a good speaking voice or movie star glamour will determine what

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the candidate would do on matters of policy when in office. In short, voting for the "best" man or the "best" woman begs the question of best for what? Elections based primarily on these surface personality characteristics are akin to beauty contests and provide no mandate from the people on how the winners should govern. The winners can adopt any policies they want without the slightest twinge of guilt for having betrayed the voters.

Candidates overstress character issues and especially stress attacking their opponents' character in negative campaigns – "raising the opponent's negatives." They believe that if they discuss substantive solutions to difficult problems, the voters will not like to hear bad news about the future and will reject the candidate who brings it to them. The fates of Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale are supposedly proof for this proposition. And because elective politicians place the supreme value on winning, they are unwilling to take any risks in order to educate the voters on the tough issues and burdens that must be faced.

During the 1988 campaign, neither presidential candidate talked about the need for painful policies to bring down the twin budget and trade deficits. They did not discuss realistically how a decline in the American standard of living can be prevented, given the increased cost of just paying the interest on the skyrocketed, over $2.7 trillion, accumulated national debt and the loss of American business infrastructure to foreigners who buy it with cheap dollars. They campaigned as if no financial crisis was hitting the savings and loans associations and thus evaded any stand on whether they would use 60 or more billions of the taxpayers' dollars to bail out those with even the most imprudent managements. Finally, they gave no detailed views on the key problem facing our nation in international relations – how to deal with the new Soviet Union of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, either in terms of foreign and military policy or in whether or not to extend credits or sell high technology items.

A campaign that focuses on personality and competence is especially prone not to discuss issues in a way that would educate, rather than confuse the issues. Indeed, its effect is to suppress vital issues by crowding them out of media coverage. Consider George Bush's repeated attacks on Michael Dukakis's veto in the 1970s of legislation requiring schoolchildren to say the pledge of allegiance every morning. These attacks were calculated to raise questions about Dukakis's patriotism for his respecting a 1943 Supreme Court decision that had declared such a requirement unconstitutional. But more importantly, the attacks blocked out of the evening news what Bush or Dukakis had been saying on at least some issues of substance. Television, a medium with an inherited show business ethic, seems governed by a kind of Gresham's Law in its coverage of news: the trivial, because it is often pictorially interesting, drives out the serious, because it is frequently pictorially dull. So a picture of Bush at a flag factory just couldn't be passed up in order to show a speech on issues.

There seems to have developed almost a complete split between campaigning and governing in American presidential politics. During campaigns the opposing candidates ignore important issues, exaggerate differences between their positions,

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and use all the techniques of advertising to sell themselves and demean their opponents. It looks as if only when the election is over does the winning presidential candidate start thinking about what he must actually do to govern a country with problems that he essentially said in the campaign were nonexistent.

Governance in our system of separation of powers and a party-organized Congress requires skills at forging agreements and building governing coalitions. Presidents whose campaigning skills in ignoring or fudging over issues and in raising their opponent's negatives made them more successful on the campaign trail, may find those skills useless or even counterproductive once in office. Surely such campaigning skills are no evidence of having the best skills for governing.

*Media Manipulation*

Can voters resist manipulation to vote against their best interests in candidates and policies when their only information comes through mass media and television spots and photo opportunities and false rumors? Don't voters lose their sense of efficacy and ability to influence officials when the choices presented sound so similar, all in favor of broad general values without the details of how to achieve them? My answer would be no to the first question and yes to the second.

And the trend is worsening, with the tools of manipulation increasing all the time. Candidates use systematic polling to find out what the voters want to hear. The candidates don't then try to lead public opinion, but pander to it. There is now a new campaign expert—the spinner or spin doctor—who is loosed on media reporters to manipulate the media's perceptions of what is happening so that the media can report as straight, neutral news, a version favorable to their candidate. The moral code of most candidates and their handlers permits the systematic confusing of the voters in order to get their votes, even if the outcome is having voters manipulated into voting against the things that are good for them and for things that will harm them.

I am reminded of the Sophists, who, at least as Plato reports it, made their living in fifth and fourth century Athens by teaching politicians how to make the better argument appear the worse and the worse argument appear the better. How envious these ancient Sophists would be of their modern equivalents, who have the same morals but terrific new toys like computer graphics, TV spots, teleprompters, and tracking polls.

Voters are not stupid. Elective politicians say they worry about the increase in public cynicism and the decline in voter turnout; in 1988 the voter turnout of 50.1 percent for the presidential election was the lowest since 1924.[7] But that cynicism

[7] The 1988 turnout statistic was provided by the Congressional Quarterly Research Service. Those for the other years are in U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1988* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1988), 250; and *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*, Part II, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1975), 1071.

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and low turnout are probably the direct result of the voters realizing that they are being manipulated by their would-be rulers rather than allowed to exercise their sovereign privilege of choosing in elections how they want the country to be governed.

*Elections as Registering Party Affiliations*

The voters who are most resistant to campaign manipulation are those roughly two-thirds that voting studies show have persistent, long-term emotional attachment to the Democratic or Republican party. Some of this attachment is reflected in being registered as Democrats or Republicans on the voting lists. These party attachments provide a motivating force of varying intensity to vote for candidates of the party with which the voter identifies, independent of the candidates' personality characteristics or even of their specific views on the issues. The strongest party identifiers don't even have to follow the campaign, because they always vote for their party's candidates.

Party voting—or blind party voting, as its detractors refer to it—has been under attack by so-called reformers at least since the turn of the century. But party voting need not be ineffective in promoting a voter's policy ends on the leading issues. Suppose the parties had clear, cohesive, and differentiated long-term sets of policy and programmatic principles that all of its candidates shared. Suppose the voters acquired their party identification through conscious choice based on an evaluation of the respective party principles. Then voting automatically for or against candidates because of party labels would be an economical, issue-relevant, mental shortcut. That shortcut would reduce the need to consider specifics and to make new judgments at every election and for every candidate, just as a consumer buys products with a particular brand name.

In actual fact, not all candidates bearing a party label are guaranteed to share any particular policy position, since capturing a party's nomination in a direct primary or a nominating convention does not require the passing of any test on issues or ideology. Also, the images of the parties that most voters have—more willingness to use government action to solve social problems and more concern for the disadvantaged on the part of the Democrats and more resistance to government regulation and more concern for the welfare of the better-off on the part of the Republicans—are based primarily on the performance of past presidents and the rhetoric of presidential nominees. Congressional candidates running with either party label may have completely different policy orientations than their party label implies.

It is important to understand that the largest "party" in presidential elections—clearly larger than the Republican and according to many polls slightly larger than the Democratic—consists of the voters who identify themselves as independents. Those voters make electoral choices without feeling any emotional pulls of party loyalty to anchor them and thus without regard to the presidential or congressional nominee's party label. These independent voters and the party identifiers

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who have only a marginal, rather than a strong, attachment to their party are most susceptible to manipulation on personality characteristics or issues. Yet it is precisely these independents and weak party identifiers who decide presidential elections. This is because the strong Democratic or Republican voters are simply too few in presidential elections to constitute a majority of the electorate.

*Do Elections Serve any Policy Purpose?*

Because our top officials are chosen in competitive, free elections, what we have in our national government certainly is a democracy. But it is a democracy of a special kind and most emphatically not a direct, majority-rule democracy with respect to policy. The chief role of voters is not to decide policy in a kind of continuing referendum, but to elect officials who make policy. And the top official elected – the president – may be chosen because of personality characteristics such as his likability and warmth relative to his opponent, rather than on the basis of his policy stances and indeed even despite policy stances that the voters disliked, as in the case of Ronald Reagan. More and more, the only way voters register policy preferences in presidential elections is by punishing for some obvious disaster the presidential candidate of the party whose president is in power. This was the case with Vietnam for Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey, with Watergate and impeachment for Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and with general malaise and the hostages for Jimmy Carter. Irangate and massive budget deficits were obviously *not* seen as disasters by a majority in 1988. With respect to future performance, the voters seem to make some kind of summary evaluation – perhaps only a guess – of which candidate is more likely to improve bad conditions and/or maintain good conditions, particularly economic ones, in the short run. If things seem to be going well, why, as Everett Ladd writes, should voters change party in the presidency or persons in Congress?[8]

By choosing the president, the voters do have another impact on policy, though not in a foreseen or intended way. The election of one candidate instead of the other means the appointment of one rather than another set of high-level presidential appointees (some needing but almost always receiving senatorial confirmation): departmental cabinet and subcabinet heads; White House staff members including a chief of staff and the national security adviser; a council of economic advisers; ambassadors; federal reserve board members and the chairman; and district, court of appeals, and Supreme Court judges. And because there is sufficient discretion possible in how these top executive branch officials and members of the judiciary make executive and judicial decisions, significant policy differences may be implemented by them *even without Congress changing legislation.* But again, the new president-elect's appointments come as pleasant or unpleasant sur-

[8] Everett Carll Ladd, "The 1988 Election: Continuation of the Post-New Deal System," *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (Spring 1989): 1–18.

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prises to the voters and were not information available to help the voter make a decision before election day.

Occasionally, there can take place what the political scientist V. O. Key was first to call a "critical election"[9] that does produce a widely understood policy mandate: An incumbent president or a candidate running on the sitting president's record who scores a tremendous victory can claim a general vote of confidence on the policies he has been espousing (Roosevelt in 1936 and Reagan in 1984). Or a resounding defeat of an incumbent can indicate a vote of massive lack of confidence and a need to change course (Hoover in 1932 and Carter in 1980). But the policy mandate of even this type of election has started to become confusing, because the party of the winning presidential nominee does not always make large gains in Congress or worse, as in 1988 for the first time in the modern American party system, the winning president's party not only didn't gain control of either house of Congress but receded from possible control by losing seats in both.

Elections, finally, do serve another important policy function, even though it is not much discussed and, therefore, not much appreciated. Some policy departures aren't made or even attempted, not because of a past mandate, but because of the anticipated reaction of the voters the next election time around. If there were no elections, even imperfectly conducted as they are, the preferences of the citizenry could be largely disregarded because the public would have lost its chief sanction. That sanction is the ability of the voters to punish officials retrospectively, by turning the "ins" into "outs" at the next election, which in the United States is never more than two, four, or six years away.

## Separation of Powers

Paradoxically, something that the Founders considered essential for preventing tyranny—the separation of powers between the president and the two houses of Congress—also is currently presenting obstacles to voters using the vote in a policy-oriented way. The Founding Fathers saw elections as essential protection against oppressive rulers and at the extreme against tyranny, but not as sufficient protection. Jefferson wrote in his "Notes on the State of Virginia" that if "all the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary" are given to the legislative body, which Jefferson assumed would be elective:

> It will be no alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one. . . . An elective despotism was not the government we fought for.[10]

The Founding Fathers resorted to "auxiliary precautions" (again their words) to prevent this kind of "elective despotism" or "tyranny." In the new national govern-

[9] V.O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics* 17 (Spring 1955): 3–18; Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 4th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1958), chap. 19.

[10] Quoted in *Federalist Papers*, No. 51. (Madison).

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ment, they separated constitutionally—as a matter of supreme constitutional law not changeable by ordinary legislation passed by congressional majorities—governmental powers among the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. This way they gave "to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. . . ." As Madison phrased it:

> Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people [i.e., elections] is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.[11]

### *Party as Bridging Separation of Powers*

Broadly speaking, for almost 150 years of history, the major fragmentation of authority between the president and Congress was bridged by officials of a single party having control of the White House and Congress. The presidential nomination of a major party virtually guaranteed a nominee with policy orientations shared by congressional majorities. The new president and a handful of majority party leaders from the House and the Senate could negotiate legislation that the Congress as a whole would pass.

Major actors in election campaigns used to be party organizations, and electoral victory was viewed as a party victory, not just a victory for an individual presidential nominee. In any event, until the 1930s the federal government didn't do much in domestic affairs that directly affected the public. The federal government today does do a multitude of things that affect us directly, like having programs for health, education, environment, poverty, unemployment, interest rates, as well as protecting us against nuclear annihilation. But the selection of officials is now very decentralized, and they need not have a common point of view. There is no party organization either with formal authority or de facto powers to insure that the party's nomination is conferred on someone in the party's mainstream or even that the candidate has minimal qualifications for governing. Presidential nominations get captured by self-selected, self-starting candidates with personal followings and money and television smarts. The nomination is secured by winning a majority of delegates in state primaries and caucuses. The nominating convention is no longer a national meeting of state and local public and party officials who make

[11] *Federalist Papers*, No. 51.

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independent decisions. It is simply a gathering of the delegates chosen in the primary season because they are pledged to a particular candidate, plus in the Democratic Party, a smattering of superdelegates from among government and party officials. Thus far the superdelegates have been picked too late in the primary election season to affect who had a first-ballot majority at the convention.

Presidential campaign strategy and tactics are completely controlled by the nominees. There are no party elders or peers with whom they must be cleared. The candidates' self-selected crowd of pollsters, television advisers, and personal aides call the shots, and call them exclusively in the interest of their particular campaign. Campaigns thus are not fought between parties on issues of public policy and governance, but rather between two individual entrepreneurs. They communicate with the voters not through party organs, but through the mass media in photo opportunities that the networks will report as straight news, in paid television commercials, and in highly-rehearsed presidential television debates. Meanwhile, would-be members of Congress wage their own media-oriented campaigns to win the party nomination in the direct primary of their district or state and then to win the general election.

The central point is that the president and members of Congress do not run as a team to become a putative new government. They run as individual entrepreneurs to hold their particular jobs. The members of Congress and the president of their party thus have little incentive to cooperate when in office. In any event, since the end of World War II, divided party control between the executive and Congress has occurred in twenty-two out of the forty-two years between 1947 and 1989. In these years, as preparation for the next election campaign, presidents and leaders of the majority party in Congress had an incentive to make each other look bad, primarily in order to maximize their party's chances of winning the presidency or control of Congress at the next election. As James Sundquist recently explained in the pages of this journal:

> . . . If the president sends a proposal to Capitol Hill or takes a foreign policy stand, the opposition-controlled House or houses of Congress—unless they are overwelmed by the president's popularity and standing in the country— simply must reject it. Otherwise they are saying the president is a wise and prudent leader. That would only strengthen him and his party for the next election, and how can the men and women of the congressional majority do that, when their whole object is to defeat him when the time arrives? By the same token, if the opposition party in control of Congress initiates a measure, the president has to veto it—or he is saying of his opponents that they are sound and statesmenlike, and so he is building them up for the next election.[12]

### *Fragmentation in Congress*

Power within Congress itself is also very fragmented. Since the reforms of the 1970s,

[12] James L. Sundquist, "Needed a Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly* 103 (Winter 1988–89): 629.

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there are about 200 committees and sub-committees in operation that act highly autonomously. Each one has a chair and professional staff. There is no longer any handful of congressional party leaders with whom a president can negotiate and then have those congressional leaders produce straight, party-line voting for particular programs and policies. Presidents may thus not be able to convert even truthful promises into legislation. For that, presidents need large majorities independently committed to their point of view, as were had by Franklin Roosevelt after the 1932 election and Lyndon Johnson after 1964. Or presidents must claim a policy mandate from their electoral victory, an argument less and less persuasive given the nature of current campaigns.

It has become very difficult—even for political scientists who watch these things—to know whether it is the president or Congress, or whether it is different party or crossparty coalitions within Congress that are responsible for policy successes or failures. When things go wrong, the president blames Congress, and Congress blames the president. Within Congress the Republicans blame the Democrats and vice versa, and the conservative coalition blames the liberal coalition and vice versa. This makes it almost impossible for voters even retrospectively to reward or penalize officeholders for what they actually did in office.

The fragmentation of political power often leads to stalemates, and presidents sometimes try to break the stalemates by illegal and even unconstitutional means. If the president's measures are successful, the public excuses the means and bad precedents are set.[13] Or else the measures fail and are exposed, and the presidency is further weakened vis-à-vis Congress, even for the purpose of doing laudable things.

These last paragraphs are *not* a brief against Congress and the separation of powers. The lifeguard measures they have produced over the past two decades in Watergate and Irangate are self-evident justification. But for many people in my generation, who grew up while President Franklin Roosevelt led the nation out of the Great Depression and to victory in World War II, the president could do no wrong. Congressional opposition was seen as selfish and parochial and not reflective of popular opinion nationally.

Congress in the past twenty years has, however, reformed itself. When congressional majorities resist the president now, it's not at all clear that they are the bad guys or gals and the president is the good guy. Since the 1960s there is no longer malapportionment in the House with rural areas greatly overrepresented in terms of their population and central cities and suburbs greatly underrepresented. There is no longer an inflexible seniority system for committee chairmanships, which gave disproportionate power to southern conservatives and allowed chairs to rule

[13] As Machiavelli explained in *The Prince*, "In the actions of all men, and especially of princes, . . . we must always look to the end. Let a prince, therefore, win victories and uphold his state; his methods will always be considered worthy and everyone will praise them, because the masses are always impressed by the appearance of things, and by the outcome of an enterprise." Norton edition, trans. Robert A. Adams (New York: Norton, 1977), chap. xiix.

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their committees with an iron hand. Now if committee chairs run their committees dictatorially or greatly out of tune with the sentiments of a majority of their party colleagues, there is precedent for seniority being set aside and the chairmanship being taken away at the next reorganization of Congress, two or fewer years hence. In short, Congress is now organized very democratically—indeed some think too democratically for the development of cohesive and coherent policies and programs and for focusing accountability.[14] The upshot is that the voice of Congress can be deemed just as validly to be the voice of the people as can the voice of the president. But these reforms have further aggravated the fixing of accountability.

### *Consequences of Fragmentation and Party Decline*

Members of Congress are not easily penalized by the voters for their policy decisions. Members of the House are insulated from all but the most serious crises and swings of popular opinion; about 95 percent of the incumbents who run for reelection win. Senators, too, while not as highly insulated as representatives, can generate personal popularity that insulates against popular tides of discontent more than can the president.

The separation of powers combined with our current mode of elections gives us no mechanism through which the voters can deliver a mandate on the direction for the government overall, whether to continue "steady as you go" or to change course "a little to the left," "a little to the right," or a "lot" to the left or right. We have some 470 separate, personality-oriented, media-based elections taking place simultaneously in a presidential election year. This number of separately run elections defocuses attention and eclipses any discussion on *where collectively, from the White House, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, each party all together will try to take the nation.* Given this ethos of individual entrepreneurship, I suppose it isn't strange that not I nor anyone I have asked heard either presidential candidate arguing in 1988 that it was "as important," or even just "important," to elect a Congress controlled by his party as it was to elect him to the White House.

Great Britain offers a clearly contrasting way to run a democratic government. Candidates for Parliament run as members of a team whose chief responsibility is to support the government's—which used to mean the Cabinet's, but now means more the prime minister's—program, without individual judgment on the merits. There is crystal clear accountability for good or bad governmental programs, because there is never doubt as to who was in charge. But it also means that between elections, which can be as long as five years, the British really live under a despotism, admittedly an elective despotism, with almost no checks and balances within the government during its term.[15]

[14] See Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative Trade-off," *Political Science Quarterly* 103 (Fall 1988): 461–484.

[15] After I first wrote these words, the Thatcher government announced in November of 1988 that

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Let me offer some questions for the reader to think about. The answers may reflect what aspects of our governmental system we value more and less. To have more accountability, would it be desirable to amend the Constitution so that a new president would have a working majority in both houses of Congress? One way is to allow the president and/or Congress to appoint enough additional, like-minded, at-large representatives and senators of the president's party. A better way to focus debate and accountability might be to require each party's presidential candidate, vice presidential candidate, candidate for the House, and candidate for the Senate (if one is running that year) to run as a slate so that the voter could not split his or her ticket for those four offices.

To put it more concretely, would it have been better if President Reagan had had enough like-minded members of Congress elected with him in 1980 to have gotten all of his policies through? To perform this thought experiment, we must obviously keep in mind that if Reagan really had the power to get all of his policies enacted, he might not have asked for some of the more drastic cutbacks of domestic programs that he did. Also, even Republican members of Congress might have objected to what the president wanted and, therefore, denied him congressional majorities on all his proposals.

Reagan in 1980 carried 315 congressional districts, while Republican candidates for the House carried only 193. In the thirty-six states that had Senate races, Reagan carried thirty-three, but Republican senatorial candidates won in only twenty. Assuming that most voters would have let their preference for Reagan or Carter control for what slate they voted, under a single-slate requirement the Republicans would have had solid majorities in both the House and Senate for at least two years.[16] This kind of ballot would have produced more efficient government in the sense that the most recent majority would have gotten its way. And on accountability, there would have been no question that President Reagan and the Republican Party were completely responsible.

The Founders had no place in the Constitution for political parties. They counted on Congress, because it was independently chosen, to have the necessary "ambition" to counteract the president if he overreached. But now that we do have parties, would providing the president with automatic majorities of his party in Con-

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it was changing the criminal procedures statute so that refusal to answer questions put to an accused criminal by the police or during trial could be used as evidence implying guilt of the accused; and it was forbidding by an Order in Council—essentially an administrative decree—British radio and television from broadcasting interviews with "terrorists."

[16] In 1984 Reagan carried 371 House districts while the Republican House candidates carried only 182, and he also carried twenty-nine states that had senate elections; but Republican senatorial candidates won in only fourteen of those. A party ballot would not always have benefited the president's party in Congress: in 1980, Jimmy Carter carried only 227 House districts while 292 House Democrats were actually elected; but Carter carried sixteen states having senatorial elections while of those, Democratic candidates won only twelve. Of course we have no evidence on how may voters might have such strong preference for the House candidate in their district or the senatorial candidate in their state that they would let those preferences control their votes for the president, rather than vice versa.

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gress run the risk of an American elective dictatorship? It is relevant that unlike in Britain, we have constitutional limitations on what an administration even with a responsive Congress can do. And all members of the House and one-third of the senators must run for election only two years after a presidential election, and at that time without a presidential candidate as part of the slate. Or is it the case that for the checks and balances between the executive and the Congress to work in today's Washington, what is required is not only separately elected officials in Congress but also majorities of the party other than that of the president's?[17] Would a Republican-controlled Congress have investigated Republican President Richard Nixon's Watergate or Republican Ronald Reagan's Irangate? The dilemma here is how much protection against tyranny and against drastic, rapid changes in policy we should be willing to trade off for a government that in policy outcomes is more reflective of a current presidential majority's votes.

The Founding Fathers gladly sacrificed government that could provide speedy, effective, cohesive, and internally consistent policies. They opted for one that had a maximum number of veto points and checks and balances and protections against tyranny by officials or tyranny by selfish majorities. These veto points and checks and balances also have prevented radical changes in policy from administration to administration. If we had a choice, would we still strike the balance the same way as the Founders? Or might we choose a course that made it somewhat easier for majorities to impose a cohesive set of policies while still protecting against such a "concentrating [of powers] in the same hands," as Jefferson thought would be "precisely the definition of despotic government"?

## Limited Government and Judicial Review

Over and above trying to protect us against oppression and tyranny by means of elections and of the separation of powers, the Founders bequeathed us a government that was also constitutionally limited. Certain kinds of individual activity and belief and certain procedures in criminal trials were so important, the Founders believed, that they had to be protected even against voting majorities working through elections and having the support of a particular president and majorities in a particular Congress.

The Constitution written by the Founders contained, as Hamilton put it, "certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like."[18] Further limitations were to be those protective of civil liberties and procedural due process

[17] Sundquist has made the excellent point that having so many years of divided party control between the presidency and Congress is not a rational, self-protective choice of a majority of the voters but only the accidental byproduct of the minority of voters splitting their ballot. Sundquist, "Needed," 634. Ladd provides data showing that *after* the election, large majorities of the public approved of different parties controlling the presidency and Congress. See Ladd, "The 1988 Elections," 4.

[18] *Federalist Papers*, No. 78.

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in criminal trials that everyone agreed would be added to the Constitution as soon as the first Congress met to propose, and the states had the opportunity to ratify, the necessary amendments. These now constitute the Bill of Rights.

But these limitations could be preserved, according to the Founders, "no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing."[19] More eloquent about the principle of constitutional limits than even the writings of the Founding Fathers was, in my judgment, an opinion by Justice Robert Jackson, speaking for the Supreme Court when it declared unconstitutional in 1943, in the middle of a world war, the requiring of schoolchildren to say the pledge of allegiance and salute the flag every morning. The West Virginia state government working through majority rule had decided these practices were reasonable to inculcate patriotism. "The very purpose of a bill of rights," thundered Justice Jackson:

> . . . was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. . . .
>
> If there is any fixed star in our Constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, in nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances that permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.[20]

It should be outside the informal rules of the game for a presidential candidate, in order to score some short-term political gain in an election, to call into question the legitimacy of those very civil liberties and civil rights bequeathed to us by the Founding Fathers. This was done in 1988 when the Republican presidential candidate attacked the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), whose central organizational principle is to support civil liberties and procedural due process rights for all, although it sometimes takes positions that most Americans would consider extreme. That kind of attack on our civil libertarian, procedural due-process rules of the game is especially damaging when an opposing candidate fails to explicitly defend civil liberties and civil rights and instead just counters that there were positions of his own the ACLU had criticized. This is what the Democratic presidential candidate did in 1988.

Constitutional safeguards of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion for those who become at odds with majority thinking and also constitutional procedural due process in criminal trials for individuals accused of crimes should be perceived by anyone with a modicum of foresight as not being in the interest of liberals only, or of conservatives only, but in the in-

[19] *Federalist Papers*, No. 78 (Hamilton).

[20] *West Virginia Board of Education vs. Barnett*, 319US624 (1943).

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terests of all. This is because no one can know in advance when he or she will be in the minority in terms of party or ideological viewpoint or be accused of a crime and, therefore, need constitutional protections to escape oppression of the weak by the strong.

But even more important, these constitutional limits on majorities are also essential for maintaining our political system as a democratic government. Constitutional limitations, beyond the reach of majorities to change, insure that losers in a particular election will be allowed to survive as the "outs." And not only will the losers be allowed just to survive, they will also not be arrested or imprisoned and will be allowed to compete for office unhindered by the majority-supported "ins," whom they will be trying to displace in the next election.

According to the brilliant turn-of-the-century journalist Henry Jones Ford, it was the "great unconscious achievement" of Jefferson to take advantage of these "open constitutional channels of political agitation." By channeling and organizing the forces of discontent against the Washington-Adams administrations into a political party, change "became possible without destruction."[21]

I would argue that an even greater achievement was the noninterference with Jefferson's campaign by the Federalists and the acquiescent, peaceful, albeit ungracious, but still voluntary leaving of presidential power by John Adams when Jefferson won the 1800 election. (Adams chose not to stay in Washington for his successor's inauguration and started the coach ride back home to Massachusetts the previous night.) This, and the giving up of the control of Congress voluntarily by the Federalists to the victorious Jeffersonian-Republicans in 1801, established the precedent that fundamental change in personnel and policies could be accomplished without the violence of a revolution or *coup d'etat*, but by what became their functional equivalent—free elections protected by constitutional guarantees.

Clearly these constitutional limits put a damper on the ability of a newly elected majority to enact its programs if they contain infringements of civil liberties and procedural due process as most recently defined by the Supreme Court. This doesn't mean, however, that majorities can be frustrated forever and that here is, finally, the fatal dilemma in our democracy. It does mean that to prevail, those majorities need to be extraordinarily large—two-thirds in the House and Senate to propose constitutional amendments—and must be sustained long enough to secure separate ratification by additional majorities in three-fourths of the states. The Founding Fathers saw the conundrum; Hamilton wrote that he trusted that:

> . . . the friends of the Constitution [will never question] that fundamental principle of republican government, which admits the right of the people to alter or abolish the established Constitution, whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness. [But] until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding. . . .[22]

[21] Henry Jones Ford, *The Rise and Growth of American Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1898), 126.
[22] *Federalist Papers*, No. 78 (Hamilton).

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Had Hamilton lived long enough, he would also have explained that sustained majorities that continuously elect presidents with their overall constitutional point of view can count on those presidents appointing enough new justices to the Supreme Court who might redefine the views of the Court on the constitutionality of some burning issues. The voters who oppose constitutional freedom of choice on having abortions, prohibition of schoolchildren being required to recite the pledge of allegiance or say prayers, and due process in criminal trials that is highly protective of accused criminals have not been large enough to impose their definition of what is constitutionally permissible.

## What Should We Try to Change?

The preceding discussion argues that the American democracy is certainly a democracy by virtue of the citizenry electing their rulers in free elections and the citizenry having some influence on policy, albeit indirectly and mostly retrospectively. It could, however, in my judgment do better. What follows is my list of prescriptions, conceding immediately that some might be politically impossible to bring about in the short run, but arguing that they should nevertheless be thought about.

• *Through education, the behavior of candidates, and the way the media cover elections we should strengthen party organization and party-line thinking.* It is important to change the frame of reference for presidential and congressional elections from what nominee is winning or losing as a sort of spectator sport, to what will be the nature of the government produced by voting in a certain way. As part of that new outlook, we should strengthen party cohesion, party joint-position taking, and party voting—restoring, for example, the party lever on voting machines—so that it is rival, would-be governments contending in elections, instead of almost a thousand individual entrepreneurs. And we, and especially we political scientists, should try to educate voters that party-line voting can be good because it leads to accountable governments. We should encourage the presidential nominees and the chairs or ranking minority members of the different standing commmittees of Congress to run as a team so that they have a stake in each other's success. This prescription requires no constitutional or legislative change; what it does require is that senior members of Congress be willing to run some electoral risk by being closely identified with their party's presidential nominee.

In order for voters to have more cues on the quality of the proposed government and of the judgment of the presidential nominee, presidential nominees should be induced to announce *before* election day the names of their proposed appointees for such key positions as secretary of state, defense, treasury, chief of the White House Staff, etc. A single nominee doing this would put great pressure on his opponent to do likewise.

We should change party rules still again to strengthen the role of senior public officials and party officials in choosing the presidential nominee and reduce the proportion of delegates with no governmental experience who are chosen in pri-

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mary elections just because they were pledged to a particular candidate. A corollary to this is to reduce the proportion of delegates chosen by primaries altogether, by having fewer primaries and by having the so-called superdelegates chosen before the primary season is over and has already indicated a first-ballot victor. A more extreme step would be sharply to reduce the number of state primaries to what they were in 1968 as a means of choosing delegates to the national nominating conventions. We could then provide for a national challenge primary a short interval after the convention. The primary would be held if any loser who had at least 20 or 30 percent of the delegates on the last ballot called for it to challenge the convention winner. The outcome of the primary would then be controlling. Similar systems exist in Connecticut and New York for state-wide party nominations and prevent candidates with strong popular support from being denied nominations by small cliques in smoke-filled rooms.

Senior members of a party who hold national and state public and party offices should stop conceding to the presidential nominee such absolutely dictatorial power as he now exercises in directing his campaign. This should be especially so in choosing a vice-presidential running mate who, as we all can recite in our sleep by now, is "one heartbeat away from the presidency." A presidential nominee's success or failure will affect not only him. It may also affect some members of Congress from close districts and states, and in the extreme case of a disastrous presidential campaign, affect which party will control Congress. This would determine who will be the chairs rather than just ranking minority members of congressional committees.

A particular presidential campaign will also have a longer-term impact on what voters perceive the two parties to stand for. The presidential nominee uses the symbols of the party, in part because they automatically produce a base of electoral support from strong party identifiers. Other party leaders who will also want to use those symbols should have some say in how they are used.

How do we inculcate in voters the idea that they should *want* to use their vote instrumentally to influence policy; and to do so, they should vote for the best party slate or for the best governing coalition and not just for the best or warmest or most likable individual as president? Even though a president can do a lot with his appointment powers and veto, history shows that presidents cannot produce a continuous stream of positive achievements without the cooperation of a party majority in Congress.

In Britain, no one can vote for Margaret Thatcher as prime minister per se. Only a resident of her constituency can vote for her at all. Everywhere else in Britain, to have Thatcher as prime minister, voters must choose their constituency's candidate as Conservative member of parliament, with the hope that a majority of constituencies will elect Conservative M.P.s who will then choose Thatcher. With these rules of the game, there is no possibility of a prime minister being elected without majority support in Parliament and having, as is now common in the United States, constant stalemates between the executive and legislative branches.

Do we dare experiment with the one slate for president, vice president, repre-

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sentative, and senator? If the other measures for restoring party government fail, I for one would support trying the experiment. In my judgment, Congress could legislate the single-slate ballot for what technically would be presidential and vice-presidential electors, representatives, and senators under its Article I Section 4 powers to "by law make or alter" regulation of the "times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives. . . ." A single-slate election would give the strongest incentives for the presidential candidate and the congressional candidates of the same party to work as a team. No more could incumbent members of Congress pay only scant attention to the presidential campaign when continuation of their congressional careers would require that the candidate of *their* party carry *their* district or state. Also, members of Congress would have strong incentive to find and encourage to run for the presidency the most competent and electable leaders of their party. And if elected, members would work with them to produce important legislative accomplishments. Madisonian ambition, under these conditions, would stimulate cooperation and team play, not individual entrepreneurship and careerism in Congress.

• *We must somehow reduce the current role of television in election campaigns and expand a different kind of role.* It should be simply unacceptable to all who believe in democratic governance that literally only a handfull of invisible and unanswerable network television news editors and producers have the power to determine what hundreds of millions of potential voters will see as the most relevant aspect of the election campaign for that day. Why can't we have major networks, as a condition of having licenses from the Federal Communications Commission, be required to contribute fifteen or thirty minutes a night to presidential candidates and other party spokespersons who will organize their own presentations of what issues are important and what their party's position on them is? Such presentations might be more interesting to the general public if the spokespersons were asked questions by panels of substantive experts and knowledgeable politicians of the other party.

Television has great potential for educating the voters. The small minority of voters who watch the public television-sponsored MacNeil-Lehrer program every weekday night and some of the Sunday morning interview and talk shows probably now has better information than it ever had. And even the television debates, while far from perfect, do force candidates to expose themselves without prepared texts and teleprompters to questions, at least some of which they and their handlers hadn't predicted. But the majority of the voters get their information in ten-second bites from television's so-called straight news coverage; for the good of this majority, we should not allow to continue a situation where if television network news doesn't cover an event, it simply hasn't happened.

• *We as voters should choose candidates with different value systems.* Somehow – I don't know exactly how – we should encourage the public to support presidential nominees who show an obligation during the campaign not just to use strategies and tactics for maximizing their chances of winning, but who try realisti-

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cally to educate the nation when it is not paying attention to the difficult problems that it will have to face. Such a commitment to being honest with the voters is also in the candidates' own self-interest. If they are not honest, presidential nominees will have developed no support, and they will not be able to claim a mandate from voters for their solutions on difficult issues. Consider if Franklin Roosevelt had campaigned in 1936 on increasing the size of the Supreme Court to make it more sympathetic to New Deal legislation or if Lyndon Johnson in 1964 had campaigned on the issue of massively escalating the ground force commitment in Vietnam. If they had done that, perhaps they would still not have been able to generate enough public and congressional support to have made their policies stick. But given that these plans were left as only silent intentions, the public not only wasn't prepared for a sympathetic consideration of these radical or hard measures, but also felt tricked by not having had them discussed in advance.

Ronald Reagan was right in 1980 when he explicitly campaigned on reducing taxes and increasing military expenditures. When he won the Presidency he claimed he had a popular mandate for such changes, and Congress during his first year in office gave him almost all of what he wanted. When the Republicans lost twenty-six seats in the 1982 House elections, it became clear the mandate for futher sharp changes had been used up. From then to 1988, there was pretty much a policy stalemate between the President and Congress.

In this context, George Bush's "read-my-lips-no-new-taxes," though a great campaign ploy, was irresponsible at best. Now that he is president, that ploy reduces his ability to deal with the budget deficit through increasing revenues without losing credibility. To generalize, presidential nominees should not make, especially as central parts of their campaign, seemingly iron-clad promises that anyone with some contact with reality must know stand a high probability of being broken.

Voters must learn not to support candidates for national office, and especially for the presidency, who run negative campaigns. Not only do negative campaigns try to manipulate voters by avoiding issues, but they also increase the public's cynicism about politicians and government in general and thus weaken support for our democratic political system as a whole. Certainly we should not support presidential candidates who attack an opponent for following the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court rather than, as one candidate put it in 1988, "finding some way to get around it." This kind of mentality produced a National Security staff in the basement of the White House who treated their version of the national interest as justifying "finding some way to get around" the Constitution so they could implement illegal and unconstitutional measures in foreign and military policy.

Finally—and this is my most utopian prescription—we should persuade candidates that their supreme goal should not be to win their elections. It should be to clarify the issues as best they can. They may of course be permitted to hope that majorities of the voters will find their positions on the issues better than those of their opponents.

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To sum up my argument, if presidential elections become more like contests between rival executive-legislative governing coalitions, if major network television directs its coverage of elections more to educating than to entertaining its audience, and if voters would begin to reject candidates who refuse to tell them in some detail how they would confront the truly central issues facing the nation—if these changes took place, the outcome of elections could become great collective decisions not only on who would hold office, but also in broad terms on what the winners would do once they were elected. True, this is more than the Founders thought the general populace was capable of. But with the additional experience of 200 years, we may presume to differ with them on this point.*

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# Solidarity as a New Social Movement

DAVID S. MASON

Poland's Solidarity was one of the largest social movements in history. For sixteen months following its birth in the workers' strikes in the summer of 1980, it dramatically altered the face and temper of Poland. Because of its size and popularity, it threatened the very foundations of communist rule in Poland. This led the government to suspend the union's activities and declare martial law in December 1981. Since then, Solidarity has continued in a truncated, weakened and illegal form. But a new wave of workers' strikes in the spring and summer of 1988, plus pressure from the Gorbachev leadership in the Soviet Union, led the regime to move toward renewed legalization of the organization. This powerful social movement, dormant for seven years, has reemerged once again to challenge the way Poland is ruled.

It is important, therefore, to understand the origins and nature of Solidarity. During its legal existence, Solidarity was formally identified as a trade union, but in fact was then and still is as much a social movement as a trade union. The organization defined itself as a movement, and many of its members, especially its activists, considered it a social movement. But the organization also fit the more objective sociological criteria for a social movement as "socially shared activities and beliefs directed toward the demand for change in some aspect of the social order."[1] The "socially shared activities" suggests group action, but does not necessarily imply a formal organization. Solidarity was such a group action, based on widely held dissatisfaction with the status quo in Polish society. It challenged the

[1] Joseph R. Gusfield, ed., *Protest, Reform and Revolt: A Reader in Social Movements* (New York: Wiley, 1970), 2.

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existing rules, relationships, and moral codes of society and demanded changes in the economic and political system that would have involved major changes in Poland's social order.

Most definitions of social movements are by western sociologists and are based on studies of collective behavior in western societies, particularly the advanced industrial democracies. Some of the literature on revolutionary social movements extends beyond these boundaries, but pertains largely to historical cases of countries that are now industrial systems.[2] Analysis of social movements is particularly weak for authoritarian and one-party regimes, though over thirty years ago Rudolf Heberle called attention to communist, fascist, and other totalitarian movements as social movements.[3] Despite the neglect of communist societies by social-movement theorists, many of the generalizations about revolutions and social movements in western industrial societies apply as well to the Polish case during the Solidarity era.[4] Solidarity particularly fits into the category of a new social movement, suggesting that it may not be quite as unique as most analysts assert.

## The Origins of the Solidarity Social Movement

Traditional theories of social movements have explained their existence as a result of the dysfunctions of rapid social and economic change in society and the sense of "relative deprivation" in the population.[5] Such a consciousness develops after a period of some change and improvements in society, during which people come to expect further improvements. The sense of deprivation develops when people desire some goal, believe that they have a right to achieve that goal, but perceive that the opportunity for such a gain is being blocked by the system. Power-oriented movements emerge when the blockage is perceived as being structural and when the only hope for resolution of the problem is through structural changes. In participation-oriented movements, on the other hand, group action in and of itself is seen as important and beneficial to the participants, regardless of the goals or their realization.[6]

[2] For example, Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1952); and Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[3] Rudolf Heberle, *Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951).

[4] Solidarity has been treated as a social movement in Alain Touraine, *Solidarity: The Analysis of a Social Movement* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Elizabeth Crighton, "Resource Mobilization and Solidarity: Comparing Social Movements Across Regimes" in Bronislaw Misztal, ed., *Poland After Solidarity: Social Movements versus the State* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1985), 113–132; and Bronislaw Misztal, "Social Movements Against the State: Theoretical Legacy of the Welfare State" in Misztal, *Poland After Solidarity*, 143–161.

[5] For example, James C. Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 27 (February 1962): 5–19; and Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[6] Denton Morrison, "Some Notes Toward a Theory of Relative Deprivation, Social Movements, and Social Change," *American Behavioral Scientist* 14 (May/June 1971): 675–90.

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The setting for the emergence of Solidarity was provided by the rapid social and economic changes of the post-World War II period, including substantial improvements in the standard of living, education, and efforts to meet the basic material needs of society. While the pressures leading up to the formation of Solidarity had been building for a long time, the spark that ignited the strikes in the summer of 1980 was a result of material grievances and frustrated expectations.[7] After the 1970 disturbances, the new Edward Gierek regime initiated rapid improvements in food and consumer supplies that led to the most rapid and sustained growth in the standard of living in Poland's history. By the late 1970s, however, the economy was bankrupt, the government heavily in debt to the West, and economic growth had leveled off and even declined. This led to frustrated expectations and a sense of relative deprivation, which Polish sociologists and even the Polish leadership later recognized as a major factor in the 1980 unrest.[8]

The systemic and psychological changes caused by modernization, in combination with the grievances of the later 1970s, further weakened the political legitimacy of the regime and in particular of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP, the ruling Communist party). By the end of 1980 public opinion polls[9] and unofficial reports (for example, by the Experience and the Future Discussion Group[10]) found an increasing and widespread perception that the government and the party were corrupt and incompetent and that this accounted for the increasingly dismal state of the country's economy. In a December 1980 poll of Gdansk area workers on the causes of the crisis, almost all of the most frequent responses pertained to these issues of corruption and incompetence.[11] These workers most frequently mentioned hypocrisy and mendacious propaganda; dishonesty, corruption, and economic offenses of decision makers; wrong economic policies; bad consumer goods deliveries; and incompetence of officials. This criticism of the elite was combined with frustration at the lack of popular participation and input even at the factory level. After the formation of Solidarity, shipyard workers identified the structure of authority as the main obstacle to overcoming the crisis.

While the theory of relative deprivation may identify the conditions under which social movements emerge, it does not adequately explain why they do so in only

[7] For a fuller development of this idea, see David Mason, "Policy Dilemmas and Political Unrest in Poland," *Journal of Politics* 45 (May 1983): 397–421.

[8] See W. W. Adamski, "Structural and Generational Aspects of a Social Conflict," and J. Kurczewski, "The Old System and the Revolution" in *Sisyphus: Sociological Studies*, vol. III, "Crises and Conflicts: The Case of Poland 1980–1981" (Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1982); and Ray Taras, "Polish Rulers' Perceptions of Why Poles Rebel," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New York, 1984.

[9] For polls on this subject and others referred to in this article, see David S. Mason, *Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980–1982* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[10] Experience and the Future Discussion Group, comp. and Jack Bielasiak, ed., *Poland Today: The State of the Republic* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1981).

[11] Stanislaw Bucholc, "Shipyard Workers on Causes of the Crisis," *Tu i Teraz*, 28 September 1983, trans. Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) *East Europe Report*, 1 November 1983.

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some cases. Resource mobilization theory, a relatively new addition to the literature on social movements, stresses that the movement also needs organizational, human, and material resources. Movements form "because of long-term changes in group resources, organization, and opportunities for collective action."[12] Grievances are a secondary factor. Organizations must deliberately mobilize for collective action to capitalize on such grievances. Indeed, social movement organizations may themselves try to promote a sense of grievance and frustration among their members.

Incipient organizational forms had already developed in Poland during the 1970s. After the workers' protests at Radom and Ursus in 1976, several new opposition groups emerged, including the small Free Trade Unions of the Coast, consisting mostly of workers – the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR), who were mostly intellectuals; the Movement for the Defense of Civil and Citizens' Rights (ROPCiO); the Young Poland Movement; and the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN). In the late 1970s, these groups and others produced dozens of underground publications (even books), some of them hundreds of pages in length, and many of them distributed in thousands of copies.[13] KOR activists initiated the publication of *Robotnik* (The Worker), which became an important source for worker-activists on ideas for reform and tactics for strikes and other actions. KOR and these publications were also an important channel of communications for dissident groups both before and during the summer 1980 strikes that led to the emergence of Solidarity.

While KOR and other political opposition groups were largely taken by surprise by these strikes, they quickly mobilized to provide support for the workers and to establish crucial links with both western reporters and Polish intellectuals.[14] The reports of western journalists were broadcast by radio (via Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, and other stations) back into Poland, allowing the isolated strikers to learn what was happening elsewhere in the country. What had been diffuse and uncoordinated protest in Poland in earlier years and months now became focalized. On the Baltic coast striking workers formed an Interfactory Strike Committee to coordinate their demands and to present a united front to the government. One of the strike newsletters was titled "Solidarnosc," and this came to symbolize the unity and determination of the workers.

Many intellectuals, especially from Warsaw and Krakow, came to the shipyards to counsel and assist the workers in their negotiations with the government. With their help, the Gdansk shipyard workers developed their list of twenty-one demands, which included changes that would have fundamentally altered the political system:

[12] J. C. Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 530. For an application of resource mobilization theory to Solidarity, see Crighton, "Resource Mobilization and Solidarity."

[13] See Joanna Preibisz, ed., *Polish Dissident Publications: An Annotated Bibliography* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

[14] For an insider's account of the role of KOR, see Jan Jozef Lipski, *KOR* (London: Aneks, 1983).

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the constitution of an independent and self-governing trade union; the relaxation of censorship; and restrictions on the Communist Party's power of appointment (*nomenklatura*).

Of course, Solidarity's main resource was its human capital. Workers flocked to the new labor organization even before its role and organization were clearly defined. Within a few months after the coastal strikes, the movement had enlisted nine million members, out of an electorate of twenty-six million. This was an incredibly large organization by any standard, and its size alone forced the authorities to deal seriously with Solidarity. Tens of thousands of workers volunteered their time to the cause, and eventually Solidarity supported some 40,000 full-time paid functionaries. This huge inventory of intangible resources soon came to produce tangible ones as well, as Solidarity organizations began to collect dues, acquire office space, purchase equipment (including printing presses and communications facilities), and develop a widespread and speedy communications network (primarily with telexes). As Betsy Crighton has pointed out, socialist regimes can more easily restrict access to tangible resources than to intangible ones.[15] The Polish regime, however, soon had to confront the fact that intangible resources can rather quickly be converted into tangible ones.

## The Development of Solidarity

Resources are necessary not only for the creation of a social movement, but also as determinants of its success or failure. The primary task facing social movements is to attract and retain supporters: as John McCarthy and Mayer Zald put it, to convert adherents into constituents (contributors) and nonadherents into adherents.[16] Mancur Olson has argued that a large organization must use either coercion or direct material incentives to get and maintain members. Coercion can lead the movement toward revolutionary violence. Incentives entail the opposite risk of making the movement more conservative.[17] Other sociologists, however, have contended that organizations may attract members by offering collective incentives of group solidarity, commitment to a moral purpose, identity, sociability, etc.[18]

Solidarity was enormously successful in attracting supporters. At first, this was done without any real material incentives. People joined out of a sense of commitment, solidarity, and participatory enthusiasm, all of which was enhanced by the workplace location of the founding units of Solidarity chapters. This supports Zald's theory that if a movement is to offer "individual satisfaction and change,

[15] Crighton, "Resource Mobilization and Solidarity."

[16] John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (May 1977): 1212–1241.

[17] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York: Schocken, 1965).

[18] For example, Ralph Turner, "Collective Behavior and Resource Mobilization as Approaches to Social Movements" in Louis Kriesberg, ed., *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, vol. 4 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press), 1–24; and Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory."

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solidarity, and interpersonal satisfaction, it *must* have small units deliver rewards at the location of potential members."[19] It is impossible, Zald contends, to "deliver solidarity through the mails or over radio or t.v." Solidarity's novel form of regional organization allowed it to maintain these local level rewards, while at the same time maintaining a national organizational structure that was able to put pressure on the government.

While Solidarity claimed some nine million members, this membership was "soft" in that many people claimed affiliation without formal membership and many who joined were involved only nominally, for example through the payment of dues. This, however, is a problem that all social movements face, particularly in the early phases of development when organizational structures are weak or nonexistent. Over time, then, the main task of Solidarity was to *keep* all the members who had joined in the first flush of excitement in the summer and fall of 1980. Over the long run, the organization had to deliver some material benefits, either individually or collectively. This was one reason why the union's leadership was so anxious to acquire the assets of the former trade union structures so that Solidarity could begin dispensing vacations, family benefits, maternity allowances, etc. The Solidarity leadership also pushed hard at the national level to get the regime to fulfill the promises of August 1980, so that the movement could display collective rewards as well. Largely because of the continuing collapse of the Polish economy, however, Solidarity could effect few positive economic changes.

The lack of material successes was compounded by the increasing fragmentation of the movement, a natural consequence of the evolution of social movements.[20] For Solidarity, this was a result of the rapid growth of the organization and of the decline of elan and unity that characterized the early days of the movement. One Solidarity observer called attention to the problem in May: "The Solidarity movement does not have at this time either a defined ideology or a world view, bringing together believers, non-believers, Pilsudskiites, Dmowskiites, people of every stripe and those without any defined political view."[21]

While most Solidarity supporters were agreed on the main directions of the movement, there were all sorts of divisions on different issues of tactics, strategy, and organization within the central leadership, between the center and the regions, and among the mass membership. Differences in the National Coordinating Commission of Solidarity, often over Lech Walesa's leadership, led to threats of resignation or expulsion of a number of prominent leaders, including Anna Walentynowicz

[19] Mayer Zald, "Issues in the Theory of Social Movements" in S. G. McNall and G. N. Howe, eds., *Current Perspectives in Social Theory*, vol. 1 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1980), 66. (Emphasis in original.)

[20] For a good discussion of the fragmentation of revolutionary social movements, see Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," *Social Forces* 28 (March 1950): 270–79; and an application of his scheme to the Solidarity experience, see Bronislaw Misztal, "Apathy-Participation-Apathy: The Vicious Circle of Collective Behavior in Contemporary Poland" in Misztal, *Poland After Solidarity*, 3–18.

[21] A. Paczkowski, quoted in *Komunikaty* (NSZZ Solidarnosc, Uniwersytet Wroclawski), 20 May 1981.

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(an important symbol of the strikes in Gdansk) and Andrzej Gwiazda. There were sharp differences between the national commission and the regional leaders over issues of organization, centralization, and tactics (particularly over the strike weapon). And, as Solidarity members themselves realized, there were divisions between the radicals and the moderates.[22] The movement was divided even on its self-definition. Delegates to Solidarity's Congress, the activists in the movement, were much more likely (59 percent) to define Solidarity as a social movement than were rank and file Solidarity members, who were much more likely to define it as a labor union (48 percent) than a social movement (20 percent).[23] These kinds of divisions were perfectly natural for a developing social movement.

Thus, during 1981 the luster of Solidarity began to fade somewhat, and many members simply drifted away from the organization. Ralph Turner has discussed the importance for social movements in attracting the "bystander public"—those who are neither opponents nor adherents of the organization.[24] In Solidarity's case, the problem was an opposite one. After attracting almost everyone to the movement in the first place, Solidarity found that many began to drift into the role of bystanders who basically supported the organization and its ideals, but who were no longer willing to commit time or resources to it.[25]

The social movement that became Solidarity is not easily characterized as either a power-oriented movement or a participation-oriented one, as Denton Morrison classifies them. Solidarity combined elements of both of these: it was intent on trying to achieve structural change in Polish society; but it also viewed popular participation important in and of itself. In fact, wider participation was to be *part* of the structural solution. For this reason, the declining involvement in Solidarity was an especially difficult problem for the organization. Both its *raison d'etre* and its source of power and authority vis à vis the authorities were based on its mass membership, charisma, and popularity.

## The Frustrated Revolution

Solidarity also fit many of the patterns of a revolutionary social movement, which are those that attempt to seize state power.[26] While there is a continuing debate in Poland about whether Solidarity intended to seize state power, the power of

[22] Polish sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis defines the split as between pragmatists and fundamentalists in her book, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[23] "Socjologiczne badania pogladow delegatow na I-szy Zjazd delegatow NSZZ Solidarnosc" (Sociological research on the views of delegates to the First Congress of delegates of Solidarity) (Warsaw: Osrodek Badan Spolecznych, 25 October 1981).

[24] Ralph Turner, "Determinants of Social Movement Strategies," in Tamotsu Shibutari, ed., *Human Nature and Collective Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), 145–64.

[25] For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Mason, *Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland*, 164–200.

[26] For a review of the literature on social revolutions, see Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 6–14.

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the state was certainly undermined as a result of Solidarity's appeal and its activities. Charles Tilly distinguishes between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes: "a revolutionary situation begins when a government previously under the control of a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct policies"—a situation he describes as "multiple sovereignty."[27] A revolutionary outcome "is the displacement of one set of power holders by another." By these definitions, Poland in 1981 was a revolutionary situation, with Solidarity claiming the allegiance of much of the population and the legitimacy of the Party and the government eroded from its already low levels. It was the fear of a revolutionary outcome that led the regime to declare martial law and to ban Solidarity. As Rudolf Heberle observed many years ago, "when a dominant minority resorts to repression . . . it is usually a symptom of fear resulting from weakness."[28]

Solidarity faced a dilemma in that it had revolutionary goals in trying to achieve structural changes in the system, but could not resort to revolutionary means, especially violence, to achieve its goals. Solidarity recognized that it could not challenge the Party head on, both because of the possible civil violence that might entail and because of the ever-present threat of Soviet intervention on behalf of the Party. Without being able to wield even the threat of radical action. Solidarity's position was weakened. The regime could wait out the movement and allow the internal fragmentation and increasing popular fatigue to further weaken Solidarity.

The radical leaders in Solidarity did talk increasingly of radical action, but this was supported neither by Walesa and the majority of the national commission nor by the majority of Solidarity's members. At the final meetings of the commission in Radom and Gdansk in December 1981, Zbigniew Bujak and others raised the issue of more radical action. Despite the lack of support for such a path among the other Solidarity leaders, the regime used this as its excuse to move in and crush Solidarity on 13 December.

In other respects besides violence, Solidarity recognized certain limits. In fact, KOR member and Solidarity adviser Jacek Kuron coined the phrase "self-limiting revolution" to describe the whole Solidarity phenomenon; and Jadwiga Staniszkis has adopted that terminology to describe Solidarity's initial phase during which the movement attempted the "painful process of cramming that radical wave of protest and class war into a 'trade union' formula."[29] There were ambiguities, however, as to where the limits were on some crucial issues. For example, both the Gdansk Agreements and Solidarity's statutes acknowledged the leading role of the Polish United Workers' Party in the Polish state, and both the Solidarity leadership and the membership largely forswore any political aspirations for the move-

[27] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison and Wesley, 1978), 191–193.

[28] Heberle, *Social Movements*, 456.

[29] Staniszkis, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution*, 17.

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ment. Few Poles wanted Solidarity to become a political party or wanted any new political party besides the PUWP and its satellite parties.[30] However, interviews with Solidarity activists reveal that while they did not want to seize power from the authorities, they did want "to drive the Party from their lives, and to limit it to its proper functions within the state, so that a free society might once more exist."[31] But these were political goals, and one wonders how it was possible to drive the Party from their lives, while maintaining its leading role. Indeed, the power and the role of the Party did decline during 1981; as Party membership declined, its hierarchical principles were challenged and modified and its role in the economy and the political system reduced.

There is another factor that may have stymied Solidarity—its organization. While the movement began like any social movement, as a disparate and disorganized mass, it extremely quickly developed an organizational structure and a highly visible central leadership. This became a continuing source of tension and conflict within the organization, because most members favored a decentralized structure. The regional form of organization was meant both to promote maximum participation and to prevent centralized and authoritarian leadership. The popular concern over these issues was evident at Solidarity's national congress in Fall 1981, where Walesa was subject to harsh criticism for autocratic tendencies and for failing to consult with other Solidarity leaders.

Solidarity was much more centralized and organized than most social movements have been after such a short existence. Moreover, it had the appearance of being centrally directed because of the role and charisma of Lech Walesa. In some ways, this was necessary for the movement to deal with the authorities on the implementation of the Gdansk Agreements. Solidarity was already in a kind of partnership with the government from September 1980, and as such, needed to have a central organization and leadership. But as Luther Gerlach has pointed out, there are certain strengths to be gained from a decentralized and fragmented movement. "Factionalism and schism," for example, "facilitate penetration of the movement into a variety of social niches."[32] This was precisely one of the strengths of Solidarity in its early development. The regional, segmentary, and decentralized nature of the movement allowed it to penetrate into virtually every aspect of Polish society, including the government and the Party, though excluding the military.

As Solidarity became more organized and centralized, it lost some of the advantages of diversity and segmentation. A segmentary organization is more adaptable to change and challenge and is more difficult for the authorities to suppress. A "multiplicity of leadership and lack of centralized control ensures the survival of the movement even if its leaders are jailed or otherwise removed."[33] In organizing

[30] W. Adamski et al., *Polacy '81* (Warsaw: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1982).

[31] Touraine, *Solidarity*, 56.

[32] Luther P. Gerlach, "Movements of Revolutionary Change," *American Behavioral Scientist* 14 (July/August 1971): 826.

[33] Gerlach, "Movements of Revolutionary Change," 825.

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and centralizing so soon, Solidarity ran a double risk: as a centralized organization it became more of a threat to the regime; and it simultaneously became more vulnerable to suppression by the regime. It may have been better for Solidarity to maintain its decentralized and fragmentary character for some time, but in some respects the centralized model was the only one that Solidarity's leaders or any Poles were familiar with. Centralization was the major characteristic of the established regime and seemed to be a major source of power for the Party. In challenging the Party's supremacy, Solidarity adopted some of the same hierarchical and authoritarian characteristics. This, however, was not the strength of the movement, and contributed to the ease with which the regime managed to crush the movement in 1982. Amazingly, the arrest of a few hundred of Solidarity's leaders was sufficient to defuse the movement, at least in the short run.

## Solidarity as a New Social Movement

While Solidarity matched many of the characteristics of both traditional social movements and of revolutionary movements, it most closely fits the pattern of new social movements. Since the late 1960s, there has been a growing recognition that social movements, at least in the democratic industrial societies, have taken on new forms. The predominant issues in social movements have always been shaped by the stages of economic and political development in society.[34] The old politics of economic, social, domestic, and military security have now been replaced by the new politics of quality of life, equality, individual self-realization, participation, and human rights. As Jurgen Habermas has put it, "the new conflicts are not sparked by *problems of distribution*, but concern the *grammar of forms of life*."[35] Solidarity was concerned with many of the issues of the new politics of the quality of life, equality, individual self-realization, and human rights. All of these were emphasized from the very beginning in the workers' twenty-one demands, and all of them were addressed in concrete ways in Solidarity's program.

Paradoxically, the goals of the new social movements are a result of both the successes and failures of the older ones. Such social movements have emerged in societies that already have modern social, political, and economic institutions. Partially as a result of the efforts of previous revolutions and social movements, they have already achieved a good measure of distributive justice, economic welfare, and representative democracy. But in the process, societies have been burdened with highly centralized, large, and unwieldly bureaucracies that lead to both alienation and diminishment of the individual. Thus, the new social movements aim both to claim and defend "personal identity"[36] and to create "new public spaces"[37]

[34] Zald, "Issues in the Theory of Social Movements."

[35] Jurgen Habermas, "New Social Movements," *Telos* 49 (Fall 1981): 33. (Emphasis in original.)

[36] Alberto Melucci, "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach," *Social Science Information* 19 (1980): 199–226.

[37] Jean Cohen, "Rethinking Social Movements," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 28 (1983): 97–113.

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free of administrative control. This leads to an emphasis on decentralized forms of organization and on participatory, rather than representative, democracy.

Just as with the new social movements in the West (for example, civil rights, ecology, peace, women's movements) the Solidarity movement was a reaction not so much to class domination, as had been the case with most earlier social movements, but to the domination of society by various institutions. What Alberto Melucci has said about western societies is even more true of the eastern socialist ones: elite control now involves not simply the productive structure of society, but involves "manipulation of complex organizational systems, by control over information and over the processes and institutions of symbol-formation, and by intervention in interpersonal relations."[38] These aspects of Polish society particularly annoyed the workers: the domination by the Party of almost all aspects of life; the expropriation and distortion by the Party of the national symbols, tradition, and history of Poland; and the effect of all this on the very fabric of societal and interpersonal relations—the solidarity of Polish society.

What Jean Cohen said about western societies was equally true of Poland: "the core institutions of the political system—parties, parliaments, elections and unions—have lost the capacity to provide collective identities and solidarities."[39] By 1980 virtually all of these institutions in Poland were discredited by the population and were fulfilling only the function of regime maintenance. This was particularly true of institutions created after 1945 (the political parties and the branch trade unions); those institutions with older roots and historical associations, such as the Sejm (Polish parliament) and the army, retained some measure of popular trust.[40] Only the Catholic Church provided identity and solidarity, and the Church had little influence in the economic and political spheres. Thus the workers demanded their own autonomous organization and decided to call it Solidarity. When Solidarity did bargain with the authorities, it preferred to deal with the government rather than the Party and to have its gains ratified by the Sejm rather than the Central Committee.

Like most of the new social movements of the West, this one was also led by and made up of young people. While previous social movements have been generated by a rise to power of some major class, such as the bourgeoisie or the working class, the new social movements are stimulated by an age group—youth.[41] The new politics are supported by the new middle class, by those with higher educational levels, and by the younger generation. The leaders of Solidarity were mostly in their twenties and thirties, and most of the members were also the younger generation. Young people were more strongly supportive of the movement than were middle-aged and older ones.

[38] Melucci, "The New Social Movements," 217–18.

[39] Cohen, "Rethinking Social Movements," 99.

[40] For the results of 1981 public opinion surveys on trust in various institutions in Poland, see Mason, *Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland*, 118.

[41] Ralph Turner, "The Theme of Contemporary Social Movements," *British Journal of Sociology* 20 (December 1969): 390–405.

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These new types of social movement do not always reject the ideas of the older ones, but simply incorporate them and move on. They foster the eighteenth-century liberal-humanitarian ideals of political democracy and change, and the nineteenth-century socialist ones of equality and justice. They attempt to build on and develop these achievements, while also promoting the development of individual identity and group solidarity. Precisely because the functions of the state have become broader, the demands of social movements have expanded.

Solidarity was an extremely broad-based organization, calling for changes in virtually every aspect of society. It, more than most new social movements, incorporated both old and new politics in its demands. The Solidarity experience might be referred to as a post-materialist social movement or a post-materialist revolution. As Ron Inglehart describes post-materialism in western and Japanese societies, post-materialist values stress belonging, self-expression, and the quality of life, while materialist values stress physical sustenance and safety.[42] These are also characteristics of the new social movements and tend to emerge in those societies that have already assured the basic physical needs of society. Poland was in a peculiar situation in this regard. By 1980, thirty years of socialism had assured the basic material needs of society, and the early 1970s had brought unprecedented levels of consumption and prosperity. On the other hand, the economic collapse at the end of the decade caused widespread shortages and a decline in consumption. Nevertheless, the earlier affluence had already set the stage for the emergence of some post-materialist values.

Solidarity pushed for both material improvements and for the post-material values of identity, solidarity, and participation. As Solidarity's program put it, "what we had in mind were not only bread, butter, and sausage, but also justice, democracy, truth, legality, human dignity, freedom of convictions and the repair of the republic."[43] Consequently, the program demanded both material benefits, such as increased food supplies, wage increases to offset price rises, and improvements in health services and housing, as well as post-material benefits such as political and social pluralism, freedom of conscience, the promotion of national identity, and self-government at all levels. As Alain Touraine has pointed out, Solidarity was a "total social movement aiming to change all aspects of public life."[44]

Several aspects of Solidarity particularly set it apart from traditional social movements. These included Solidarity's emphasis on nonviolence, its connection with the Catholic Church and religious values, its concern with self-management at all levels, and its arresting combination of the values of democracy, participation, justice, equality, human dignity, and socialism. Solidarity's nonviolence was, as one analyst has put it, "*the* striking feature of the Polish breakthrough."[45] Before

[42] Ron Inglehart, "Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity," *American Political Science Review* 75 (December 1981): 880–900.

[43] "Program NSZZ Solidarnosc," *Tygodnik Solidarnosc*, 16 October 1981.

[44] Touraine, *Solidarity*, 2.

[45] Andrzej Kutylowski, "Non-violence in the Polish Breakthrough," *Journal of Peace Research* 19 (1982): 104. (Emphasis in original.)

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1980, marches and demonstrations had been largely peaceful, but had always led to violence, usually initiated by the authorities. In 1980, by staying in the factories, the workers effectively eliminated the option of violence by the authorities, or at least made the option of dialogue relatively more attractive. As Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and other disciples of nonviolent action have pointed out, such action demands discipline, organization, supervision, and leadership. Walesa and other strike leaders seemed to recognize this from the very beginning, imposing, for example, a ban on consumption of alcohol during the August shipyard strikes. The relatively calm and peaceful atmosphere in the shipyards contributed to the nonviolent and productive resolution of the Gdansk Agreements. The success of this strategy in the summer reinforced the notion that gains could be won by nonviolent tactics, and this became a major element of subsequent Solidarity activities.

Throughout Solidarity's sixteen months, discipline, supervision, and leadership managed to keep protests peaceful. This supervision and control was a major concern of the national leadership and several times led Walesa to appeal for an end to strike actions initiated at the local level. In fact, during the whole of Solidarity's existence, there were only three nationwide strikes plus one national work boycott. The martial law regime later claimed that Solidarity had been planning to develop an armed militia for the seizure of power at the end of 1981. This assertion seems unlikely, however, and has been vigorously denied by Solidarity leaders. Solidarity spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz, for example, later admitted that Solidarity had created security squads to prevent disturbances at major mass meetings. The leadership was planning to extend this on a national basis, but only for that purpose. As Onyszkiewicz pointed out, even the Church organizes such squads.[46] Solidarity underground leader Zbigniew Bujak put the case for nonviolence even more directly in 1982:

> The basic principle adopted by Solidarity, and still valid, is the use of exclusively peaceful means. Contrary to slanders against Solidarity, the Union never made any preparations to use force and does not wish to use force. We are against any acts of violence, street battles, hit squads, acts of terror, armed organization—and we do not accept any responsibility for violent acts.[47]

This commitment to nonviolence was related to Solidarity's identification and close association with the Catholic Church and with Christian values. In its program, Solidarity claimed to "draw from the values of Christian ethics, from our national traditions and from the workers' and democratic traditions of the labor world." The program specifically referred to Pope John Paul II's encyclical on human labor (*Laborem Exercens*) as "a new stimulus to work." All during its existence, Solidarity maintained an important symbolic relationship with the Church. Walesa especially relied on this connection, frequently wearing "Black Madonna"

[46] Janusz Onyszkiewicz (interview), *La Repubblica* (Rome), 19 February 1983, trans. JPRS.
[47] Cited in *Survey* 26 (Autumn 1982).

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buttons, meeting with Church leaders, and even travelling to Rome to consult with the Pope. During 1981, Solidarity strengthened its links with the clergy and the Church bureaucracy, which may in turn have jeopardized Solidarity's chances of recruiting members from the existing power elite.[48] On the other hand, some people joined Solidarity precisely because of its cooperation with the Church, and some 43 percent of the members listed this as one of their reasons for joining Solidarity.[49]

Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of the Solidarity social movement was its emphasis on self-management. Solidarity was unusual in combining elements of a power-oriented movement aimed at structural changes and a participation-oriented one, which treated participation as an end in itself. These two concepts were brought together in the idea of self-management. From the beginning of the strike movement in the Lenin shipyards, this theme was already taking hold. When some Spanish Trotskyites came to the shipyards to ask the striking workers about their "revolution," the response was "we are not making a revolution. We are settling our own problems."[50] Gradually this idea was developed in more theoretical terms. In an article entitled "Solidarity and Socialism," the Solidarity newspaper *Jednosc* identified the problem this way:

> Theoretically, under socialism the means of production would be held in common ownership by those who actually use them, that is, the working class. But if the social ownership of the means of production is to be a true fact and not simply a propaganda statement then it involves control over one's own labor-power—control and the full right to decide on the social subject of that labor; it means a structure of legal and political norms in harmony with the needs of labor.[51]

In the spring and summer of 1981, self-management was the main subject of discussion within Solidarity, and self-management councils were springing up spontaneously throughout the country. By the end of July, there were over 1,000 such self-management organs. Both Solidarity and the Sejm began developing bills on self-management, and in some enterprises (for example the airline LOT) workers tried to elect their own managers. At Solidarity's national congress in September, the delegates adopted a resolution calling on the Sejm for a national referendum on self-management. If the Sejm refused, the union threatened to arrange it in the factories itself and to implement self-management on its own if a satisfactory law was not forthcoming. In the interim between the two sessions of the congress, the Solidarity leadership agreed on a compromise bill with the government; but the union's leadership came under intense criticism from the members for accepting the weaker version of the bill.

The issue of self-management was a crucial one for Poland and aligns Solidarity

[48] Misztal, "Apathy-Participation-Apathy."

[49] "Sprawy podstawowe w oczach czlonkow zwiazku" (Basic issues in the eyes of members of the union) (Warsaw: Osrodek Badan Spolecznych, September 1981).

[50] Cited in Piotr Zeydler-Zborowski, "Grass Roots Action in Poland," *Development* 3 (1982): 27.

[51] Translated in Stan Persky and Henry Flam, eds., *The Solidarity Sourcebook* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1982), 127.

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with other new social movements.[52] Through self-management, Poles were able to pursue a number of the goals of new social movements: grass roots participation, a sense of dignity and self-worth, and "new public spaces" relatively free of administrative control. Advocates of this idea also expected that self-management would lead to an improvement in economic productivity and, therefore, an eventual improvement in the standard of living. The workers would replace the corrupt and inefficient managers with honest ones who understood the work force. Polish workers were trying to get more control over their own lives and over the future of their country.

The introduction of self-management was a dangerous innovation for the Party, however, in that it threatened the Party's control over appointments through *nomenklatura*, especially for factory directors. As Polish sociologist Witold Morawski pointed out in 1981, a wide introduction of the principles of self-government and self-management would lead to fundamental changes in the political system, or perhaps even to "a rebuilding of the social order."[53] Solidarity's challenge could not be met by simple reforms.

What was most unique about Solidarity was its unusual combination of values: democracy, equality, socialism, nonviolence, Christianity, and human dignity. Solidarity favored democracy and participation, but also had a special concern for the poor and disadvantaged. While Solidarity's program did not once use the term socialism, it strongly supported most socialist principles.[54] Bronislaw Geremek, one of the drafters of the program, asserted that Solidarity was proposing a "new model of relations between the state and the society" and that the model was a socialist one.[55] While many social movements have been democratic, socialist, or nonviolent, few have been all three; even fewer have been so closely associated with the dominant church in the society. Few other social movements have been so large and so universal as Solidarity. In some respects, Solidarity resembled the environmental or antinuclear movements in Europe (and even the West German Green Party), but Solidarity was much larger than any of those, and its goals were much more universal.[56] Most contemporary social movements in the West are non-

[52] French sociologist Alain Touraine has suggested that the nature of social conflict worldwide has changed. Social struggle is now not over political or workers' rights, but over "a population's right to choose its kind of life and in support of its political potential, which is often called self-management." *The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 7.

[53] Witold Morawski, "O zrodlach i naturze kryzysu 1980–1981 w Polsce" (On the sources and nature of the crisis of 1980–1981 in Poland), *Literatura*, 24 September 1981. An English version of this essay appears in *Sisyphus: Sociological Studies.*

[54] See David S. Mason, "Solidarity and Socialism" in Jack Bielasiak and Maurice Simon, eds., *Polish Politics: Edge of the Abyss* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 118–137.

[55] Cited in Persky and Flam, *The Solidarity Sourcebook*, 228.

[56] For a comparison of Solidarity and the West German Green Party, see Elizabeth Crighton and David Mason, "Solidarity and The Greens: The Rise of New Social Movements in East and West Europe" in Kurt and Gladys Lang, eds., *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1986), 155–176.

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violent and democratic, but have fairly narrowly focused goals. Most social movements in the Third World have broader goals, but tend toward violence.

Not only did Solidarity combine these values and principles in a novel way, but it did so in a most unusual environment—a Communist Party state. There had been revolutionary movements before in Eastern Europe, as in Hungary in 1956. There, however, the movement was not nearly so organized or institutionalized; and there was never a formal program for development, apart from the vague notion of freedom—especially from Soviet hegemony. Czechoslovakia had experienced its own spring of 1968, but the changes there were initiated and managed by the Party itself, rather than by the workers. In Poland, for the first time an independent, autonomous institution representing a social movement confronted a ruling Communist Party with a challenge to its claim to be the leading force in society. Solidarity was the central driving force in Polish society for sixteen months. The initiative for social, political, and economic change came from Solidarity, not from the Party. The Polish United Workers' Party could have adapted to this challenge by narrowing the scope of politics in society and by providing "institutional channels for transforming dissenters into participants."[57] Indeed, the Party did go some way in this direction.

In reversing itself and supporting a crackdown on the movement, the Party only delayed dealing with the underlying problem. Many of the values that Solidarity promoted remain with the population. The regime cannot ignore them and must eventually deal with them. As Heberle has written of other social movements, "if repression is at all successful, it may result in a high degree of conformity of overt behavior and in the illusion of preserved or restored social solidarity. . . . [but] forcible repression is usually the least appropriate course of action. One has to cure the causes, not the symptoms."[58]

The regime of Wojciech Jaruzelski seems finally to have understood this, probably under pressure from a reforming leadership in Moscow that hopes to avoid any new trouble in Poland. In a startling development in January 1989, Jaruzelski threatened to resign from the leadership if the Party's Central Committee did not agree to open the way to legalization of Solidarity. Several weeks later the government and the Solidarity leaders sat down to roundtable discussions about Poland's future.

In 1980-1981, the Polish workers learned the hard way just how powerful the modern state is. Theda Skocpol has asserted that social revolutions can only occur when the state has weakened or collapsed. In the modern world, such a collapse could well lead to international warfare and the destruction of society. Thus, for a social revolution to transform an advanced industrial society, it would have to take quite different forms from the "great historical social revolutions":

[57] Samuel Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One Party Systems" in Samuel Huntington and Barrington Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 44.

[58] Heberle, *Social Movements*, 456–458.

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> Because it seems highly unlikely that modern states could disintegrate as administrative-coercive organizations without destroying societies at the same time, a modern social revolution would probably have to flow gradually, not cataclysmically, out of a long series of "non-reformist reforms," accomplished by mass-based political movements struggling to democratize every major institution from the economy to the political parties, army, and civil bureaucracy.[59]

This was precisely what Solidarity attempted, though perhaps at a pace too threatening to the Party. The union's leadership, now more conciliatory, has a second chance to launch Poland in the direction of thoroughgoing, evolutionary, and democratizing reform.

## Conclusions

Much of the literature on social movements is based on western experiences, particularly in the industrialized democratic states. Many of these theories, however, may be equally applicable to modern authoritarian states—even to Communist Party ones. Modernization of a society, even a socialist one, tends to produce changes that are ultimately disruptive. Increases in literacy, urbanization, and education increase political consciousness; and economic and social changes lead to diversification of the social and political elite. These changes eventually produce "new, more complex lines of cleavage cutting across the previously dominant bifurcation" between the political elite and the population.[60] Thus, social movements that challenge existing structures may emerge in authoritarian systems as well as democratic ones.

In one-party political systems, such as Poland, the party elite at first dominates all aspects of society: the scope of politics is extremely broad. In the early stages of political development and consolidation, rigid controls and widespread repression inhibit the development of any independent social or political activity. But in order to accommodate social and economic changes, the party needs to restrict the scope of politics to allow greater participation by other groups. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out, if the party does not restrict the scope of politics, then other elements in society will begin to play a political role, and thereby challenge the authority and role of the party. When a single party maintains its pervasive societal role in the face of such changes, the various nonparty interests and groups may coalesce into a social movement to effect more radical changes in the political and social system.

Solidarity was the first manifestation of such a phenomenon in the Soviet bloc, but it was not the last. There are numerous reasons why it occurred in Poland: the tradition of popular revolt in that country, and the measured success of such revolts in earlier years; the existence of an independent and alternative source of authority and allegiance in the Roman Catholic Church; the peculiar Polish am-

[59] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 292–293.

[60] Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics," 18.

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bivalence, even hostility, toward the Soviet Union and its ideology; and the loss of authority and decay of the Polish United Workers' Party. These factors are unique to Poland and helped define the unusual form and content of Solidarity.

No social phenomenon, however, is totally unique, and in terms of its origins, goals, demands, and organization, Solidarity resembled social movements elsewhere in the world. The emergence of Solidarity was a response to economic and political developments in Poland that have affected other people in the West and are likely to affect other Soviet bloc peoples as well. These include the development of post-materialist values that follow the achievement of economic security; the popular frustration and alienation that results from large and centralized bureaucracies; and the consequent interest in political or economic participation, particularly at the grassroots or work place.

To the extent that Solidarity did resemble new social movements in the West and was not simply a reaction to the communist form of politics, then social movement theory must account for this social movement. Most social movement theorists either explicitly or implicitly limit their focus to democratic societies. Denton Morrison, for example, contends that one of the conditions for the emergence of social movements is "the presence of much voluntary association activity in a society."[61] Certainly there was far more of such activity in Poland than elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, but far less than in most western societies. If new social movements develop in Communist as well as democratic states, then the factors that encourage their development are not specific to either East or West.

Like other social movements in the West, Solidarity needed resources to gain maximum effectiveness, and the Polish workers had an unusual opportunity to gather material and human resources. But one must not overemphasize the uniqueness of this. As other Communist states experiment with economic and political decentralization (namely, the recent reforms in China, the USSR, and most of East Europe), the resources for mobilizing social movements will become more accessible to nonparty groups. Furthermore, as noted above, a centralized organization is not always necessary for a successful social movement and in the case of Solidarity may even have hurt the movement. Many new social movements in the West, (for example, the women's movement, environmental and civil rights movements, even the Green movement in West Germany) have had remarkable success with minimal central organization or coordination. In one-party states, social movements that are decentralized or minimally organized may have a better chance of success than centralized ones, in that they less directly confront the party and are more difficult to suppress.

All of this suggests not only a revision of social-movement theory to account for Solidarity, but some rethinking of the idea of the uniqueness of the Solidarity experience. Certainly it was a novel phenomenon for the Communist world, where for the first time a broad-based social movement confronted the Party and the regime. But if Solidarity reflects trends that transcend Poland, or even the Communist bloc, then it may portend similar challenges to regimes in both East and West.

[61] Morrison, "Some Notes Toward a Theory," 685.

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# Public Opinion and the Welfare State: The United States in Comparative Perspective

ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO
JOHN T. YOUNG

To what extent do citizens of the United States and other countries prefer particular social welfare policies? How have these opinions changed over the last twenty years? What have been the effects of these preferences on government policies? This article reviews some of the empirical English language literature that has directly or indirectly considered these matters by examining national-level survey data.[1] Although we initially expected an investigation of this research to be a mammoth undertaking, we found that the literature was not very extensive.

[1] We have undoubtedly omitted relevant works that are not available in English. We have also limited our review to studies using survey data. Opinion processes might also be studied without survey data through other historical methods, including content analysis of the media, which influence mass and elite opinions. Lawrence R. Jacobs, and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Public Opinion and the New Social History: Some Lessons for the Study of Public Opinion and Democratic Politics," *Social Science History* 13 (forthcoming, 1989); Peter Golding and Sue Middleton, *Images of Welfare: Press and Public Attitudes to Poverty* (Oxford, England: Martin Robertson, 1982); Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Glenn R. Dempsey, "What Moves Public Opinion," *American Political Science Review* (APSR) 81 (March 1987): 23-43.

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## Public Opinion toward Social Welfare Policy

Although there has been much debate about the growth of social welfare programs in the bonafide welfare states and elsewhere, and there has been considerable interest in public opinion, there have been few analyses of survey data concerned with the full range of social welfare issues.[2] For the United States, several reports have examined public preferences toward the government's role in providing for public welfare, medical care, Social Security, income assistance to the poor, and employment.[3] The general conclusion of these analyses has been that despite some criticism and qualifications and despite—or perhaps because of—the retrenchment efforts of the Reagan administration, the American public has accepted and even expected an active government role as the last economic resort.[4] Although there are clear differences between the United States and other welfare states, the research and evidence for other countries lead to the same conclusion.

The public opinion data show that support for social welfare policies in the United States has generally remained solid and stable from the 1970s to the early 1980s,

[2] An exception is Michael E. Schiltz, *Public Attitudes toward Social Security 1935–1965* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970).

[3] Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Government Role in Welfare," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 39 (Summer 1975): 257–274; Natalie Jaffe, "Appendix B: Attitudes Toward Public Welfare Programs and Recipients in the United States. A Review of Public Opinion Surveys, 1935–1976" in Lester Salamon, ed., *Welfare: The Elusive Consensus* (New York: Praeger, 1978); Fay Lomax Cook, *Who Should be Helped*? (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1979) and "Public Opinion and Social Welfare Policy: What We Know and Need to Know," unpublished paper, Northwestern University, 1985; Robert Y. Shapiro and John T. Young, "The Polls: Medical Care in the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50 (Fall 1986): 418–428; Robert Y. Shapiro and Tom W. Smith, "The Polls: Social Security," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49 (Winter 1985): 561–572; Robert Y. Shapiro, Kelly D. Patterson, Judith Russell, and John T. Young, "The Polls: Public Assistance," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (Spring 1987): 120–130; Doris Yokelson, *Public Attitudes toward Poverty and the Characteristics of the Poor and Near Poor*, vol. III, Doris Yokelson, ed., *Collected Papers on Poverty Issues* (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, 1975); Connie De Boer, "The Polls: Attitudes Toward Unemployment," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 47 (Fall 1983): 432–441; Robert Y. Shapiro, Kelly D. Patterson, Judith Russell, John T. Young, "The Polls—A Report: Employment and Social Welfare," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (Summer 1987): 268–281. For other references, see Shapiro and Young, "Public Opinion Toward Social Welfare Policies: The United States in Comparative Perspective" in Samual Long, ed., *Research in Micropolitics*, vol. 3, *Public Opinion* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1989).

[4] Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: The Role of Government in Welfare"; Carll Everett Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Public Opinion and Public Policy" in Peter Duignan and Alvin Rabushka, eds., *The United States in the 1980s* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1980), 49–84; Cook, *Who Should be Helped*?; Robert Y. Shapiro and Kelly D. Patterson "The Dynamics of Public Opinion toward Social Welfare Policy," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1986; Richard M. Coughlin, *Ideology, Public Opinion, and Welfare Policy* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1980); Everett Carll Ladd, "Public Attitudes toward Policy and Governance: Searching for the Sources and Meaning of the 'Reagan Revolution'" in Lester Salamon and Michael Lund, eds., *The Reagan Presidency and the Governing of America* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1984); James R. Kluegel, "Macroeconomic Problems, Beliefs about the Poor and Attitudes toward Welfare Spending," *Social Problems* 34 (February 1987): 82–99.

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FIGURE 1
*High and Stable Support*
For Spending on Education and Welfare




Source: NORC/GSS ("Don't Know" excluded, N > 1400 unless noted).

Question: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount of money. . . . Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right about on . . . Improving and protecting the nation's health . . . Improving the nation's educaton system?" Survey dates: 3/72, 3/73, 3/74, 3/75, 3/76, 3/77, 3/78, 3/80, 3/82, 3/83, 3/84 (N = 465 for health, N = 475 for education), 3/85 (N = 727 for health, N = 724 for education), and 3/86 (N = 702 for health, N = 705 for education). These data for the United States were taken from the NORC General Social Survey. See James A. Davis and Tom W. Smith, *General Social Surveys, 1972–1986: Cumulative Codebook*. (Chicago: NORC, 1986).

despite some sizeable increases in opposition mainly to income maintenance and related "welfare" activities. Coinciding with the rhetoric and policies of the Reagan administration and especially with the recession, public support for maintaining and expanding government assistance rebounded since the early 1980s, and Americans rejected further cuts in social welfare programs. Examples of this high and stable support for social welfare policies in the United States and the liberal rebound are shown in Figures 1 and 2.

The same overall stability can be found in other affluent western democracies, but there have also been some clear shifts in preferences as great or greater than those in the United States. Conservative shifts or welfare backlashes have occurred

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FIGURE 2
*Liberal Rebound in Opinion*
Toward Welfare Spending




Source: NORC/GSS ("Don't Know" excluded, N > 1400 unless noted).

Question: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount of money. . . . Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on . . . welfare?" Survey dates: 3/72, 3/73, 3/74, 3/75, 3/76, 3/77, 3/78, 3/80, 3/82, 3/83, 3/84 (N = 471), 3/85 (N = 719), and 3/86 (N = 700). These data for the United States were taken from the NORC General Social Survey. See James A. Davis and Tom W. Smith, *General Social Surveys, 1972–1986: Cumulative Codebook*. (Chicago: NORC, 1986).

in a number of countries in recent years. This has coincided with deteriorations in economic growth, increases in inflation, and changes in employment and perceived tax burden. The shift to the right occurred in Great Britain more dramatically than in the United States and contributed to Margaret Thatcher's ascendancy. But similar to the liberal rebound occurring later during the Reagan administration, public opinion reversed itself substantially after Thatcher became prime minister, rejecting further retrenchment of the welfare state.[5] Despite the political leader-

[5] See Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, *Right Turn* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); David R. Gergen and Anthony King, "Following the Leaders: How Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher have Changed Public Opinion," *Public Opinion* 8 (June/July 1985): 16–19, 55–58; Joel Krieger, *Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Carll Everett Ladd,

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ships' rhetoric of cuts, there has continued to be popular support for major cash transfers, education, and health services financed by taxation; other direct services were perceived to be less central.[6] Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing observed that while British opinion may have continued to move to the right on social welfare issues in 1979, opinion rebounded afterward and clearly supported the view that spending on welfare state programs should be extended even if this required a tax increase. By 1983 the entire electorate, including Conservative Party identifiers, moved to the left of its 1974 position concerning whether welfare spending had gone too far.[7] Moreover, despite clear divisions on some issues, there is a broad consensus or "collectivism" toward the positive role of the welfare state in society: support for welfare state programs such as the National Health Services and efforts to end poverty and to redistribute wealth drew large measures of support even during the conservative British shift in the late 1970s.[8]

The expansion of the welfare state elsewhere was also challenged, and cuts were proposed as a result of reactions to increases in taxes, including visible direct taxes versus programmatic taxes.[9] Douglas Hibbs and Henrik Madsen evaluated arguments about the visibility of taxation and the consequences of welfare services versus direct transfers in Denmark, Sweden, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and West Germany. They concluded that the backlash was more fundamentally a reaction to the perception of government inefficiency and an objection to particular forms of taxation, rather than a revolt against social security or equality.[10]

The public backlash did not last long nor occur to the same degree in all Euro-

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"Converging Currents in British and American Politics," *Public Opinion* (June/July 1983): 4–6, 55–60; David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974); Ralph Harris and Arthur Seldon, *Over-Ruled on Welfare* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1979); Peter Taylor-Gooby, *Public Opinion, Ideology, and State Welfare* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985); Bo Sarlvik and Ivor Crewe, *Decade of Dealignment: The Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the 1970s* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Richard Parry, "United Kingdom" in Peter Flora, ed., *Growth to Limits: The Western European Welfare States since World War II*, vol. 2, *Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 155–240; Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing, "Thatcherism: Its Origins, Electoral Impact and Implications for Downs's Theory of Party Strategy," no. 37 *Essex Papers in Politics and Government* (Department of Government, University of Essex, 1986).

[6] Parry, "United Kingdom."

[7] Crewe and Searing, "Thatcherism."

[8] Nick Bosanquet, "Interim Report: Public Spending and the Welfare State" in Roger Jowell, Sharon Witherspoon, and Lindsay Brook, eds., *British Social Attitudes: The 1986 Report* (Brookfield, Vermont: Gower Publishing Company, 1986), 127–139; Taylor-Gooby, *Public Opinion, Ideology, and State Welfare.*

[9] Harold L. Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality: Structure and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Wilensky, *The 'New Corporatism,' Centralization and the Welfare State* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976).

[10] Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. and Henrik Jess Madsen, "Public Reaction to the Growth of Taxation and Government Expenditure," *World Politics* 33 (April 1981): 413–435; see also Richard Eichenberg, *Society and Security in Western Europe*, unpublished ms., Tufts University, 1987, concerning the defense-social welfare trade-off.

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pean countries, and it did not necessarily produce changes in expenditures and policy. In the Scandinavian countries, for example, leftist opinion did not deteriorate in the 1970s.[11] In Norway support for social welfare policies (that is, expansion of cradle-to-grave social security) diminished from 1965 to 1973 and returned to a high level by 1977.[12] In Sweden no overall change in very high and stable support appears to have occurred in the 1960s and 1970s concerning payment for welfare state programs. In fact, from 1967 to 1978 there apparently was a sizable increase in support for state responsibility for ensuring everyone a good standard of living. This contrasts sharply with the rightward shift occurring elsewhere during the same period. But resistance to state intervention and other signs of backlash did occur in Sweden by the early 1980s.[13]

In Denmark, while there was demand in 1972 for lower government expenditures, there was resistance to cuts in welfare spending.[14] Although there were important cuts during the two years after the 1973 elections, the antispending and antitax issues became less salient for voters during the following elections.[15] Real disposable income decreased steadily after 1976, and the welfare backlash in Denmark was a short-lived phenomenon: public opinion had changed considerably by 1979, reestablishing by the mid-1980s the consensus registered in the 1960s.[16]

West Germans were much more willing to cut back social services and social transfers in 1983 than in 1978 or 1979. Under conditions of fiscal strain, reductions in services were more popular than an increase in the tax burden. At the same time, however, there was no measurable decline in commitment to the welfare state and to state responsibility as opposed to individual responsibility for social welfare.[17]

Similarly, a noticeable decline in public support for expansion in certain social

[11] Diane Sainsbury, "Scandinavian Party Politics Reexamined: Social Democracy in Decline?" *West European Politics* 7 (October 1984): 67–102.

[12] Henry Valen and Willy Martinussen, "Electoral Trends and Foreign Politics in Norway: The 1973 Storting Election and the EEC Issue" in Karl H. Cerny, ed., *Scandinavia at the Polls* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), 39–71.

[13] Sven Olson, "Sweden" in Peter Flora, ed., *Growth to Limits: The Western European Welfare States Since World War II*, vol. 1, *Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 1–116; Hans Zetterberg, "Maturing of the Swedish Welfare State," *Public Opinion* (October/November 1979): 42–47; but see Bo Sarlvik, "Recent Electoral Trends in Sweden" in Cerny, ed., *Scandinavia at the Polls*, 73–129.

[14] Sainsbury, "Scandinavian Party Politics Reexamined"; see also Ole Borre, "Recent Trends in Danish Voting Behavior" in Cerny, ed., *Scandinavia at the Polls*, 3–37.

[15] Lars Norby Johansen, "Denmark" in Peter Flora, ed., *Growth to Limits:* vol. 1; Jorgen Goul Andersen, "Electoral Trends in Denmark in the 1980s," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 9 (June 1986): 157–174.

[16] Johansen, "Denmark"; Andersen, "Electoral Trends."

[17] See Jens Alber, "The West German Welfare State in Transition," paper presented at the meeting of the International Study Group of Trends in the Welfare State, University of Massachusetts, Boston, 22–26 September 1986; and "Germany" in Peter Flora, ed., *Growth to Limits:* vol. 2, 1–154; see also Eichenberg, *Society and Security in Western Europe.*

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welfare areas occurred in Finland from 1975 to 1980, but this was probably not a threat to the provision of a welfare system that had become very firmly entrenched and had overwhelming public support. A similar phenomenon occurred in the Yugoslavian republic of Slovenia, in which there was a steady increase in support for retrenchment over the entire 1968–1983 period.[18]

Thus we find substantial similarity in patterns of changes in public preferences across countries—changes at the margin, independent of the levels of support for social welfare policies. Although we have not seen the most recent data, in some cases, the conservative shift in certain preferences occurred later and has not yet reversed itself. But the German case, for example, does not differ much from modest opinion movements elsewhere: some conservative shifts in preferences subsequently reversed themselves substantially, and preferences that did not rebound still showed extremely high levels of support for social welfare programs. It can be argued there and elsewhere that there is substantial support for the modern welfare state, and various marginal shifts in preferences represent essentially its consolidation rather than movement toward dismantling its components.[19]

Important social cleavages can be found in variations in support for the welfare state. The largest and most persistent demographic differences in preferences in the United States are still those associated with race and economic status. There is no unequivocal evidence that these political cleavages have changed substantially since the first national surveys of the 1930s and 1940s. Of course, the focal points of public debate about social welfare issues have changed as have government policies themselves, which is why socioeconomic differences in such preferences *appear* to have diminished.[20] Differences in preferences due to party identification are among the largest as well, but they vary depending upon whether or not Democratic and Republican leaders take more clearly distinctive positions

[18] See Matti Alestalo and Hannu Uusitalo, "Finland" in Flora, ed., *Growth to Limits:* vol. 1, 197–292; Peter Jambrek, "Socialism Without Welfare? Preliminary Analysis of Popular and Elite Preferences about Public Spending in Yugoslav Communes" in Terry Nichols Clark, ed., *Research in Urban Policy*, vol. 2, part A (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1986), 219–226.

[19] Alber, "The West German Welfare State" and "Germany"; see Olson, "Sweden"; Albert Hirschman describes this as "growing pains" in "The Welfare State in Trouble: Systemic Crisis or Growing Pains?" *American Economic Review* 70 (May 1980): 113–116.

[20] Shapiro and Patterson, "The Dynamics of Public Opinion"; David Knoke, "Stratification and the Dimensions of American Political Orientations," *American Journal of Political Science* (AJPS) 23 (November 1979): 772–791; David Colby and David Baker, "Socioeconomic and Psychological Determinants of Welfare Policy Attitudes: Path Models," *Journal of Social Science Research* 1 (Summer 1978): 345–356; A. Wade Smith, "Social Class and Racial Cleavages on Major Social Indicators," *Research in Race and Ethnic Relations* 4 (1985): 33–65; Avery Guest, "Class Consciousness and American Political Attitudes," *Social Forces* 52 (June 1974): 496–510; Jon P Alston and K. Imogene Dean, "Sociological Factors Associated with Attitudes Toward Welfare Recipients and the Causes of Poverty," *Social Service Review* 46 (March 1972); Joe R. Feagan, *Subordinating the Poor: Welfare and American Beliefs* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975); Ladd and Lipset, "Public Opinion and Public Policy."

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on the economic and social issues that divide the parties.[21] In general, however, as public opinion has shifted on social welfare issues there have been parallel changes in opinion for different demographic subgroups.[22]

Very noteworthy demographic differences in preferences are associated with age. Contrary to media reports and popular beliefs, new cohorts of young adults in the United States tend to be the most supportive of virtually all social welfare policies. They are not more liberal than other recent cohorts as they enter adulthood, nor are they more conservative, even though they have been likely to call themselves Republicans and supporters of President Ronald Reagan. Their liberal positions on social and economic issues may simply reflect what have become typical aging (life cycle) differences, so that new cohorts differ little from their immediate predecessors; or they may be more liberal or accepting of the American welfare state, since they have been socialized in it and have come to expect certain functions of government.[23]

Such age differences can be found in a number of European countries, leading us to stress similarities rather than differences. While Ronald Inglehart and others have described generational differences in issue salience and what they have referred to as "post-materialist" values, the broad collectivist support for British welfare state programs may in part be due to the views of a generation that came to adulthood during a period when welfare provision was hardly debated.[24] Younger cohorts, however, are not more liberal on all issues across all nations. Support for the antitax, antispending Progress Party in Norway came largely from younger voters in 1973, and this might portend a generational schism on welfare in the future. But, whereas young Norwegian voters tended toward the Progress Party in 1973 and toward other conservative parties later in the 1970s, the left-of-center Swedish and Danish parties have had much greater success in attracting the loyalties of new cohorts.[25]

[21] For a discussion of such party cleavage issues, see Benjamin I. Page, *Choices and Echoes in Presidential Election* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

[22] But there are interesting and important exceptions attributable to processes involving partisanship and the influence of the party in the White House; see Shapiro and Patterson, "The Dynamics of Public Opinion."

[23] Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); James R. Kluegel and Eliot R. Smith, *Beliefs about Inequality: Americans' Views About What is and What Ought to be* (Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1986); Richard F. Hamilton and James D. Wright, *The State of the Masses* (New York: Aldine, 1986); Shapiro and Patterson "The Dynamics of Public Opinion"; Michael Delli Carpini and Lee Sigelman, "Do Yuppies Matter? Competing Explanations of their Political Distinctiveness," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50 (Winter 1986): 502–518.

[24] Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); and Paul R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, "Generational Replacement and Value Change in Six West European Societies," *AJPS* 30 (March 1986): 1–25; Eichenberg, *Society and Security in Western Europe*; Bosanquet, "Public Spending and the Welfare State"; Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality*; Coughlin, *Ideology.*

[25] Sainsbury, "Scandinavian Party Politics Reexamined."

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Notwithstanding the above observation about Great Britain, the youngest British cohort has not been the most supportive of all welfare state programs. In 1984, 18–34 year olds were somewhat less supportive of extra spending on the National Health Service, young males markedly so; but they were more supportive of spending on benefits for the unemployed, help for industry, and education than were older citizens. Retirement pensions drew far less support among younger males and females than they did among the oldest cohort, although the young cohort was as supportive or more supportive of increasing social spending and taxes than their elders. There was greater support among the young for spending on poverty and for aid to families with children.[26]

Part of the differences in preferences among Americans can be attributed to self-interest: mainly those general differences associated with economic status and race, and particular cases such as the high levels of support among urban residents for aid to cities or the alarm among retirees or near retirees when Social Security or Medicare benefits are threatened. Self-interest, however, is often difficult to disentangle from group interests, or group consciousness, or concerns about the well-being of the nation as a whole. Age and other differences in preferences can only rather remotely be connected to self-interest, particularly the more liberal positions of young adults and women. These preferences are complex, and many people no doubt are motivated by a collective interest or by symbolic concerns. Although the influence of personal self-interest is consistent with some of the evidence, it alone is an inadequate explanation for the generally parallel subgroup trends in preferences and for all the variations in attitudes toward particular social welfare policies.[27]

Such questions about personal versus collective concerns have not been studied much crossnationally.[28] The less than expected role of self-interest in influencing preferences has been found in Europe as well, although the fact that the benefits provided are more substantial there than in the United States raises the stakes for more people. On the other hand, the importance of partisanship and ideology

[26] Nick Bosanquet, "Social Policy and the Welfare State" in Roger Jowell and Colin Airey, eds., *British Social Attitudes: The 1984 Report*. (Brookfield, Vt: Gower Publishing Company, 1984), 75–104; Gordon Heald and Robert J. Wybrow, *The Gallup Survey of Britain* (Dover, N.H.; Croom Helm, 1986). For related findings on support for medical care and pensions in Italy and Canada, see Maurizio Ferrera, "Italy" in Peter Flora, ed., *Growth to Limits:* vol. 2, 385–482; and Mildred A. Schwartz, *Public Opinion and Canadian Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

[27] For example, Donald R. Kinder and Roderick D. Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting," *AJPS* 23 (August 1979): 495–527; David O. Sears, Ricard R. Lau, Tom R. Tyler, and Harris M. Allen Jr., "Self-interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting," *APSR* 74 (September 1980): 670–684; Robert Y. Shapiro and Harpreet Mahajan, "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50 (Spring 1986): 42–61.

[28] James E. Alt, *The Politics of Economic Decline* (Cambridge: England: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

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in these countries may extend political debate beyond personal or family gains. The fact that the comparative public opinion and politics literature stresses ideology, partisanship, voting, and the relationship among them indicates that self-interest is of less concern than ideological, symbolic, or other more collective considerations.[29] This comparative research prefers to examine states' policies largely in terms of political party support and a single general left-right ideological continuum, and not to compare similar kinds of social policy issues across nations.

Much of what we observed about public preferences in the United States—their patterns of change and sources—applies to other countries as well. The differences between the United States and other welfare states are not as consistently different as might be expected by the staunchest advocates of America's exceptionalism. When we look at overall support for the current welfare state policies and at marginal changes in support and their causes during the last twenty years, there are many similarities and shared experiences.

There are congruities in various program-specific preferences in the United States and European welfare states. Striking differences emerge, however, when underlying ideology is considered, which is most obviously reflected in the timing of the establishment of welfare state policies.[30] The similarities in preferences also extend to the ranking in importance of sets of benefits and forms of assistance. Support for social security and old-age assistance, medical care, and perhaps education is the highest in virtually all countries for which public opinion data have been examined. Ranked next, but less consistently, are government efforts to provide for employment. This is followed by income assistance, in cases in which the beneficiaries are likely to be deemed deserving although not necessarily poor.[31] This includes family allowances and in-kind assistance, such as housing and U.S.

[29] For example, see Ian Budge, "Strategies, Issues, and Votes: British General Elections, 1950–1979," *Comparative Political Studies* 15 (July 1982): 171–196; Karl H. Cerny, ed., *Scandinavia at the Polls* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977); Harold D. Clarke and Gary Zuk, "The Politics of Party Popularity: Canada 1971–1979," *Comparative Politics* (April 1987): 299–315; Harold D. Clarke and Marianne C. Steward, "Partisan Inconsisitency and Partisan Change in Federal States: The Case of Canada," *AJPS* 31 (May 1987): 383–407; Hilde T. Himmelweit, Patrick Humphreys, Marianne Jaeger, and Michael Katz, *How Voters Decide: A Longitudinal Study of Political Attitudes and Voting Extending over Fifteen Years* (New York: Academic Press, 1981); Peter McDonough, Antonio Lopez Pina, and Samuel H. Barnes, "The Spanish Public in Political Transition," *British Journal of Political Science* 11 (January 1981): 49–79; McDonough, Barnes, and Pina, "Economic Policy and Public Opinion in Spain," *AJPS* 30 (May 1986): 446–479; Howard R. Penniman, ed., *France at the Polls* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975); Penniman, *The French National Assembly Elections of 1978* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980); G. Bingham Powell Jr., "Comparative Voting Behavior: Cleavages, Partisanship, and Accountability" in Samuel Long, ed., *Research in Micropolitics*, vol. II (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1987): 233–264.

[30] Coughlin, *Ideology*; Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality*; King, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Policies of Governments: A Comparative Analysis: Parts I and II, Part III," *British Journal of Political Science* 3 (July-August 1973): 291–313, 409–423.

[31] Cook, *Who Should be Helped?*

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food stamps. Of course, there is less support when survey question wordings suggest that there might be some abuse of the assistance or that the benefits provide disincentives to employment. Although there may be some differences across nations in the intensity of opinions and salience of certain issues, and in the question of whether particular policies should be thought of as social welfare issues, there are also similarities in preferences toward spending more or less relative to existing levels. Americans, for example, are no more opposed to their current burden than Europeans.[32] Thus there is much evidence indicating a convergence across nations.

But when we examine closely the specific levels of support based upon the most recent data and evaluate ideologies or underlying philosophies, especially those having to do with principles of collectivism and individualism, (or egalitarianism versus individualism), there are striking differences.[33] The attitudes and policy preferences of citizens in the United States and a number of European welfare states correspond to the differences in the historical development and contemporary policies of these states.[34] These differences go beyond differences in ideological support for actions by which governments explicitly promote equality. Americans are less positive than Europeans, even on social welfare matters that have very high levels of support in the United States—retirement benefits, health care, jobs, and housing. The United States is consistently at the bottom in its support for different kinds of social welfare benefits.[35]

The comparative evidence, however, need not minimize the continual incremental extension of U.S. social welfare policy. But the differences are large and they do strengthen the case for the ideological distinctiveness of the United States. An important additional piece of evidence is that there is one major social welfare issue

[32] See Tom W. Smith, "The Polls: The Welfare State in Crossnational Perspective," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (Fall 1987): 404–421.

[33] See Coughlin, *Ideology*; McClosky and Zaller, *The American Ethos*; Sidney Verba and Gary Orren, *Equality in America: The View from the Top* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Sidney Verba, Steven Kelman, Gary R. Orren, Ichiro Miyake, Joji Watanuki, Ikuo Kabashima, and G. Donald Ferree, Jr., *Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden, and the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Kluegel and Smith, *Beliefs About Inequality*.

[34] Smith, "The Welfare State"; James A. Davis, "British and American Attitudes: Similarities and Contrast" in Jowell, Witherspoon, and Brook, eds., *The 1986 Report*, 89–114.

[35] Coughlin earlier also found this consistency in the rankings of nations, with the Anglo-American nations (U.S., Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia) at the lower end and the U.S. at the bottom. But he emphasized this less than the similarities in various attitudes in contrast to ideological differences and divergences in government policies. The countries in which public support appeared to be the highest were West Germany and France in his analysis (which also examined Sweden and Denmark) and Italy in Smith's analysis (which also included Austria, Germany, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland). Because of data limitations, it is difficult to draw clear contrasts among European nations, but more similarities in public opinion appear among them when they are compared with the United States. See Smith, "The Welfare State"; Coughlin, *Ideology*; Philip K. Armour and Richard M. Couglin, "Social Control and Social Security: Theory and Research on Capitalist and Communist Nations," *Social Science Quarterly* 66 (December 1985): 770–788.

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on which Americans fare much better—and often the best—compared with other nations: educational opportunity, assistance, and spending. Overall support for education in the United States is close to that for Social Security and medical care. This is neither difficult to explain nor surprising. It stems from Americans' views and values concerning individualism and the equality of opportunity, as opposed to equality of outcomes for individuals.[36] How we judge the United States's distinctiveness depends upon whether we emphasize the direction and sources of current political trends and the evidence for convergence, or whether we stress cardinal comparisons of public preferences and policies at different points in time. The sections that follow distinguish among several different areas of social welfare policy: Social Security and old-age assistance, income assistance for the poor, employment, medical care, education, housing and urban problems, and redistribution more generally. For each we examine briefly the research and evidence concerning policy preferences on the United States and then turn to trends in other countries.

### *Social Security and Old-Age Assistance*

The passage in the United States of the Social Security Act of 1935 marked the late and modest expansion of the American welfare state. Since then Social Security and other social welfare policies have had substantial support, and benefits from Social Security and some other programs have been perceived as rights of citizenship.[37]

It is particularly striking that during the fifty years following the passage of the Social Security Act, public polls in the United States failed to track fully trends in opinion toward old-age assistance. From 1950 to the mid-1970s we found an average of only one survey question per year—and all of those questions were worded differently. There was a fair number of questions asked in the 1930s and 1940s, showing high levels of support; and there were flurries of interest in the late 1970s and the 1980s as the federal government's financial problems as well as those of the Social Security system increased and as senior citizens and their representatives and organizations gained attention. But generally Social Security has been a less salient issue than other domestic and foreign policy matters because of the early consensus that emerged.[38]

[36] See King, "Ideas, Institutions and Policies of Government"; Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality*; Coughlin, *Ideology*; Smith, "The Welfare State."

[37] T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1965); Mayer N. Zald, "Political Change, Citizenship Rights, and the Welfare State" in Yeheskal Hasenfeld and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *The Welfare State in America: Trends and Prospects, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 479 (1985): 48–66; Erskine, "The Role of Government in Welfare," and "The Polls: Health Insurance," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 39 (Spring 1975): 128–141; Cook, *Who Should be Helped*?

[38] See Shapiro and Smith, "Social Security"; Schiltz, *Social Security*; Irving Crespi, "Social Security and the Polls: No Ado About Something," *Public Opinion* 5 (October/November 1982): 19.

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The expansion of the Social Security system has been attributed to President Franklin Roosevelt's insight and ability to lead—or manipulate—public opinion. Social welfare programs are complicated policies when their costs, benefits, and administrative rules and procedures are considered. But Social Security's emphasis on workers' required contributions to a governmental social insurance system—engineered by Roosevelt and his advisers—gave people an easy way to comprehend the program, because it fit in well with the work ethic and other values concerning capitalism and democracy.[39] Although it was not originally made clear, Americans have come to realize that Social Security involves transfer payments from the young to the old and that it is not a social insurance program in which an employer and employee pay for the employee's own retirement.[40] It is still in doubt, however, whether the public understands fully the regressiveness of the payroll tax financing Social Security.

That public preferences toward redistributive policies such as Social Security may be especially susceptible to the influence of incomplete or inaccurate information has serious implications for democratic policy making.[41] Interpreting opinion concerning these policies requires great care, since pollsters have often added to the confusion by providing poor descriptions of policies in their questions. Much of the pessimism expressed about the future of Social Security can be attributed to the lack of a fully informed public discussion.[42]

The patchwork of trends in opinion toward Social Security, which has been pieced together from questions with very different wordings, shows support for Social Security since 1965 to be similar to what was found earlier. The great expansion of Social Security and other social welfare programs that occurred from the 1960s to the early 1970s no doubt required public approval. During this decade the proportion of elderly increased and, more importantly, the percentage who became eligible for retirement benefits rose dramatically. There is still support for continuing worker contributions to the retirement program.[43]

The public has persistently approved of existing or higher levels of government spending or other activity concerning Social Security. Support seems to increase

[39] McClosky and Zaller, *The American Ethos*; Shapiro and Smith, "Social Security."

[40] See Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc., *A Fifty-year Report Card on the Social Secuity System: The Attitudes of the American Public. A National Survey*, August 1985.

[41] See Benjamin I. Page, *Who Gets What from Government?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Educating and Manipulating the Public" in Michael Margolis and Gary Mauser, eds., *Manipulating Public Opinion*, (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1989, forthcoming).

[42] See Paul Light, *Artful Work: The Politics of Social Security Reform* (New York: Random House, 1985), 71–73; Shapiro and Smith, "Social Security"; Rudolph Penner, "Spooking the Public: The Social Security Specter," *Public Opinion* (October/November 1982): 16–18.

[43] See Schiltz, *Social Security*; Shapiro and Smith, "Social Security"; David A. Rochefort, *American Social Welfare Policy: Dynamics of Formulation and Change* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986); James T. Patterson, *America's Struggle Against Poverty 1900–1980* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

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when survey questions suggest some threat to the system, and the public's willingness to be taxed also increases when benefits are threatened. There has been continued (but perhaps diminishing) support for expanding the system to include government and uncovered employees and overwhelming support for indexing benefits to inflation. But the public is more open to limiting the size and frequency of cost-of-living increases and taxing the benefits of higher income groups. The public has tended to oppose raising the retirement age, despite increases in life expectancy and the improved health of the population. It has also favored increasing the earnings limits of retirees.[44]

To be sure, Social Security has been deemed highly successful; it has a tremendous constituency and serves a variety of interests.[45] It benefits not only the elderly, who can be influential as a growing voting block and through their pressure groups and representatives, but also those who supply goods and services to them, as well as younger generations that may be less concerned about their own retirement than about how Social Security helps assure that aging parents, grandparents, and others will not be in great financial need.

Here, as elsewhere, we can only roughly compare support across some nations for particular policies, because identical survey questions from the same time have not been available. In Great Britain there was strong support for spending more on Old-Age Pensions (OAPs) from the late 1950s through the early 1970s. Much more recently, there has been continued strong support for improving the standard of living of pensioners. Retirement pensions have ranked first in priority for increased spending among social benefits, and only one percent of survey respondents have thought that too much was being spent on OAPs.[46]

Support for such social security schemes appears to be widespread. Like Social Security in the United States, Old-Age Security is the most popular social program in Canada. The increase in this support, which started in the 1950s and continued to 1970, has remained and is quite impressive. In 1974 over two-thirds of one survey's respondents thought that Old-Age Security benefits were too low, and young people were more supportive than those receiving the benefits.[47]

There has been strong support in Italy for increasing social security contributions as long as benefits were raised to "a decent level," although from 1978 to 1982 there was a slight drop in this support. We find similar support in Finland for increasing spending on national pensions, but some drop in enthusiasm from

[44] Shapiro and Smith, "Social Security."

[45] D. Garth Taylor, "American Politics, Public Opinion, and Social Security Financing" in Felicity Skidmore, ed., *Social Security Financing* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 235–273; Fay Lomax Cook and Edith J. Barrett, "Public Support for Social Security," *The Journal of Aging Studies*, forthcoming.

[46] Coughlin, *Ideology*; Heald and Wybrow, *The Gallup Survey of Britain.*

[47] Christopher Leman, *The Collapse of Welfare Reform: Political Institutions, Policy, and the Poor in Canada and the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980); Schwartz, *Public Opinion*; Coughlin, *Ideology.*

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1975 to 1980 as support for using taxes to finance such pensions remained high but dropped somewhat. In Norway a large percentage of the public has favored the status quo or an expansion of the general cradle-to-grave social security system.[48]

In the case of Denmark, there has been little support—appearing to drop even further from 1973 to 1977—for cuts in old age pensions, nursing homes, and pensions for the disabled. Danes have tended to favor greater spending for particular social purposes, and old-age pensions were one area in which from 1979 to 1985 the public increasingly felt that expenditures were too small. Even at the height of the antitax, antispending mood in 1973, few Danish survey respondents wanted cuts in old-age pensions.[49] In Germany, however, respondents in both 1981 and 1983 favored curtailing social security expenditures rather than increasing taxes or social security contributions.[50] Thus Europeans, with this possible exception, have been highly protective of their old-age and pensions systems—apparently even more defensive than Americans are toward Social Security.

### *Income Assistance*

In contrast to all other social welfare policies, public assistance programs for the poor are the most controversial. These policies remind many Americans of deadbeats, fraud, and entangled bureaucracies; and they appear to provide serious disincentives for employment. The American public has held mixed or ambivalent attitudes toward income assistance, even as the government has done more for the poor.[51]

As is well known, Americans are uneasy toward the terms "welfare" or "relief" (related terms are used in other countries) in contrast to "assistance for the poor" or similar phrases.[52] In principle, the public has been ready to help those in need and would like to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. But in practice, people compare the pros and cons of welfare and the needs and other characteristics of potential recipients.[53] Moreover, since Americans stop far short of seeking active efforts toward direct redistribution, they have preferred programs such as food stamps to broader policies such as a guaranteed income.

[48] Ferrera, "Italy"; Alestalo and Uusitalo, "Finland"; Stein Kuhnle, "Norway" in Peter Flora, ed., *Growth to Limits*, vol. 1, 117–196.

[49] Hibbs and Madsen, "Public Reaction"; Andersen, "Electoral Trends in Denmark"; Borre, "Recent Trends."

[50] Alber, "The West German Welfare State."

[51] For example, see Patterson, *America's Struggle Against Poverty*; Jennifer Hochschild, *What's Fair?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); McClosky and Zaller, *The American Ethos.*

[52] Smith summarizes this in "That Which We Call Welfare by Any Other Name Would Smell Sweeter: An Analysis of the Impact of Question Wording on Response Patterns," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 (Spring 1987): 75–83; see also Golding and Middleton, *Images of Welfare*; Taylor-Gooby, *Public Opinion, Ideology, and State Welfare.*

[53] For an analysis of the complexity of this, see Cook, *Who Should Be Helped?*

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Public preferences and subgroups differences concerning many of these related welfare issues do not appear to have changed very much since the 1930s. There was a modest liberalizing shift in preferences toward welfare and assistance for blacks in the 1960s; attitudes toward some issues leveled off or reversed by approximately 1974.[54] This was followed by a conservative shift up to the beginning of the 1980s. From the third quarter of 1981 to 1987 there was a liberal rebound in which opinions seemed to return to their 1970s levels. Since the political context and the meaning of many of the survey measures of preferences are not the same as those of the 1960s and 1970s, we cannot make exact comparisons. But in our judgment the public is more liberal on these issues than it was when President Jimmy Carter left office. The public reacted against the Reagan administration's original social welfare policies and especially spending reductions, some of which began under Carter and were consistent with the conservative movement of opinion during the mid to late 1970s. (See Figure 2.)[55]

There was clear liberal rebound in opinion, but it tapered off. Moreover, a full consensus toward income assistance is still far away, and the public may not have shifted back fully in its attitudes toward redistribution. The public has become more supportive of doing *something* about income inequality than it was a few years ago, but its renewed support for maintaining or expanding social welfare activity may not indicate a commensurate increase in support for significant measures to lessen the gap between the poor and those much better off. More so than before, it appears that opinion has shifted to a middle position in which citizens want both the government and individuals to take responsibility for dealing with economic hardships.[56]

To be sure, the idea that government responsibility should not be complete need not prevent further growth of social welfare programs in the United States. The Reagan administration may have helped to show, through its reluctant acceptance of government's current functions and responsibilities, what government's role should continue to be in providing public assistance—certainly like its active role in regulation of business and industry. Just as the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations provided Republican legitimacy for the foundation and expansion of the American welfare state, the Reagan administration, ironically, appears to have evoked the acceptance—even by conservative segments of the public—of government's responsibility for economic welfare.[57]

[54] Although this is not fully tracked by the available data; see Schiltz, *Social Security*; Erskine, "The Role of Government in Welfare"; Shapiro and Patterson, "The Dynamics of Public Opinion"; Kluegel, "Macro-economic Problems"; Tom W. Smith, "General Liberalism and Social Change in Post World War II America," *Social Indicators Research* 10 (January 1982): 1–28.

[55] Shapiro, et al., "Public Assistance"; Shapiro and Patterson, "The Dynamics of Public Opinion"; Ladd and Lipset, "Public Opinion and Public Policy"; Natalie Jaffe, "Appendix B."

[56] Shapiro et al., "Public Assistance"; Shapiro and Patterson, "The Dynamics of Public Opinion"; Karlyn H. Keene, "Who's the Fairest of Them All?" *Public Opinion* 7 (April/May 1984): 47–51.

[57] Shapiro et al., "Public Assistance"; Ladd and Lipset, "Public Opinion and Public Policy"; Hugh Heclo, "The Political Foundations of Anti-poverty Policy," paper presented at the Institute for Re-

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Outside of the United States there have been some striking similarities as well as differences; and there have been similar patterns of change during some periods. During the early to mid-1970s in Canada, there was a drop in support for a guaranteed income, although majority support remained strong, especially compared to American opinion on the issue. In Great Britain, the conservative shift in opinion toward income assistance that was followed by a reversal after 1979 falls into the general pattern described earlier. But public support for "reducing poverty" was high and stable overall from 1974 to 1984. The evidence for Sweden also depicts a backlash and rebound parallel to Britain's. From 1968 to 1979 support seemed to increase for reducing allowances and assistance, and this appeared to reverse itself from 1979 to 1982. Since the survey items which have been compared are different, the stability of opinion is perhaps more impressive than the pattern of change. During part of the same period, the data for Germany showed that the substantial opposition to reducing social transfers increased a bit further from 1975 to 1978, and that this was followed by a substantial conservative shift from 1978 to 1983.[58]

Support for other forms of income assistance and supplements that are not provided in the United States has tended to be more resistant to backlash than need-based assistance to the poor. These include such policies as child allowances and maternity benefits. In Denmark, from 1973 to 1977 there were few mentions of support for cuts in child allowances. In contrast to other policy areas, from 1975 to 1980 there was a small increase in support in Finland for the position that more taxes should be used to finance child and maternity allowances.[59]

### *Employment*

Government assistance in providing jobs is of great interest and concern everywhere. The American government has not been very active in this area since the New Deal and, to a lesser extent, since the job-training projects of the 1960s and 1970s.[60] The broader issue of employment policy has received even less attention; in fact, the lack of attention to it by American pollsters suggests that it is rarely debated in the media and consequently not much of a public issue.[61] In contrast,

search on Poverty Conference on "Poverty and Policy: Retrospect and Prospects," Williamsburg, Virginia, 6–8 December 1984.

[58] See Leman, *The Collapse of Welfare Reform*; Ian McAllister and Anthony Mughan, "Class, Attitudes, and Electoral Politics in Britain, 1974–1983," *Comparative Political Studies* 20 (April 1987): 47–71; see also Sarlvik and Crewe, *Decade of Dealignment*; Olson, "Sweden"; Alber, "The West German Welfare State."

[59] Hibbs and Madsen, "Public Reaction"; Alestalo and Uusitalo, "Finland."

[60] Donald C. Baumer and Carl E. Van Horn, *The Politics of Unemployment* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985).

[61] For example, Paul Osterman, "Labor Market Policy and Labor Markets: Lessons from Abroad," prepared for the Ford Foundation Project on the Future of the American Welfare State, 1986.

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unemployment compensation is a visible benefit involving substantial expenditures, and debates about it have involved the extension of benefits. In this instance, the lack of questions asked by pollsters reflects a very favorable public consensus toward this kind of assistance.

The public, of course, has been much less concerned about the amount that government spends on unemployment transfer payments than about actions directed at unemployment itself. Not surprisingly, the degree of public concern has depended upon the magnitude and duration of unemployment (versus inflation and other economic problems) and the economic status and other characteristics of citizens whose opinions are examined.[62]

Since the New Deal, there has been a recurring policy discussion about whether welfare assistance should involve work and, if needed, jobs that the government itself would help provide. Because of the work ethic and American values, there has always been overwhelming support for work in place of welfare, but the public has also disliked the unproductive work that some public jobs entail.

The public consensus is a rather nebulous one in search of a viable policy. This has provided an opportunity for national leadership and innovation that until recently had not been taken up since the actions and rhetoric of the New Deal. (The states, Congress, and the Reagan administration have virtually come to agreement on employment as a substitute for welfare). The one difference, in contrast to today's problems of structural unemployment and the "underclass," was that Roosevelt could treat employment programs as temporary until the economy heated up, which it did largely as the result of World War II. There has been no shortage of work-related proposals for dealing with the underclass.[63] Given the level of public support for providing jobs, in the abstract, it is striking that this preference has had relatively little impact on policy since the 1960s.

There is substantial variation in survey responses depending upon how questions are worded about government's role in making sure people have jobs.[64] Employment is perceived as less an entitlement than Social Security, medical care, or education. Americans clearly have mixed feelings about public service jobs, in which the government is a very active employer of last resort. In contrast, they tend to approve of more limited proposals, such as having the government provide productive work or training and education for young adults, and proposals that only vaguely describe guarantees of employment. Opposition increases as policy proposals deemphasize individual initiative or promise to guarantee an adequate

[62] Schiltz, *Social Security*; Erskine, "The Role of Government in Welfare"; Feagan, *Subordinating the Poor: Welfare and American Beliefs*; De Boer, "Attitudes Toward Unemployment"; Douglas A. Hibbs, "The Mass Public and Macroeconomic Performance: The Dynamics of Public Opinion Toward Unemployment and Inflation," *AJPS* 23 (November 1979): 705–731.

[63] For example, see Mickey Kaus, "The Work Ethic State," *The New Republic*, 7 July 1986, 22–33, and his critics.

[64] Shapiro et al., "Employment and Social Welfare"; Shapiro and Patterson, "The Dynamics of Public Opinion."

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standard of living; opposition decreases when the main alternatives to government employment assistance are welfare payments. For this reason, "workfare" proposals are popular among conservative segments of the public. Many liberals also support these proposals, but they may presume that not only will jobs and job training be provided, but also support services such as child care and medical care. In contrast, conservatives interpret workfare as forced self-help in which individuals and the private sector take the main responsibility for jobs and necessary services.

Americans' support for the expansion of child care facilities has increased because of the increasing numbers of women in the labor force and the need for two-wage earners to afford a middle-class standard of living. But the public has been hesitant in seeking government-provided child care services. Americans appear to be receptive to innovations such as unpaid "parental leaves," but thus far not toward paid leaves or job-sharing.[65]

Other nations provide a significant contrast with the United States. Unemployment benefits are not in dispute anywhere, although opinions toward increases in benefits at particular times may vary.[66] Clearly, in other welfare states (and communist and socialist nations) employment itself is viewed as much more of a right. Americans' attitudes and opinions differ in fundamental ways that presumably reflect ideological differences that have been long debated and discussed. These differences become apparent when employment is considered, although not nearly as much so as in the case of policies designed to redistribute income or wealth. There have been similarities in opinion shifts across nations on the urgency of employment and other economic issues, but there are some differences in how the public has viewed government actions.

From 1976 to 1984 in Great Britain there was a more than 35 percentage point shift in the percentage of the public preferring that the government devote attention to unemployment rather than inflation. This no doubt has been the common pattern as unemployment levels have increased relative to prices in particular countries, although Americans seem to be more adverse to high inflation than citizens elsewhere. But what is striking in the case of Britain under Thatcher is that by 1984 support for the government guaranteeing jobs and a decent standard of living was 10 percentage points higher than it was in 1947 during a socialist administration.[67] In contrast, when it has come to proposals that government finance projects to create new jobs, even when American support has remained high, it has been surpassed by support in other countries.[68] There is evidence for substantial sup-

[65] Shapiro et al., "Employment and Social Welfare."

[66] See Andersen, "Electoral Trends in Denmark"; and Alestalo and Uusitalo, "Finland," who describe support for increases in expenditures on employment benefits in Denmark from 1979 to 1985, and the absence of change in opinion toward unemployment insurance in Finland from 1975 to 1980; but see Johansen, "Denmark."

[67] See King in Gergen and King, "Following the Leaders"; the data in Smith, "The Welfare State"; the data for the Netherlands in David Capitanchik and Richard Eichenberg, *Defence and Public Opinion*, Chatham House Papers 20 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983).

[68] Coughlin, *Ideology*; Smith, "The Welfare State."

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port in Canada and for large differences between the United States and Italy and Great Britain. But only slight, insignificant differences exist between the United States and West Germany and Austria.[69] Americans are also less supportive of other ways of reducing unemployment. But Americans are most distinctive concerning government's responsibility to "provide a job for everyone who wants one" or making sure "that everyone who wants a job can have one": the differences in agreement to these statements between Americans and the citizens of several European countries have been 20 percentage points or more.[70]

The available evidence on foreign support for child care programs and expenditures is limited, but it is consistent with the acceptance and continued support for these policies. There was a slight increase in public support in Denmark for expenditures on day care institutions from 1979 to 1985. Similarly, data for Yugoslavia show a comparable liberal trend during a longer period of retrenchment from 1968 to 1983.[71]

*Medical Care*

There are major differences in how medical care is provided and paid for in the United States and other affluent western democracies. American policies have changed slowly but substantially in recent years. Rising medical costs have been the catalyst for change, and the Reagan administration and budget cuts have altered the course of health policy. The problems of equity and access to medical care have continued for the poor and the uninsured, and there have been recurring debates about forms of national health insurance.[72] Other influences on the cost of medical care have also started to gain prominence: an aging and older population, long-term care, catastrophic care, prevention, the development and use of new technology, malpractice, and the accountability of the medical profession. The public has only begun to get acquainted with the new ways in which patient care is provided, insured, and paid for—larger insurance premiums, deductibles, out-of-pocket expenses; the uses of preferred provider organizations, health maintenance organizations, and prospective payment cost controls.

Americans' support for medical care is virtually on par with Social Security as an entitlement.[73] This support appears to have been strikingly stable for de-

[69] Schwartz, *Public Opinion*; Clarke and Zuk, "The Politics of Party Popularity"; Smith, "The Welfare State"; Roger Jowell and Sharon Witherspoon provide further evidence for very high and stable preferences in Britain during the 1980s in *British Social Attitudes: The 1985 Report* (Brookfield, Vt.: Gower Publishing Company, 1985).

[70] Smith, "The Welfare State."

[71] Andersen, Electoral Trends"; Jambrek, "Socialism Without Welfare?"; see also Johansen, "Denmark."

[72] Erskine, "Health Insurance"; John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984); Theodore R. Marmor, *The Politics of Medicare* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970).

[73] Shapiro and Young, "Medical Care"; Cook and Barrett, "Public Support for Social Security."

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cades and shows some striking similarity with other affluent western countries.[74] Support for additional government medical spending and action has been consistently high in general (see Figure 1), especially because these policies benefit the elderly and the poor who are perceived to be truly needy. The public appears to be motivated by compassion and altruism, although some personal interests cannot be ruled out.[75]

Overall, the survey data suggest that changes in American health care thus far have not had substantial effect on the public's general satisfaction with medical care and insurance. In addition to challenging high costs, however, Americans appear to be more critical, litigious, and scrutinizing of doctors and hospitals than in the past. Systematic evidence concerning the consequences of various reforms and policy changes has not yet been examined fully, but given the medical services it has come to expect, the public will tend to oppose drastic changes in access or quality such as rationing of health care and abuses or widespread errors in judgment that occur in the name of "cost effectiveness."[76]

On the other hand, there appears to be an underlying ambivalence making the public receptive to incremental changes of the sort that have occurred in the past with Medicare, Medicaid, federal encouragement for health maintenance organizations and certain types of specialized treatments, and, currently, prospective payment controls and changes in employer-provided health plans. Such policies—along with persuasive efforts at opinion leadership—could move the country closer to some form of national health insurance. "National health insurance" in the abstract has generally had substantial support. But as was observed more than forty years ago, this has not necessarily been support for insurance or health services provided by the government, but rather the wish that the federal government guide private and public efforts to provide and pay for medical care.[77] Americans have always been willing and eager to look to market competition for solutions—especially a market tending toward a surplus of medical providers—but typically with desirable government regulation in the wings, should anything go wrong.[78]

The United States is quite similar to other countries in that its public views medical

[74] See Coughlin, *Ideology*; Bernice A. Pescosolido, Carol A. Boyer, and Wai Ying Tsui, "Medical Care in the Welfare State: A Crossnational Study of Public Evaluations," *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 26 (December 1985): 276–297.

[75] Cook, *Who Should be Helped?*; Steven R. Steiber and Leonard A. Ferber, "Support for National Health Insurance: Intercohort Differentials," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45 (Summer 1981): 179–198.

[76] Shapiro and Young, "Medical Care"; Kenneth E. John, "Americans' Satisfaction with Health Care is on the Decline," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 10 June 1985, 38.

[77] See Humphrey Taylor, "Healing the Health Care System," *Public Opinion* (August/September 1985): 16–20, 60; Stanley L. Payne, "Some Opinion Research Principles Developed Through Studies of Social Medicine," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 10 (Spring 1946): 93–98.

[78] Robert Y. Shapiro and John M. Gillroy, "The Polls: Regulation," Part I and Part II, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48 (Summer and Fall 1984): 531–542, 666–677; Ladd and Lipset, "Public Opinion and Public Policy"; see also David A. Rochefort and Carol A. Boyer, "Use of Public Opinion Data in Public Administration: Health Care Polls," *Public Administration Review* 48 (March/April 1988): 649–660.

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care as an entitlement and desires to prevent cuts in government spending and services when they are threatened. But as in the case of other entitlements, there are some differences in attitudes as well. Again, even though very large majorities view medical care as government's responsibility, public opinion is more nearly unanimous in European countries; and there has often been more support in Europe for increasing expenditures.[79]

For Great Britain, in particular, support for greater spending on the National Health Service remained steady at better than the 85 percent level from 1974 to 1983. In contrast, some authors have emphasized the increase in support that occurred for the private provision of medical care. Whether some provision of private care conflicts with the objectives of a welfare state is a complex question for the future. In Denmark, the percentage of the public responding that expenditures on health services were "too small" increased by nearly 30 percentage points from 1979 to 1985. In contrast, in Yugoslavia there was a 20 percent drop from 1968 to 1983 in support for increasing public funds on health care. In Finland, the percentage wanting more taxes spent on sickness insurance decreased from 1975 to 1980.[80]

### *Education*

In contrast to other social welfare issues, education is the one policy area in which U.S. public opinion often stands out as more supportive than public opinion in other welfare states. Aside from the specific issues of aid to parochial schools and matters related to school desegregation, which bogged down U.S. federal action in the 1950s and early 1960s, there has been strong and steady support for aid to education (see Figure 1) and the desire for improvements in education at all levels. Several influences on opinion are unequivocally at work here: children and young adults are the well-regarded beneficiaries of this form of assistance; education provides a means to employment and upward mobility; education is not only a private good but also a public good affecting the nation's technological sophistication, productivity, and overall effectiveness (and, of course, it can also be a means of social control).[81] Unlike other social welfare issues in the United States, there

[79] Smith, "The Welfare State."

[80] Taylor-Gooby, *Public Opinion, Ideology, and State Welfare*; McAllister and Mughan "Class, Attitudes, and Electoral Politics"; Sarlvik and Crewe, *Decade of Dealignment*; Harris and Seldon, *Over-Ruled on Welfare*; Taylor-Gooby, *Public Opinion, Ideology, and State Welfare*; Andersen, "Electoral Trends"; Jambrek, "Socialism Without Welfare?"; Alestalo and Uusitalo, "Finland."

[81] See James L. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968); Susan Esser, "Public Opinion and Policy Change: A Case Study of Federal Aid for Elementary and Secondary School Construction, 1954–1965," unpublished paper, University of Chicago, 1980; Tom W. Smith, "Public Support for Education Spending: Trends, Rankings, and Models, 1971–1978" in Kevin J. Gilmartin and Robert S. Rossi, eds., *Monitoring Education Outcomes and Public Attitudes* (New York: Human Sciences Press, 1982); Fay Lomax Cook and Penny A. Sebring, "An Analysis of Public Support for Public Education," unpublished, North-

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was little, if any, opinion change in a conservative direction beginning in the mid-1970s. But there has clearly been a liberal trend in support for increased government action in the 1980s, if not earlier.[82]

Comparisons with other nations on this issue are striking, since this is the one policy area for which there is greater public support and in many ways greater policy effort (for example, in the area of higher education) in the United States than in other countries. Although the publics of some other countries are more likely to consider education as an essential government responsibility, Americans are substantially more concerned about providing college opportunities for young people and spending much more on education. In contrast, however, Americans, not surprisingly, tend to prefer loans to grants for poor students and good students alike.[83]

European countries have not consistently shown the recent increase in public support for spending on education that has occurred in the United States. On the one hand, from 1973 to 1977 in Denmark there was a decline in the already low level of support for cuts in student grants; from 1979 to 1985 there was a significant increase in the percentage of the public responding that educational expenditures were too small. In contrast, the spirit of retrenchment elsewhere carried over to education. From 1968 to 1983 there was nearly a 20 percentage point drop in providing more public funds for education in Yugoslavia; and in West Germany support for reductions rose a bit from 1978 to 1983 after dropping three years earlier. In Britain, there was a dramatic decline of nearly 30 percentage points in support for "Establishing Comprehensive Schools" from 1974 to 1983, which is not easy to explain in light of other liberal trends on social welfare issues. In contrast, the increase from 1963 to 1978 in support for "contracting out to pay for private education" was consistent with other conservative shifts in preferences.[84]

### *Other Issues: Housing and Urban Problems*

The above policy areas are not the only types of social welfare policies, and particular categories of programs and policies are not the same across nations. For some issues, there have not been studies of public preferences simply because there is

western University, 1982; "Opinion Roundup: Looking at Education in America," *Public Opinion* (Summer 1986): 33–39; S. M. Elam, ed., *A Decade of Gallup Polls of Attitudes Toward Education 1969–1978*," (Bloomington, Ind.: Phi Delta Kappa, 1978).

[82] "Opinion Roundup Looking at Education"; Shapiro and Patterson, "The Dynamics of Public Opinion."

[83] See Smith, "The Welfare State."

[84] See Hibbs and Madsen, "Public Reaction"; Andersen, "Electoral Trends"; Jambrek, "Socialism Without Welfare?"; Alber, "The West German Welfare State"; McAllister and Mughan "Class, Attitudes, and Electoral Politics"; Harvey Goldstein, "Educational Issues and Priorities" in Roger Jowell and Colin Airey, eds., *British Social Attitudes: the 1984 Report*, (Brookfield, Vt.: Gower Publishing Company, 1984), 105–119; Harris and Seldon, *Over-Ruled on Welfare*.

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little survey data available. This is the case for housing, which has not been a major area of social welfare activity in the United States, particularly when compared to other countries. Survey data for the United States have dealt primarily with property taxes, home mortgages, tax deductions, and housing assistance for the poor, although only the latter is perceived as a social welfare benefit.

Housing is considered more of a government responsibility or entitlement in Europe than in the United States. It is a policy area, however, that has evoked positive, not negative, reactions on the part of Americans as revealed in surveys and by reactions in the media to the problem of homelessness and difficulties encountered by the poor and part of the middle class in finding suitable and affordable homes.[85]

Housing as a state responsibility is a much broader undertaking in Europe, where rent and housing allowances and public housing are more widespread than in the United States. In Britain the privatization of council houses became a controversial social welfare reform, sharply dividing the political parties, but apparently accepted as a legacy of the Thatcher years. Such privatization may not undermine the welfare state, and housing has been a less urgent issue in Britain than in the past. Housing was a serious problem in Europe after World War II. Housing shortages have been considered great national problems at various times, for example, in the Netherlands from 1977 to 1980.[86]

Public opinion toward housing assistance did not consistently demonstrate the backlash that appeared for other welfare state issues. In Denmark there was no change in support for cuts in rent allowances from 1973 to 1977; and in Yugoslavia there was an increase in support for the use of more public funds on housing from 1968 to 1978, although this reversed fully by 1983. From 1975 to 1980, in Finland there was a decline in support for financing housing allowances at a higher level.[87]

Urban problems in the United States and the related issue of assistance to blacks and minorities are social welfare matters that should be examined separately because of the connections that citizens, elites, and the media have drawn between them and other social welfare problems.[88] The policies and politics of American cities since the 1960s have involved economic problems and racial issues related to poverty and urban blight. Although Americans have not necessarily seen these issues as a piece, opinion trends for them have followed the same pattern as prefer-

[85] A sizeable majority agree that it is an important or essential government responsibility; Smith, "The Welfare State."

[86] See Elizabeth A. Roistacher, "Housing and the Welfare State in the United States and Western Europe," paper prepared for the Ford Foundation Project on the Future of the American Welfare State, 1986; Nick Bosanquet, "Interim Report: Housing" in Jowell, Witherspoon, and Brook, eds., *The 1986 Report*; Capitanchik and Eichenberg, *Defence and Public Opinion*.

[87] Hibbs and Madsen, "Public Reaction"; Jambrek, "Socialism Without Welfare?"; Alestalo and Uusitalo, "Finland."

[88] Gerald Wright Jr., "Race and Welfare Policy in America," *Social Science Quarterly* 57 (March 1977): 718–730.

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ences toward welfare assistance for the poor: there have been some mixed or otherwise ambivalent feelings, although the public has always been much more supportive of aid to minorities and cities than it has been to spending on "welfare." There was the same modest liberal trend during the 1960s, leveling off by the early 1970s, followed by a conservative shift into the early 1980s and a liberal rebound into the mid-1980s.[89]

More recently the American public may have developed a different view of cities, one that is quite favorable toward state and local governments and one in which the preferred level of direct federal involvement is less than during the past twenty years. The public has supported the position that state and local governments, as the Reagan administration intended, should take on greater policy responsibilities. But the relative increase in public support for federal assistance does not seem to be commensurate with the outside help these governments would need, unless they substantially increase their revenues. This may be an important change in how the public sees cities and state governments in the American welfare state.[90]

### *Redistribution and Ideology*

More so recently than in 1980, the American public supports doing *something* in principle about income inequality, but the renewed support for maintaining or expanding social welfare activity does not involve great fervor for directly narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor. The public appears to be content with policies that make everyone better off, involving both government action and the initiative of individuals. The public has always been ready to have the private sector do what it can, for bringing about greater equality at the expense of individuals was never the purpose of the American welfare state. The public agrees that redistribution is desirable, but it is not essential that government work actively toward it.[91]

Moreover, the public has become even more critical of the seemingly progressive income tax than of other taxes. It continues to complain least about regressive Social Security taxes.[92] Liberal and progressive leaders in the United States have apparently failed to educate citizens about the effects of taxes and spending on redistribution; or the public may be relatively easy to manipulate or deceive in such fundamental but complex economic matters.[93] This may be why the public has generally opposed measures that would explicitly and substantially redistribute wealth. To the extent efforts to equalize wealth are considered important activities

[89] Shapiro and Patterson, "The Dynamics of Public Opinion."
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Shapiro and Smith, "Social Security."
[93] Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society*, (London: Quartet Books, 1969); David Stockman, *The Triumph of Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986); Page, *Who Gets What from Government?*

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of welfare states, redistributive policies in the United States—which have never been extensive or effective to begin with[94]—may have received an enduring setback in the public mind during the Reagan years. The one exception is the public's support for closing tax loopholes that benefit mainly the wealthy.

Americans would like everyone to have a job but prefer that government provide these jobs only when the alternative solutions are worse from the standpoint of individualism, the work ethic, and related values. This reasoning applies to an even greater extent to public preferences toward redistributive policies. These opinions reflect an ideology that is not yet reconciled with the principles underlying other more extensive welfare states. The differences among welfare states may have resulted largely from these ideological differences. Although the processes by which ideologies or ideas have particular consequences have not been fully described, the public opinion evidence is consistent with this argument.[95] American elites as well as the mass public have consistently shown the least support among welfare states for reducing differences in economic status.[96] Past and especially present data have shown that Americans are about half as likely as Europeans to respond that the government is responsible for reducing income differences between the rich and poor. Americans apparently prefer to rely on their open society and the upward mobility of new generations—or they have come to accept or support inequality.[97]

Overall, American opinion toward redistribution has been quite stable. The data show a conservative movement that had reversed, but not fully, and in such a way that the public in the mid-1980s tended toward a middle position. There is some evidence that public opinion became slightly less supportive of efforts to reduce inequality at times during the late 1970s and early 1980s in West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and Denmark.[98] But we can track later reversals in Great Britain and Northern Ireland and in Denmark,

[94] For example, Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality*; and Page, *Who Gets What from Government?*

[95] Coughlin, *Ideology*; King, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Policies of Governments"; Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality*; Heclo, "The Political Foundations of Anti-poverty Policy"; Judith Russell, "Ideas, Elites, and Antipoverty Policy," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1987.

[96] For example, Verba and Orren, *Equality in America*; see also Verba et al., *Elites*.

[97] Coughlin, *Ideology, Public Opinion, and Welfare Policy*; Smith, "The Welfare State"; Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology*, (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Hochschild, *What's Fair?*; McClosky and Zaller, *The American Ethos*; Stanley Feldman, "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values," *AJPS* 32 (May 1988): 416–440.

[98] Eichenberg, *Society and Security in Western Europe*; McAllister and Mughan, "Class, Attitudes, and Electoral Politics"; Sarlvik and Crewe, *Decade of Dealignment*; Laura Crockett and Christopher Wlezien, "Corporatism, Pluralism, and Representation: Public Opinion and Social Welfare Policy in the European Economic Community," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. 1987; Capitanchik and Eichenberg, *Defence and Public Opinion*, 28; Olaf Petersson and Henry Valen, "Political Cleavages in Sweden and Norway," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 2 (1979): 313–331.

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where the rebound may have been especially great.[99] Since these findings are based on comparisons of survey question that have different wordings, and because changes in opinion were small, our conclusion is that opinion in the above countries was quite stable (and in Belgium and Ireland public support may have increased slightly), showing persistent and large majority support for reducing inequality.

## Effect of Public Opinion on Policy

Given the interesting but sparse comparative research on the nature and dynamics of public preferences, it was not surprising to find little systematic research on the effects of public preferences on policies. Some relevant discussion occurred in the studies we have already reviewed, especially those addressing the effect of public opinion and ideology on the development of welfare states. But little of the research examined the degree or frequency of the influence of public preferences on policies, a matter central to theories about democracy. Such theories ought to be pertinent not only to the United States but to other ostensibly democratic nations as well.[100]

One might have expected concern for the future of the welfare state in the West to have produced more research beyond important early discussions, which considered the role that public opinion might play in policy making.[101] Even if public preferences did not generally affect policies, they might be more likely to do so under certain forms of representation of interests. The only genuinely comparative study that examined this matter directly found that greater representation on issues of redistribution and welfare occurred under corporatist forms of interest organization.[102]

While the overall findings are mixed and some authors have argued that public opinion has little to do with social welfare policy making beyond providing a broad

[99] Crockett and Wlezien, "Corporatism, Pluralism, and Representation"; Andersen, "Electoral Trends"; but see the data in Johansen, "Denmark."

[100] See Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Donald J. Devine, *The Attentive Public: Polyarchial Democracy* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970); Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957); Robert Weissberg, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976).

[101] Schiltz, *Social Security*; Coughlin, *Ideology*; Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality*; Wilensky, "Democratic Corporatism, Consensus, and Social Policy"; and Wilensky, "Political Legitimacy and Consensus: Missing Variables in the Assessment of Social Policy" in S. E. Spiro and E. Yuchtman, ed., *Evaluating the Welfare State: Social Political Perspectives* (New York: Academic Press, 1983), 51–74; see also Flora, ed., *Growth to Limits*, vol. 1 and vol. 2. Although there has been much analysis of welfare spending and policies in advanced industrial democracies, the impact of public preferences has received little consideration. For a good example and review of this literature, see Fred C. Pampel and John B. Williamson, "Welfare Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950–1980," *American Journal of Sociology* 93 (May 1988): 1424–1456.

[102] Crockett and Wlezien, "Corporatism, Pluralism, and Representation."

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constraint, there is considerable evidence that changes in American government policies have corresponded in a number of ways with public preferences.[103] Less—and less direct—evidence has been presented for this in Great Britain than the United States, and this has been even more so for other countries. Moreover, competing views have been offered by British scholars in evaluating elitist versus pluralistic or more populistic theories about political power and democracy.[104]

Studies of representation in Congress, which do not deal directly with enacted policies, have found stronger relationships between constituency preferences and members' roll call voting on social welfare issues than was initially reported in Warren Miller and Donald Stokes' classic study.[105] Greater correspondence can also be found when the analysis shifts from pairings of district-member dyads to collective representation.[106] Neither the representation studies nor the studies

[103] Heclo, "The Political Foundations of Anti-poverty Policy"; Kluegel, "Macro-economic Problems"; Devine, *The Attentive Public*; Alan D. Monroe, "Consistency Between Public Preferences and National Policy Decisions, *American Politics Quarterly* 7 (January 1979): 3–19; and Monroe, "American Party Platforms and Public Opinion," *AJPS* 27 (February 1983): 27–42; Page and Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy; "Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Dynamics of Public Opinion and Public Policy*, diss., University of Chicago, 1982; Rochefort, *American Social Welfare Policy*; Jack Knight, "Welfare Spending 1972–1978: A Case Study in Democratic Responsiveness," M. A. paper, University of Chicago, 1980; Lawrence R. Jacobs, *A Social Interpretation of Institutional Change*, diss., Columbia University, 1989; Robert Y. Shapiro and Lawrence R. Jacobs, "The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Public Policy" in Samuel Long, ed., *Political Behavior Annual* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Ernest H. Wohlenberg, "A Regional Approach to Public Attitudes and Public Assistance," *Social Service Review* 50 (September 1976); Gerald C. Wright, Robert S. Erikson, and John P. McIver, "Public Opinion and Policy Liberalism in the American States," *AJPS* 31 (November 1987): 980–1001; David Lowery, Virginia Gray, and Gregory Hager, "Public Opinion and Policy Change in the American States," *American Politics Quarterly*, forthcoming.

[104] See Paul Whitely, "Public Opinion and the Demand for Social Welfare in Britain," *Journal of Social Policy* 10 (1981): 453–475; Christopher Hewitt, "Policy-making in Postwar Britain: A National-level Test of Elitist and Pluralist Hypotheses," *British Journal of Political Science* 4 (April 1974): 187–216; and Hewitt, "Elites and the Distribution of Power" in Philip Stanforth and Anthony Giddens, eds., *Elites and Power in British Society* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Rudolf Klein, "The Case for Elitism: Public Opinion and Public Policy," *The Political Quarterly* 45 (October–December 1974): 406–417; Joel E. Brooks, "Democratic Frustration in the Anglo-American Polities: A Quantification of Inconsistency Between Mass Public Opinion and Public Policy," *The Western Political Science Quarterly* 30 (June 1985): 250–261; Jacobs, *A Social Interpretation of Institutional Change*.

[105] Robert S. Erikson, "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination of the Miller-Stokes Data, *AJPS* 22 (August 1978): 511–535; Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. Shapiro, Paul W. Gronke, and Robert M. Rosenberg, "Constituency, Party, and Representation in Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48 (Winter 1984): 741–756; Walter J. Stone, "Electoral Change and Policy Representation in Congress: Domestic Welfare Issues from 1956–1972," *British Journal of Political Science* 12 (January 1982): 95–115; Donald J. McCrone and Walter J. Stone, "The Structure of Constituency Representation: On Theory and Method," *Journal of Politics* 48 (November 1986): 956–975; Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *APSR* 57 (March 1963): 45–56.

[106] Robert Weissberg, "Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress," *APSR* 72 (June 1978): 535–547; Patricia A. Hurley, "Collective Representation Reappraised," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 7 (February 1982): 119–136.

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of different types of opinion-policy congruence, however, have been able to distinguish among different types of social welfare policies.

Outside the United States the overall evidence is less clear. It may be the case that the relationship between opinion and policy is weaker than in the United States. Some interesting evidence suggests that even when preferences and policies do show some congruence, this occurs less frequently for redistributive policies than for other domestic issues. This is consistent with theories about the politics of distribution, regulation, and redistribution.[107]

Constituency representation in European legislatures on economic welfare issues has been difficult to disentangle in studies of Italy, France, and elsewhere. Greater constituency-legislator agreement has been found when the representives' constituents within their party are distinguished from other constituents.[108] Also, one study comparing mass and elite preferences across several European nations found a substantial and more general mass-elite link on redistributive issues.[109] A moderately large correlation has been found between West German constituencies' and representatives' opinions, but the relationship was weaker than on non-welfare issues.[110] Moreover, a recent study directly examining majority opinion and policy found that overall there was little opinion-policy congruence in France, Britain, and Canada, and that public opinion was less influential on redistributive issues than on non-redistributive ones. This weaker relationship for redistributive policies has also been found for the United States.[111]

## Conclusion

The observation in this article that there is a dearth of comparative research is certainly not new. In 1973 Anthony King noted that it was a reflection on the interests of political scientists at that time that no one since the publication of Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk's *Public Opinion, 1935–1946* had been interested in compiling across nations—to say nothing of analyzing—data on public opinion

[107] Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy Case Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics* 16 (July 1964): 677–715.

[108] Samuel Barnes, *Representation in Italy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce, *Political Representation in France* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).

[109] Russel J. Dalton, "Political Parties and Political Representation: Party Supporters and Party Elites in Nine Nations," *Comparative Political Studies* 18 (October 1985): 267–299; Verba and Orren, *Equality in America*; Verba et al., *Equality*.

[110] Barbara G. Farah, *Political Representation in West Germany*, diss., University of Michigan, 1980; and Farah, "The Institution and Maintenance of Representation in West Germany" in W. Phillips Shively, ed., *The Research Process in Political Science* (Itasca, Ill.: Peacock Publishers, 1984).

[111] See Joel E. Brooks, "Democratic Frustration in the Anglo-American Polities"; and "The Opinion-policy Nexus in France: Do Institutions and Ideology Make a Difference?" *The Journal of Politics* 49 (May 1987): 465–480; Monroe, "Consistency Between Public Preferences and National Policy Decisions"; Page and Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy"; Shapiro, *The Dynamics of Public Opinion and Public Policy*."

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toward social welfare policy or other domestic issues.[112] In the last fifteen years there has not been very much progress, despite the growth of survey research and the greater availability of public opinion and other data.[113]

Even in the case of the United States there is much to be learned, as Fay Lomax Cook most notably has pointed out. We can only expand upon her appraisal and emphasize that we should not be concerned only with public opinion and policy making in the United States, but in other countries as well. It is necessary to understand further the multidimensional nature of policies and preferences toward social welfare issues: different kinds of programs, the needs of different beneficiaries, and the different origins of preferences found in ideology, values, and beliefs.[114]

We must also ask systematically and comparatively: What are the psychological referents of "welfare" (and terms with analogous connotations in different countries) and the "welfare state?" How are mass (aggregate and subgroups') and elite beliefs structured and organized? How homogeneous or heterogeneous is the public in its patterns of policy preferences, and why? To what extent are preferences motivated by personal interests versus concerns for the well-being of others or the nation? In what ways are constraints taken into account in opinion formation and change, as in the taxing/spending tradeoff?[115] To what extent are the public and policy makers aware of and influenced by opportunities for change? In what ways are possible negative side effects of policies and reforms taken into account? How do citizens think about the appropriate role for government, the private sector, and individuals and their families in a welfare state? What are the decision makers' sources of information about public opinion? To what extent have governments been responsive to public preferences toward different policies? In what countries and types of political systems? Under what sorts of government structures, party

[112] King, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Policies of Governments Part II," 412–413 and n. 8; Hadley Cantril with Mildred Strunk, *Public Opinion, 1935–1946* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951).

[113] There are survey organizations in at least fifty countries, and election studies somewhat analogous to the American National Election Studies have been done in twenty or more. There have also been an increasing number of published and unpublished reports of survey results and trends. See Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings, eds., *Index to International Public Opinion, 1977–1984*, several volumes, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978–1985); Paul de Guchteneire, Lawrence Leduc, and Richard G. Niemi, "A Compendium of Academic Survey Studies of Elections Around the World," *Electoral Studies* 4 (August 1985): 159–174; Robert Y. Shapiro and John T. Young, "Public Opinion and Policy Change: Comparisons Across Nations," Columbia University, 1987.

[114] See Fay Lomax Cook, "Public Opinion and Social Welfare Policy," from which some of the remainder of this article is drawn; Heclo, "The Political Foundations of Anti-poverty Policy"; Cook, *Who Should Be Helped*?; Coughlin, *Ideology*; Hochschild, *What's Fair*?; McClosky and Zaller, *The American Ethos*; Feldman, "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion."

[115] Susan Welch, "The 'More for Less' Paradox: Public Attitudes on Taxing and Spending," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49 (Fall 1985): 310–316; Terry Nichols Clark, ed., *Citizen Preferences and Urban Public Policies: Models, Measures, and Uses* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976).

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systems, and ways in which interests are organized?[116] What types of influences do the mass media have? Do policy makers currently have such great interest in what the press report that it is important to know how social welfare issues are portrayed?[117] How have welfare issues been reported and how has this changed our time?

We think that these are the kinds of important and specific questions that ought to be examined. Further research should follow up more actively than has been done thus far on King's rather penetrating observation about the interests of political scientists—and political science.

[116] Dalton, "Political Parties and Political Representation"; Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality*, "Democratic Corporatism, Consensus, and Social Policy," and "Political Legitimacy and Consensus"; Coughlin, *Ideology*; Crockett and Wlezien, "Corporatism, Pluralism, and Representation."

[117] For example, see Goldberg and Middleton, *Images of Welfare*; Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, *News that Matters* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987).

* Fay Lomax Cook, Lewis Edinger, Richard Eichenberg, Lawrence Jacobs, Mark Kesselman, Philip Oldenburg, Judith Russell, Tom W. Smith, Hilary Silver, Barbara Farah, Ester Fuchs, Terry Nichols Clark, Steven Farkas, Charles V. Hamilton, Kelly Patterson, Harpreet Mahajan, Benjamin Page, Douglas Chalmers, Demetrios Caraley, and Kurt von Mettenheim provided useful discussions concerning this article. This is part of a larger project on public opinion, policy making, and the media at Columbia University's Center for the Social Sciences. Support has been provided by the Spencer Foundation, the Ford Foundation Project on Social Welfare and the American Future, and Columbia University. The responsibility for analysis and interpretation is our own.

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# How Exceptional is the American Political Economy?

RICHARD ROSE

Statements about government involve implicit or explicit comparison. Studies of the growth of government make within-nation comparisons of the present and past size of government.[1] But concentration upon one particular country limits the capacity for generalization. Comparing the size of governments in different advanced industrial societies provides a standard for measuring the size of government relative to its national product; by this standard a country with a small population such as Sweden can have a bigger government than countries with the population of the United States or Japan. Comparing the rate at which government has grown in different nations provides a standard for determining whether American government is growing faster or slower than average, and thus, whether it is becoming more like other mixed-economy welfare states, or increasingly exceptional.

Two quotations from Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1835) illustrate the widespread ambivalence about the political economy of the United States.

> In America I saw more than America; I sought there the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character, its prejudices and its passions, in order to learn what we have to fear or to hope from its progress (Part 1, Book 1).

[1] On this logic of comparison, see Richard Rose, "Comparative Policy Analysis: the Program Approach" in Mattei Dogan, ed., *Comparing Pluralist Democracies* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988).

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> The position of America is quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one . . . . Let us cease then to view all democratic nations under the mark of the American people, and let us attempt to survey them at length with their own proper features (Part 11, Book 1).

Social science theories about the growth of government normally assume general applicability; what is true of Europe should be true of America, and vice versa. For example, Michael Lewis-Beck and Tom W. Rice conclude an analysis of government growth in America with the statement: "We see no reason why this model of government growth, although developed out of the United States experience, would not be applicable in its essentials to other advanced capitalist democracies."[2]

By contrast, most American historians endorse what might be called the Thoreau hypothesis: America marches to a different drummer. Its uniqueness is explained by any or all of a variety of reasons: history, size, geography, political institutions, and culture. Explanations of the growth of government in Europe are not expected to fit American experience, and vice versa.[3] This assumption is often shared by Eurocentric studies that treat the welfare state as the quasi-teleological end of a process of political development. Theories of convergence start by assuming that nations and governments have differed, but hypothesize that they are becoming more alike. Little scholarly attention is given to a fourth possibility that the political economies of advanced industrial societies are diverging.

The object here is to test whether or not the United States has a big government and whether its postwar growth has been normal or exceptional among advanced industrial nations. The first section reviews theories about the growth of government. The second shows that by comparison with other advanced industrial nations America is today exceptional in total public expenditure, in major program priorities, and in the value of public benefits. Another distinctive feature is emphasized in the third section: government in America has been growing more slowly than the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average. However, America is not exceptional, for the political economies of advanced industrial societies have been diverging. Living in a rich society with a not-so-big government is the situation of most people in the OECD world today. The conclusion considers the implications of America now representing an alternative to the European-style welfare state, a society that is more like Japan and other Pacific Basin nations in the emphasis placed upon non-state provision for well-being.

[2] Michael Lewis-Beck and Tom W. Rice, "Government Growth in the United States," *Journal of Politics* 47(February 1985): 25. However, Rice does not try to confirm this hypothesis in "The Determinants of Western European Government Growth: 1950–1980," *Comparative Political Studies* (July 1986): 233–58.

[3] Comparative analyses often conclude by emphasizing American uniqueness. See Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955); S.M. Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963); C. Vann Woodward, ed., *The Comparative Approach to American History* (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

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## Theories of Government Growth: Convergence or Divergence?

The starting point for comparing governments is the succinct German Marshall Fund statement that there are "certain problems common to industrial societies." Comparing OECD nations directs analysis to democratic systems that have the resources to finance the programs of big government. But the term political economy does not mean that politics can be reduced to economics. The basic theoretical and empirical question is: What proportion of the national product of rich societies do we expect popularly elected governments to claim? Theories of political economy differ greatly in what they predict.

*Common or similar path.* Universalist theories assume that all advanced industrial societies, including the United States, ought to respond much the same to common functional problems. A single ideal-type industrial or post-industrial society is identified that all nations should tend toward as part of a unilinear process of change. In the late nineteenth century Adolph Wagner postulated a "law" that economic growth leads to a disproportionately faster rate of growth in government. Demand is expected to rise faster for the goods and services that the state can supply, such as education, income security, and environmental amenities, than for private-sector goods and services. A host of theorists have subsequently restated and expanded Wagner's Law.[4] Contemporary economists concerned with the growth of government have also emphasized the universal application of their logic, including Anthony Downs's and John K. Galbraith's theories of why government should grow more slowly than the economy overall.[5]

A universalist model may be expanded to explain variations around an ideal-type mean through multivariate analysis. David Cameron's study of differences in aggregate public expenditure among OECD nations is a well known example of this genre. Observed differences in public expenditure were explained in terms of differences in the extent to which these nations had open economies.[6] Francis Castles and colleagues start from the recognition of a degree of difference in the size of governments and emphasize that this shows that "parties matter."[7] Harold Wilensky starts by emphasizing socioeconomic differences accounting for the level

[4] For a full discussion and citations, see Daniel Tarschys, "The Growth of Public Expenditures: Nine Modes of Explanation," *Scandinavian Political Studies Yearbook* 10 (1975): 9–31; D. Lowery and William Berry, "The Growth of Government in the United States," *American Journal of Political Science* 27 (November 1983): 667ff, claim that insofar as their research sustains any theory, it is Wagner's law.

[5] See J.K. Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1958); Anthony Downs, "Why the Government Budget is too Small in a Democracy," *World Politics* 12 (July 1960): 541–63. For particularly striking examples of universalism without regard to national variations, see a number of contributions to the Nobel Symposium on the Growth of Government in *Journal of Public Economics* 28 (1985): 273–399.

[6] David Cameron "The Expansion of the Public Economy: a Comparative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 72 (December 1978): 1243–61. The difference that Cameron sets out to explain is relatively small; the coefficient of variation for total revenue in 1960 is 0.15; in 1975 it is 0.21.

[7] Francis G. Castles, ed., *The Impact of Parties* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982).

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of social expenditure among sixty-four industrial and non-industrial nations. But he adds that within the restricted universe of advanced industrial nations, public spending is not so determined.[8]

Ironically, convergence theories imply substantial initial differences among advanced industrial nations. The differences are then reduced as countries converge upon a common point, for example by governments below average in size growing faster than those above average. This could happen if the marginal utility of public expenditure is higher when public spending is low, and falls as spending rises to a saturation level for public benefits and increases resistance to additional taxes to finance additional benefits. Prominent theorists of convergence such as Raymond Aron, Clark Kerr, and Daniel Bell have been sociologists, concerned primarily with linkages between social and economic change; political change is a problematic by-product.[9]

*Differentiating advanced industrial societies.* As social scientists move from abstractions to concrete historical and institutional features of particular political economies, the emphasis upon differences increases. Typologies can be developed in which each country seems to be awarded a category of its own.[10]

National historians, whether dealing with America, a European, or a non-European country, often assume that the country they are writing about is *sui generis*. Descriptive nominalism replaces the generic concepts of social sciences with nation and language-specific names of institutions, events, and actors. The growth of government is described as a series of discrete events, occurring within one nation; there is no general model. Explanations are specific to one place and usually to one point in time. What is important about the size of American, British, or French government is that it is American, British, or French.

Many social science studies start with a commitment to generalization but nonetheless conclude that countries matter. Not only is the United States found to be an exception to notional rules, but so too are countries from Australia and New Zealand to Scandinavia.[11] In statistical terms, the differences may be matters of degree, a few percent of the national product. But if countries are viewed as a gestalt, the whole of a nation's political economy can be characterized by one distinctive part, such as defense expenditure or social-welfare spending. Analyses

[8] Harold Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), xiii.

[9] See Raymond Aron, *Twenty-Eight Lectures on Industrial Society* (London: Heinemann, 1964); Daniel Bell, *The Future of Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Clark Kerr, *The Future of Industrial Societies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). For a critique, see John H. Goldthorpe, "The End of Convergence: Corporatist and Dualist Tendencies in Modern Western Societies" in Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (Oxford, Eng: Clarendon Press, 1984), 315–343.

[10] See Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984), 81ff.

[11] See Francis G. Castles, *The Working Class and Welfare* (Wellington, New Zealand: Port Nicholson Press and Allen & Unwin, 1985).

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of national styles of policy making are specially sensitive to problems of gestalt characterization. The differences in the ways in which policy makers conduct themselves is only one attribute of a political system, and there is no prima facie reason why qualitative stylistic characteristics should influence the quantitative size of government. Gary Freeman concludes that national policy styles are an unsatisfactory explanation of crossnational differences in government growth, and that there are noteworthy differences in policy-making styles between policy sectors within a nation.[12]

History provides a second type of explanation: Government commitments are carried forward by political inertia, that is, the public laws that authorize agencies and public employees to provide program benefits according to specified criteria, which then sustain entitlements and expectations of benefits. Whatever is institutionalized early tends to persist and, equally important, resist changes that are a necessary condition of convergence. This theory has been used to account for substantial and continuing differences in the tax systems of OECD political economies.[13]

Political values and culture offer a third type of explanation. After reviewing a variety of policy differences accounting for less government in America than in several European states, Anthony King concluded: "*the state plays a more limited role in America than elsewhere because Americans, more than other people, want it to play a limited role.*"[14] Comparative survey data tend to support King's assertion that Americans do not favor public programs causing big government to the same extent as Europeans.[15] However, King's explanation is question-begging. It does not explain why Americans should differ in their values. Nor does it explain why public policies should necessarily correlate closely with public opinion surveys.

Crossnational differences are usually treated as more or less constant. Yet, if countries are different at one point in time, then the rate or direction of changes in policies may also differ, thus causing nations to diverge. Among two dozen OECD nations, it would be extraordinary if through the years the rate of growth of each continued to bear the same relationship to others. Insofar as countries grow at different rates – for example, those with a limited role for the state growing more slowly, and those with a greater role for the state growing faster – then by a process of compounding over a decade, nations will increasingly diverge.

[12] Gary P. Freeman, "National Styles and Policy Sectors: Explaining Structured Variation," *Journal of Public Policy* 5 (October 1985): 490; see also Richard Rose, "The Programme Approach to the Growth of Government," *British Journal of Political Science* 15 (January 1985): 1–28.

[13] Richard Rose and Terence Karran, *Taxation by Political Inertia* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), table 9.1; see also Jerold L. Waltmann and Donley T. Studlar, eds., *Political Economy: Public Policies in the United States and Britain* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1987), 4ff, 263ff.

[14] Anthony King, "Ideas, Institutions and the Policies of Governments: Part III," *British Journal of Political Science* 3 (October 1973): 418. (Emphasis in the original).

[15] Tom W. Smith, "Public Opinion and the Welfare State: A Crossnational Perspective," annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, 1987.

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*Alternative predictions for America.* In the strictest sense, universalist theories reject the idea of American exceptionalism. Operationally, many statements of universalist theories are prepared to accept the possibility of America being exceptional. This can be inferred from the fact that most studies about the growth of government in Europe omit the United States. Occasionally, American exceptionalism is made the subject of a deviant case analysis, for example, in Sombart's classic, *Why There is No Socialism in the United States.*

Theories that emphasize differences between OECD nations do not ipso facto support a claim to American exceptionalism. Insofar as nations differ, then America cannot be considered exceptional; for there is no longer an ideal-type or modal category from which the United States can deviate. Uniqueness expresses the ultimate logic of differences between nations. But when uniqueness is claimed for every political economy, then paradoxically America has something in common with other nations, namely, a unique national pattern of government growth.

A third possibility is that America is comparable with some nations and different from others. While America may have a much smaller government than Sweden, as long as it is not the only country with a not so big government, then what must be explained is why one group of industrial societies do not have big governments, while another group do. Both exceptionalism and universalism would thereby be rejected.

It is implausible to expect the American political economy to maintain indefinitely a constant position vis-à-vis other OECD nations, for that would require federal, state, and local governments collectively to calibrate policies to match the rate of change in other OECD nations. Dynamic models of political economies normally stress convergence. Insofar as the United States is today regarded as a "laggard,"[16] convergence requires American government to grow faster than the OECD average. In the absence of America catching up with European political economies, we must expect the United States increasingly to diverge from big and growing governments, either alone or following an alternative path in company with a number of other nations.

## How Big Is American Government?

Before we can theorize about why government grows, we must answer the question: What grows when government grows? Government is here defined by a public policy model of what government does—the program approach. Programs such as defense, education, social security, etc. constitute the outputs of government; they are produced by public sector organizations that mobilize money, public employees, and laws. To think of government in terms of program outputs puts the purposes of government first, for programs constitute the objects of public expenditure. Examining major programs separately avoids the aggregate fallacy of

[16] See Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Press, 1981), 10.

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TABLE 1

*Comparing National Product Per Capita and Public Expenditure in OECD Nations*

| | *GDP per capita* | | | *Public Expend.* | | *Pub. Exp. per cap.* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *1985* | *%OECD mean* | | | *%OECD* | *1985* | *%OECD mean* | |
| | *Current US$* | *Cur't* | *PPP* | *%GDP* | *mean* | *Cur't US$* | *Cur't* | *PPP* |
| USA | 16,494 | 179 | 150 | 35.3 | 81 | 5,822 | 146 | 121 |
| Switzerland | 14,195 | 154 | 111 | 30.9 | 71 | 4,386 | 110 | 79 |
| Norway | 13,960 | 151 | 126 | 44.0 | 101 | 6,143 | 154 | 127 |
| Canada | 13,635 | 148 | 138 | 43.7 | 100 | 5,958 | 149 | 138 |
| Sweden | 12,006 | 130 | 115 | 60.8 | 139 | 7,300 | 183 | 159 |
| Denmark | 11,312 | 122 | 111 | 56.7 | 130 | 6,414 | 160 | 144 |
| Finland | 11,024 | 119 | 104 | 37.7 | 86 | 4,156 | 104 | 90 |
| Japan | 10,997 | 119 | 107 | 26.9 | 62 | 2,958 | 74 | 66 |
| Germany | 10,243 | 111 | 110 | 43.4 | 99 | 4,445 | 111 | 110 |
| Australia | 9,847 | 107 | 106 | 31.9 | 73 | 3,141 | 79 | 78 |
| France | 9,251 | 100 | 104 | 49.4 | 113 | 4,570 | 114 | 117 |
| Austria | 8,743 | 95 | 97 | 45.2 | 103 | 3,952 | 99 | 101 |
| Netherlands | 8,628 | 93 | 102 | 55.2 | 126 | 4,763 | 119 | 129 |
| Belgium | 8,022 | 87 | 97 | 52.3 | 120 | 4,196 | 105 | 116 |
| United Kingdom | 7,943 | 86 | 99 | 44.9 | 103 | 3,566 | 89 | 102 |
| New Zealand | 6,746 | 73 | 91 | 41.3 | 95 | 2,786 | 70 | 86 |
| Italy | 6,278 | 68 | 98 | 51.9 | 119 | 3,258 | 81 | 117 |
| Ireland | 5,123 | 55 | 61 | 47.0 | 108 | 2,408 | 60 | 65 |
| Spain | 4,255 | 46 | 69 | 34.7 | 79 | 1,476 | 37 | 55 |
| Greece | 3,294 | 36 | 54 | 43.2 | 99 | 1,423 | 36 | 54 |
| Portugal | 2,032 | 22 | 50 | 41.7 | 95 | 847 | 21 | 48 |
| Mean | $9,239 | | | 43.7% | | $3,998 | | |

Source: GDP: *The OECD Observer*, no. 145 (1987).

Public expenditure (i.e. current disbursements): *OECD Economic Outlook* 41 (1987), Table R7 (1984 data for Spain and Portugal). United Kingdom and Ireland, *National Accounts of OECD Countries 1973–1985*, Vol. 2, (1987), Table 1, 6. New Zealand, IMF, *International Financial Statistics* 40 (1987), 364. Portugal, *Portugal*, (OECD, 1986), Tables A, F.

Purchasing Power Parities: OECD, *National Accounts 1970–1985*, Vol. I (1987), Table 13. (1981 PPP for Switzerland).

assuming that what is true about an aggregate will also be true about its constituent parts. Just as nations may differ, so too each program can have its own distinctive logic of growth.[17]

Advanced industrial political economies are here operationally defined as the twenty-one OECD nations listed in Table 1. All have had free elections since the end of World War II, except for Greece, Spain and Portugal, which have been democracies for at least a decade of the period.[18] OECD nations are all relatively

[17] For a discussion of the full model, see Richard Rose, *Understanding Big Government: the Program Approach* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1984).

[18] Turkey is omitted because it has a different political history and is not yet industrialized; Iceland and Luxembourg are excluded for lack of data and because they are mini-countries.

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wealthy by comparison with the median member of the United Nations; the 1985 mean for gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in U.S. dollars was $9,239. There is some variation within this universe; the coefficient of variation was 0.40.

The time period covered is from 1950 to 1985, an era when governments had already become big by historical standards. Whereas a nineteenth-century government typically grew a little by introducing a novel program causing big debates of political principle, a big government can grow bigger still through political inertia steadily compounding the effect of seemingly small annual increments of already big programs.[19] In the course of thirty-five years there is ample time for the logic of compounding to generate more and more growth in government. The period has also seen America have a number of exceptional experiences, such as involvement in two major wars, a major domestic upheaval about civil rights, and the launch of Great Society programs in the 1960s.

*Government in aggregate.* When countries are compared in terms of the conventional measure of national resources, the GDP, America is undoubtedly a big economy. In 1985 America's national product constituted about one-third of the total product of OECD nations, and the United States had the highest per capita income as measured in the current value of the dollar. It was 79 percent above the mean figure for an OECD nation. (See Table 1.)

Whereas America ranks very high in total material resources, it is low by the conventional indicator of public effort—public expenditure as a proportion of the gross domestic product. Public spending averages 43.7 percent of the national product among OECD nations; however, American government spends 35.3 percent of the national product.[20] The United States is thus 19 percent below the OECD mean. American government ranks low in public expenditure; only Japan, Switzerland, Australia, and Spain make less effort to mobilize their national product. Moreover, the biggest government, Sweden, spends more than two-thirds as much of its national product through the state as does the United States. Whatever power may be attributed to American government in world affairs, it is not used to impose high taxes to support a high level of public expenditure.[21]

It is sometimes argued that the scale of government activity in America is substantially greater than the conventional public expenditure measure. Tax expenditures—that is, revenues foregone by statutory rules that narrow the tax

[19] See Rose and Karran, *Taxation by Political Inertia*, chap. 5.

[20] Strictly speaking, one should refer to governments in America, for there are tens of thousands of separate government organizations. The figures reported here concern *all* levels of government in the United States and in other federal systems. If only federal expenditure were used for comparisons, the United States would appear to have an even smaller government.

[21] The conclusion is supported by comparable figures of total public employment in the United States and major European countries. It averages 30.5 percent of the work force in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden; in the United States it is 18.3 percent. American public employment is so much lower because it has few nationalized industries and does not have a labor-intensive national health service. See Richard Rose, *Public Employment in Western Nations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

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base or lower the tax rate for select groups—are said to be an off-budget form of public spending. While the theory of tax expenditures was developed in the United States, the practice is common to all OECD nations. Available statistics suggest that allowing for tax expenditures would not alter America's relative position.[22] Government regulation is another way in which the scope of government can be extended. While regulation has been a prominent issue in the United States, it is not unique to American government; laws and administrative orders are common to all nations. There is good reason to expect that Roman-law countries of Europe are at least as heavily regulated as the United States, and no evidence that regulation places American government above the OECD average.[23]

Public effort does not guarantee a high level of public benefits—that is, public expenditure per capita. A Third World country might claim all a nation's money; but because the country is poor, public benefits will remain small. Even if a rich country such as the United States or Japan makes limited effort to mobilize resources, its national product can yield higher public benefits than in a poor country. In order to evaluate the outputs of political economies, we must look at the absolute value of public expenditure, as well as the extent of public effort.

The United States ranks fifth in the cash value of per capita public expenditure. (See Table 1.) American government spent 46 percent more per person than the OECD average in 1985, more than nations with a long history of social welfare programs, such as Germany and Britain. Moreover, public benefits in America are several times greater than in Mediterranean countries with socialist governments. For example, Greece and Portugal make a greater public effort than the United States but because their per capita national products are so much lower, the United States spends four to six times as much per person on public benefits.

Any crossnational comparison that relies upon nominal money values is sensitive to fluctuations in exchange rates between currencies. The year 1985 is examined here, because it is the latest year for which there is nearly complete data for all OECD countries. But 1985 also happened to be a year in which the dollar had a relatively high exchange value against other currencies.[24] As the 1980s is a period of floating and relatively volatile exchange rates, it is therefore important to consider how robust are conclusions drawn from comparisons in terms of 1985 exchange rates.

[22] See OECD, *Tax Expenditures: a Review of the Issues and Country Practices* (Paris: OECD, 1984); Paul McDaniel and Stanley Surrey, eds., *International Aspects of Tax Expenditures: a Comparative Study* (Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1985); Aaron Wildavsky, "Keeping Kosher—On the Epistemology of Tax Expenditures," *Journal of Public Policy* 5 (August 1985): 413–431.

[23] Peter Saunders and Friedrich Klau, "The Role of the Public Sector," *OECD Economic Studies* 4 (Spring 1985): 85–88, present evidence indicating that regulation is higher in Canada than the United States. See also Henry W. Ehrmann, *Comparative Legal Cultures* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976); and Richard Rose, *Understanding Big Government*, chap. 3.

[24] For example, the Deutsche Mark exchanged with the dollar at a rate of 2.94, and Yen at the rate of 238 to the dollar.

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Because we are concerned with public benefits, the most appropriate control is that of purchasing power parity (PPP), as calculated by OECD. When this is applied to 1985 figures, the overall effect is to reduce the difference between the top and bottom nations.[25] Correcting for purchasing power, the United States is only (sic) 50 percent above the OECD mean for GDP per capita, and Portugal rises to 50 percent below the mean. The comparative value of public benefits in richer countries is reduced; the United States is 21 percent above the OECD mean, and Sweden's overall lead is reduced to 59 percent above the mean. The value of public benefits in Mediterranean countries is raised appreciably. (See Table 1.) There is a very high correlation between the per capita measure of GDP in current dollars and in dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity (r: .94). There is also a very high correlation between public benefits per capita in current money values and adjusted for purchasing power (r: .92). Hence, current (that is, 1985) dollars will be used in all subsequent calculations; in any event, it is impossible to calculate PPP adjustments for trend analysis since 1950.[26]

*Program outputs.* Total public expenditure is not decided by a single public official or agency or at one point in time; it is the sum of processes determining spending on a variety of programs that are the responsibility of many different functional and territorial agencies, and subject to determinants that differ substantially from program to program.[27]

The growth of government has brought about fundamental changes in program priorities.[28] In the nineteenth century, government concentrated on the classic defining activities of the state, providing such collective goods as national defense and law and order. In the twentieth century, government has given priority to private benefits for individuals, such as education, health care, and income security. Whereas traditional collective goods programs are consistent with small government, social programs providing private benefits necessarily make government big, as costs rise in proportion to the numbers receiving benefits. Six different programs are examined here. Two concern classic functions of government – defense and debt interest. Four social programs affect virtually the whole population – health, education, pensions, and other social services. Altogether, these programs account for more than three-quarters of public expenditure in the average OECD nation.

American government is exceptional in its shape as well as size, for spending priorities are very different from the typical OECD nation. (See Table 2.) The share

[25] The coefficient of variation for GDP per capita is 0.40 in current dollars, and 0.24 in PPP figures; for public expenditure per capita, it is 0.42 in current dollars and 0.31 for PPP adjusted public spending.

[26] For details of calculations at 1981 exchange rates, when the dollar was lower, see Tables 1 and 2 in an earlier version of this study using 1981 data and published as *Studies in Public Policy* No. 150, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 1985. When the dollar was low in 1981, the PPP adjustment increased the value of American public benefits and GDP per capita.

[27] See OECD, *Social Expenditure 1960–1990* (Paris: OECD, 1985), chap. 2.

[28] Richard Rose, "On the Priorities of Government," *European Journal of Political Research* 4 (September 1976): 247–89.

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TABLE 2

*Program Effort of America Compared to Average OECD Nation*

| | As % GDP | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Program (N countries)* | *USA* | *OECD mean* | *USA as % mean* |
| Defense (21) | 6.5 | 3.0 | 217 |
| Education (19) | 5.2 | 5.5 | 95 |
| Debt Interest (18) | 4.6 | 5.1 | 90 |
| Pensions (21) | 7.2 | 9.0 | 80 |
| Health (21) | 4.3 | 5.6 | 77 |
| Other social services (19) | 1.4 | 5.1 | 27 |
| All other programs (21) | 5.4 | 10.5 | 51 |

Source: Education, pensions, health, and other social services: See OECD, *Social Expenditure 1960–1990*, (Paris, 1985). Debt Interest: OECD, *Economic Outlook*, 36 (1984) Table 5. Defense: *SIPRI Yearbook 1986*, (New York: Oxford University Press), Table 11A.5. Data for 1984 except debt interest, 1983.

of American GDP devoted to defense is more than twice the average for OECD nations. Given the size of the American economy, the total amount spent on defense is magnitudes greater.[29] If American government spent as much above the OECD average on domestic programs as on defense, then total public expenditure would be an astronomical 95 percent of the gross domestic product.

For every major domestic program, American government makes less effort than the average OECD nation. It is 73 percent below the OECD mean in spending on other social programs, such as unemployment, sickness and maternity benefits—measures reflecting the comprehensive caring policy of European welfare states. In the absence of a national health service, America's public effort in health expenditure is 23 percent below the OECD mean, and pensions are 20 percent below the mean. Education is 5 percent below the mean, reflecting the American belief in encouraging individuals to improve themselves. Debt interest payment is the other program for which American spending begins to match the OECD mean.

When attention is shifted to the money spent on benefits per citizen, a very different picture emerges. (See Table 3.) Because the value of America's national product is high, government can make less effort, yet spend more money. It spends substantially more money than the OECD average on the three main programs of the welfare state: education, pensions, and health care. The health figure is particularly striking. Whereas public effort for health is nearly a quarter greater in Britain, because the United States has a much higher income per head, the value of public spending per capita on health is 59 percent greater than Britain. Dollars spent on debt interest and defense are also much above the OECD average.

[29] See Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1986* (Washington D.C.: World Priorities, 1986), 33.

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TABLE 3

*Program Benefits of America Compared to Average OECD Nation*

| | *Per capita spending* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Program* | *USA* | *OECD mean (1984 US $)* | *USA as % mean* |
| Defense | 1,018 | 271 | 376 |
| Education | 815 | 496 | 164 |
| Debt Interest | 657 | 463 | 142 |
| Pensions | 1,127 | 812 | 139 |
| Health | 674 | 505 | 133 |
| Other social services | 219 | 460 | 48 |
| All other programs | 846 | 947 | 89 |

SOURCE: As in Tables 1, 2.

Moreover, the differences remain substantial after adjustment for purchasing price parities. American government spends 41 percent more than the PPP adjusted average for education, 20 percent more for pensions, and 15 percent more on health.

When we ask how big American government is, the answer is contingent. According to the conventional measure of public effort, American government is relatively small. But if we ask how much money American government spends on its citizens, then it is above average. When priorities among programs are examined, American exceptionalism is again emphasized. By contrast with welfare-oriented European governments, the United States concentrates more effort on defense than on pensions and health. But because the national product is substantially larger than most OECD nations, American government can effortlessly spend more on its citizens.

In a sense, American government is bound to be atypical. If American government made the same public effort as the average OECD nation, then the dollar value of benefits per citizen would be 80 percent above the average. If benefits were kept at the average for OECD nations in 1985, this would require a cut in public spending of $1,812 per person, and result in the ratio of public expenditure to the national product falling to 24.3 percent.

## Is American Government Becoming More or Less Normal?

The "subnormal" size of American government today says nothing about the important dynamic question: In what direction is American government changing? Population growth and economic growth have caused growth in the absolute sense. Relative to half a century or a century ago, government today claims a bigger share of the national product. But the larger question is comparative: Has the United States been converging toward or diverging from the OECD mean in public effort and in public benefits per citizen?

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Many reasons can be offered why the American political economy should be becoming more like other countries. The increasing internationalization of trade and finance, much greater crossnational awareness of public programs, and contact between policy professionals are forces for convergence through the diffusion of ideas and economic practices. Stimulated by the 1960s' War on Poverty, the United States adopted major social programs previously in place in Europe, such as Medicare and Medicaid. Equally important, other OECD nations have become more prosperous and more "Americanized," with consumers accustomed to making demands in the market place as well as at the ballot box. Insofar as other nations are putting the brakes on taxing and spending, this makes it easier for America to catch up in public effort.

In 1950 the United States was in a very exceptional position. It had already taken a turn to the left in 1933, when major European nations were firmly on the right. Transatlantic isolation saved the United States from invasion, and during wartime the American economy expanded to produce military supplies while most OECD countries were devastated. A number of European nations did not restore their national product to its pre-Depression peak until the 1950s.

*The political economy in aggregate.* For America to converge toward normality, different aspects of its political economy would change in contrasting ways. The national product should be growing more slowly than average, thus causing America's formerly very high position to decline toward the mean. Public effort should be rising toward the mean. For public benefits to be converging, their relative value should be declining, as the growing wealth of other nations raises the mean level of their public benefits.

America's national product is tending toward the OECD mean. The difference between America's wealth and that of the average advanced industrial society is now a difference of degree, whereas it was different in kind in 1950, then being 156 percent above the OECD average. GDP per capita was even fundamentally greater than European countries that had escaped invasion, being more than double Britain or Sweden. Qualitative differences lasted for decades. America's wealth was still more than double the OECD average in 1969. (See Figure 1.)

Most industrial nations have since had decades of economic growth at faster rates than the United States, thus substantially reducing the differential between America's national product per capita and that of other nations. By 1980, when the dollar was low, America's national product was only 17 percent above average, and the United States ranked behind eight European countries in the current dollar value of GDP per citizen. As of 1985 a leadership position had been recovered in both current value and PPP terms. (See Table 1.) The "static" caused by fluctuating exchange rates does not detract from the fact that the United States today remains a society where the average income is high. The great transformation has occurred in other OECD nations; they have shifted from austerity immediately after World War II to a high national product with mass consumption.

American public effort has been diverging from normalcy in the postwar era, in a way that cannot be reduced to simple trend analysis. In 1950 American public

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FIGURE 1

*America's Political Economy Compared to OECD Average, 1950–1985*




expenditure was 20 percent of the national product, below the OECD average. Since then it has risen above average, and then fallen substantially below average. Whereas the 1950s is viewed in America as a period of relative political quiescence under President Dwight Eisenhower, public spending grew by one-quarter, rising to 25.4 percent of the national product by 1960, a faster rate of growth than in most industrial nations. Having first risen above the OECD mean for public effort in 1952, American public spending reached 11 percent above the mean by 1961. As Europe was rebuilt, a higher proportion of the dividends of its growth were left in private hands, whereas in the United States public effort rose in education as well as defense. From 1952 to 1970, the public effort of American governments was usually above average.

The 1960s is viewed in the United States as a major period of growth in government. Due to Great Society programs and the Vietnam war, public spending did increase by one-sixth during the decade. In 1970, it was still just above the OECD mean. However, American government was in relative decline as other nations boosted their public effort even more. From the 1960s onward, the typical European political economy has been increasing government programs for social policies benefiting the mass of the population, thereby greatly multiplying total costs, whereas American poverty programs were targeted at a limited fraction of the population.

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The 1970s saw American government continue to diverge. As the first and second oil crises hit OECD nations, most continued to maintain a high level of public spending, even in the face of slower economic growth. The United States did not. By 1976 public expenditure had fallen further below the OECD mean than it was in 1950, and by 1978 it was 21 per cent below the average for advanced industrial nations. Public effort has changed relatively little under President Ronald Reagan, remaining one-fifth below the OECD mean. Comparative data on public employment shows an even greater degree of divergence.[30]

The value of American public benefits has also tended to converge toward the OECD mean. When the American economy was more than twice as wealthy as average and government made much the same public effort as other OECD nations, public benefits were bound to be far greater than the average for an industrial nation. In 1950, American public spending per capita was 238 percent above the mean and it remained virtually as high in 1960 at 227 percent. In 1970 the United States could make virtually the same public effort as the average advanced industrial society and spend twice as much per person. Heading down below the mean in public effort, combined with a slower rate of growth in the economy, has reduced American public benefits to a figure that is now beginning to approach the OECD mean. In 1985 dollars, public benefits per American were 46 percent above the OECD mean; in purchasing power parity terms, benefits were 21 percent above average.

*Program outputs.* Changes in spending on major public programs must be analyzed from 1960, the first year in which comparable data becomes available for nearly all OECD countries. The relatively high level of American public expenditure then was principally due to defense. America was then spending 8.9 percent of the national product on defense, compared to 3.6 percent as the OECD average. Education was the only social program for which American public effort was above average. The proportion of the national product spent on social programs in total was 19 percent below the OECD mean. (See Table 4.)

In the past quarter-century, American program priorities have diverged from the OECD average. Public effort has fallen for all but one program. All domestic programs are below average in public effort, and defense remains very much an above-average claimant on the national product. Health is unusual in that its claim on the national product has risen toward the OECD average, but that is only because in 1960, government spending on the health of Americans was only half the average share of the national product in advanced industrial nations. What has appeared to Americans as an explosion in spending on social programs appears in comparative perspective to be America running hard yet diverging fur-

[30] In 1951 public employees were 17.0 percent of the American work force, the same as the average for five major European countries (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden). By the 1980s each of these European countries had significantly increased its proportion of public employees. Because public employment had scarcely risen in America, it was now two-fifths below the European mean. Rose, *Public Employment in Western Nations*, Table 1.3.

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TABLE 4

*Changes in Program Effort Among OECD Nations, 1960–84*

| Program | 1960 | | 1984 | | USA as % OECD mean | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | USA | OECD mean | USA | OECD mean | 1960 | 1984 |
| | (As % of GDP) | | | | | |
| Education | 3.6 | 3.5 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 103 | 95 |
| Pensions | 4.2 | 4.5 | 7.2 | 9.0 | 93 | 80 |
| Health | 1.3 | 2.6 | 4.3 | 5.6 | 50 | 77 |
| Other social services | 1.8 | 2.8 | 1.4 | 5.1 | 64 | 27 |
| (Total social expend.) | (10.9 | 13.4) | (18.1 | 25.2) | (81 | 72) |
| Defense | 8.9 | 3.6 | 6.5 | 3.0 | 247 | 217 |
| Debt Interest | 2.0 | 1.9 | 4.6 | 5.1 | 105 | 90 |
| All other programs | 3.2 | 4.7 | 5.4 | 10.5 | 68 | 51 |

Source: As in Tables 1, 2.

ther. In 1960 the United States was spending on social policies 19 percent less than the average share of the national product, but by 1984 it had fallen to 28 percent below average.

In 1960 the cash value for each of six program benefits in Table 4 received more dollars per person than the average for advanced industrial societies. In the quarter-century since, the slower increase in American economic growth and in public effort has made the cash value of specific program benefits decline. Since total spending was double the OECD average in 1960, this has meant that program spending has tended to regress toward the mean.[31] The one exception is health, which while below average in public effort is above average in the cash value of benefits.

*Declining through normalcy.* Whatever else may be said about the career of American government in the postwar era, it has not followed the OECD average. Judged solely in American terms, government has been getting bigger. But this does *not* justify deriving general social science theories of government growth from the American experience. Relative to other advanced industrial nations, government has been growing more slowly. Because America was exceptionally prosperous in 1950, relatively slow growth has for the moment produced a decline into normalcy.

The crucial term is *decline*, for the logic of slower rates of growth is that the American political economy is only passing through normalcy. The resulting divergence is already evident for public expenditure. (See Figure 1.) Taking the early

[31] The current dollar value of program benefits, as a percentage of the OECD mean, is as follows (1960, then 1984 figures): Education, 220, 164; Pensions, 198, 139; Health, 106, 133; Other social services, 142, 48; Total social expenditure, 167, 121; Defense, 530, 376; Debt interest, 224, 142; All other programs, 146, 89. Sources as in Table 4.

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1980s as the basis of comparison gives a spurious sense of stability, for at this particular juncture in time America has moved nearer normal than a quarter-century ago. But the logic of the downward trend is that similarities are temporary. If December 1987 exchange rates are used, then America's per capita national product falls closer to the mean, and the per capita value of 1985 public expenditure falls to exactly the OECD average.

Thinking about the future can be guided by what is already known. We know that the past growth of public spending has been financed by a process that Hugh Heclo has characterized as "policy without pain."[32] It has been paid for by economic growth producing enough extra wealth to allow take-home pay to rise, as well as giving government a fiscal dividend.[33] But reduced growth rates and the high level of tax resistance in America evident since both the 1978 California tax revolt and the 1981 Tax Act mean that public benefits cannot grow painlessly in the future as in the past.

In a sense, the future is already here, for the inevitable slowness of international organizations in publishing comparable statistics means that changes already evident have been continuing from the terminal dates used here, 1984 and 1985. While many European nations have retained a high level of commitment to social programs, the two-term presidency of Reagan has symbolized an intention to make America diverge further from the European model of the high-spending, high-tax welfare state. The composition of American program expenditure has already started to shift. From 1981 to 1984 total social expenditure fell from 80 percent to 72 percent of the OECD average. While defense effort elsewhere has remained constant, defense spending as a share of the American national product has risen from 93 percent to 117 percent above the OECD mean.

The last federal budget of the Reagan administration includes 1989. Given the difficulties of a new President in making a major impact upon spending, the force of political inertia will carry the Reagan legacy into the 1990s. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) forecasts, total federal spending declined by one percent of the national product from 1985 to 1987; it is scheduled to decline by 3.6 percent by 1990.[34] Even if a new president wished to increase public spending to move America closer to the OECD average, he would not easily find the money. Quite apart from any cyclical downturn in the American economy following the fall in Wall Street in autumn 1987, there is a more immediate budget

[32] Hugh Heclo, "Toward a New Welfare State?" in Flora and Heidenheimer, eds., *The Development of Welfare States*, 397.

[33] "The "front end load" of the government (that is, the amount of economic growth required to fund the average rate of growth in public spending) has consistently been much lower in the United States than in major European countries. See Table 2.6 in Richard Rose and Terence Karran, "Inertia or Incrementalism? A Long-Term View of the Growth of Government" in A.J. Groth and L.L. Wade, eds., *Comparative Resource Allocation* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1984).

[34] See OMB, *Historical Tables: Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1988* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), Table 3.2.

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FIGURE 2
*Relation of National Wealth to Public Spending*




priority. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, reinforced by pressures from central banks of other nations, makes a reduction in the federal deficit the first priority for any increased revenue, and imposes a low ceiling upon spending increases. The budget deficit that Reagan leaves behind is thus a force likely to make the American political economy diverge further from the average for advanced industrial nations.

## Marching to a Different Drummer—Alone or With Others?

While the foregoing sections have shown that America is different from the average OECD nation, it could also be argued that Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, or Japan is different too. We can only characterize American government by seeing how the United States is positioned in relation to each of the other nations in the OECD world.

*Rejecting Wagner's law.* The logic of Wagner's law is that differences in the size of government reflect differences in gross national product. The higher the gross national product, the higher the proportion that government should spend for

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public programs. This is regarded as explaining differences between not-so-rich countries with not-so-big governments such as Spain, and relatively rich countries with big governments, such as Sweden. Insofar as the relationship postulated by Wagner's law produces a strong linear relationship between per capita national product and public expenditure, then America is deviant, the exception that proves the rule because it is a rich country with a not-so-big government.

In fact, there is no significant correlation between per capita GDP and public expenditure; the sign of the statistically insignificant relationship (-.12) is actually negative. (See Figure 2.) Among advanced industrial societies, a country's wealth explains less than one percent of the variance in public expenditure.[35] For every instance of a rich nation with a government making a big effort, such as Sweden or Denmark, a counterexample can be found, such as the United States or Switzerland. Equally striking, there are a substantial number of countries, such as Ireland and Italy, which have big governments without being rich.

In the absence of a central tendency, it is impossible for America to be exceptional. Four types of political economies can be identified, according to the relationship between public expenditure as a proportion of the national product, and the per capita value of the national product. Countries equal to or greater than the OECD mean for each attribute are classified as relatively-rich or having a relatively-big government; below-average political economies are classified as not-so-rich or having a not-so-big government. (See Table 1 and Figure 2.)[36]

In making comparisons of social well-being and wealth it is desirable to weigh as well as count nations, taking into account population. Individuals, not national governments, are the intended beneficiaries of public, and especially social expenditure. For example, a rich society with 50 or 100 million people has a larger displacement in the OECD population than a rich society with 5 or 10 million people. Weighing nations does not ignore the theoretical significance of countries with less population such as Sweden and Switzerland. It simply assesses the impact that different types of political economies have upon the 757 million people in the OECD world.

When America is examined along with other advanced industrial nations, it appears comparable rather than exceptional. As a rich country without a big government it is one among a group of six nations including Japan, Switzerland, Australia, Germany, and Finland. Each of these political economies has the money to provide a high level of publicly financed benefits: the gross national product per capita is actually slightly higher ($12,133) than in big-spending welfare states

[35] The absence of a significant correlation is not due to America's position. If the United States is excluded, the correlation between per capita GDP and public expenditure remains insignificant and negative (−.04). If purchasing power parity dollars are used, the correlation is lower still r: .02.

[36] On measures of wealth, there is a clear break between France 100, and Austria 95. On size of government, four nations are clustered around the mean: Norway 101, Canada 100, Germany and Greece 99. Moving this dividing line a little in either direction would not alter substantially the picture given here.

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TABLE 5

*Political Economies by Wealth and Size of Government*

| | *Rich Big govt.* | *Rich Not-big-govt.* | *Not rich Big govt.* | *Not rich Not-big-govt.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N of countries | 5 | 6 | 6 | 4 |
| Per capita GDP $ | 12,033 | 12,133 | 7,456 | 4,082 |
| GDP % OECD | 12 | 72 | 13 | 3 |
| Public expend % GDP | 50.9 | 34.4 | 49.4 | 40.2 |
| Pub exp per cap $ | 6,077 | 4,163 | 3,718 | 1,633 |
| Population Mn | 98 | 448 | 149 | 62 |
| Population % OECD | 13 | 59 | 20 | 8 |

Rich countries with big governments: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, France, Canada.
Rich countries with not-so-big governments: USA, Japan, Switzerland, Australia, Germany, Finland.
Not-so-rich countries with big governments: Ireland, United Kingdom, Italy, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium.
Not-so-rich countries with not-so-big governments: Spain, Greece, Portugal, New Zealand.
Source: As in Table 1 and Figure 2. Country classed as rich and/or big government if it was greater than or equal to the OECD mean for per capita GDP or public expenditure.

($12,033). However, governments have chosen not to levy taxes claiming a large proportion of the national product. Public expenditure averages 34.4 percent of the national product, one-third less than the 50.9 percent average in rich countries with big governments. (See Table 5.)

Conventional studies of the growth of government tend to ignore rich countries with not-so-big governments. In the case of Japan, distance and culture appear to be reasons for doing so. Switzerland may be ignored because it is small and complex in many distinctive ways. Finland is the least studied of the Scandinavian countries, and Australia is distant like Japan. Only Germany is a main-line European country. It is particularly striking that in Germany, a historic incubator of welfare policies, public effort is less than the OECD average. Whatever nation-specific reasons may be given for ignoring one particular country, no serious scientific study of the political economies of advanced industrial nations can justifiably ignore six countries with 448,000,000 people, accounting for 59 percent of the population and 72 percent of the national product of these societies.[37]

The importance of thinking of off-diagonal countries—that is, countries not conforming to Wagner's law—is reinforced by the second biggest group, which consists of not-so-rich countries with big governments, (See Table 5.) which includes two of the largest European political economies, the United Kingdom and Italy, as well as four smaller European countries. They undoubtedly have big governments, spending an average of 49.4 percent of the national product. But they are not rich, having an average per capita GDP almost two-fifths below the rich na-

[37] If categorization is done on the basis of PPP figures, the dominance of rich countries with not-so-big governments remains the same.

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tions. The neglected category of not-so-rich nations with big governments has a substantial impact in the OECD world, accounting for 20 percent of its population. Together, the two types of political economies inconsistent with Wagner's law govern 79 percent of the population of advanced industrial nations.

Many studies of contemporary political economies tend to regard the European welfare state as normal, but intellectual hegemony should not be mistaken for political hegemony. Rich societies with big governments characterize only the three Scandinavian nations of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark and, on the margin, France and Canada. Together they account for only 12 percent of the population in the OECD world and less than one-sixth of its gross domestic product. While it is correct to treat a Scandinavian county such as Sweden as the prototype of the social democratic mixed-economy welfare state, it is not justifiable to treat Scandinavian countries as leading countries that other nations follow.

The smallest category consists of four not-so-rich societies with not-so-big governments—Spain, Portugal, Greece, and New Zealand. Together they account for only 8 percent of the population of the OECD world and 3 percent of its gross domestic product. As members of OECD these countries are not poor in an absolute sense,[38] and as democracies they can be expected to respond to pressures from a mass electorate. It is an open empirical question whether, as these political economies grow richer, they are more likely to emulate Scandinavian-style welfare states or alternatively follow nations that have high standards of living without big governments.

*Divergence not convergence.* The important dynamic question about a political economy is: In what direction is it heading? It is reasonable to assume that all advanced industrial societies want to become richer. But it is empirically invalid to assume that as societies grow richer, their governments must increase greatly in size. In the period in which social scientists have been theorizing about the convergence of political economies, there has been substantial divergence.[39]

In 1960, when national economies had experienced a decade of growth, political economies then showed a tendency to conform to Wagner's law. The relationship between GDP per capita and public expenditure as a proportion of GDP was positive, albeit not significant (r: .21). More importantly, twelve political economies with 75 percent of the population of the OECD world were in the categories specified by Wagner's law. Six were rich countries with big governments, and six were not-so-rich with not-so-big governments. The United States was among the rich countries with big governments; so too were Canada and New Zealand. To-

[38] When PPPs are calculated, the GDP per capita rises from $4,082 in current dollars to $7,290, that is, from 33 percent to 55 percent of the per capita income of rich nations with not-so-big governments, and from 34 percent to 61 percent of the income of rich nations with big governments.

[39] In 1950 the standard deviation around the mean of public expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 3.6 percent; in 1960, 5.5 percent; in 1970, 6.8 percent; and in 1985, 8.6 percent. The widening of the standard deviation reflects the increasing divergence between political economies that are relatively big and those that are not so big.

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gether they supported the universalist assumption that Wagner's law was not confined solely to European nations. Only Switzerland and Australia, with 3 percent of OECD population, were then rich nations with not-so-big governments.[40]

Given the situation in 1960, convergence theories appeared reasonable. They postulated that governments of such rich countries as the United States and Sweden would continue to grow bigger, and that not-so-rich countries would see a faster rate of economic growth, with public spending increasing disproportionately in consequence. Convergence also implied that the seven not-so-rich countries with big governments (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Ireland, Italy, and Norway) would tend to enjoy faster rates of economic growth, as their relatively high levels of public spending yielded dividends as an investment in human capital formation.

In the quarter century since, divergence has been the predominant characteristic of political economies. The distance between the OECD country with the lowest and highest level of public expenditure has increased from 16.5 percent in 1950 (Spain to Britain) to 33.9 percent in 1985 (Japan to Sweden). The weak correlation between wealth and public spending has actually turned slightly negative. (See Figure 2.) The number of political economies that conform to the pattern predicted by Wagner's law has declined, and their impact upon the population of the OECD world has fallen dramatically from 75 percent of the total to 21 percent.

A big government is neither a necessary nor a permanent condition of a rich society. The American political economy demonstrates that it is possible for a government above average in size to put the brakes on the growth of government.[41] This does not mean securing an absolute reduction in the size of government, or cutting the proportion of the national product devoted to public expenditure. Putting on the brakes means slowing down the rate of growth of government, so that the nation's political economy changes from a relatively big to a not-so-big government. Japan is another spectacular example of a country growing richer without government growing rapidly. In the past quarter-century Japanese public spending, while relatively low, has doubled as a proportion of the national product. But at the same time the per capita value of Japan's national product has increased more than twenty times.

## Critical Choices

Students of change in the American political economy must make a critical choice.

[40] The six rich nations with big governments in 1960 were: the United States, Canada, Sweden, France, Britain, and New Zealand (Mean per capita GDP: $1,871; public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 27.9 percent). The six not-so-rich nations with not-so-big governments were: Spain, Portugal, Greece, Japan, Finland, and Denmark (Mean per capita GDP: $662; public expenditure, 17.2 percent). The average GDP per capita for the two rich countries with not-so-big governments was $2,594, and public expenditure, 18.0 percent of GDP.

[41] See Richard Rose and B. Guy Peters, *Can Government Go Bankrupt?* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 221ff.

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If one only looks back in the American past, then there is ample justification for writing about the growth of government (or the state) in America.[42] Given the scale of government in America in 1789 or 1889, it could only grow larger. But this is doubly limiting. First of all, explanations are likely to stress what is specific to America, rather than what is common to many advanced industrial societies. Second, it is impossible to identify the way in which America may be similar to or different from other political economies. Insofar as social scientists seek general explanations, it is appropriate to view America as comparable. Since comparison shows that the American political economy is not statistically normal, the more general social science question is: Why has American government grown so slowly?

General answers to questions about the growth of political economies depend upon assumptions about the autonomy of the state.[43] Convergence theories grant very little autonomy to the state; they are reductionist in assuming that economic and social change can and must determine the course of government. This is true of such different approaches as public choice models of economics and neo-Marxist models in sociology. Typically, the evidence supporting convergence refers to changes in the international economy and changes in social values and behavior reflecting changes in communications.

Yet if government does not grow greatly as societies grow richer, how do people secure the benefits that we typically associate with contemporary big governments, such as income security, health, education, housing, and transportation? The answer can be found by conceiving total welfare in society as the sum of activities by the state and the market. By shifting attention from the public sector alone to comprehensive national income accounts of the allocation of resources, we can identify the extent to which the market substitutes for or substantially augments public spending by not-so-big governments. A welfare mix of non-state as well as state-financed benefits can sustain a high level of social well-being. This is no problem technically, for most public programs provide what economists describe as private goods and services—that is, outputs that can be sold in the market or provided by not-for-profit institutions.[44]

The first step in understanding the place of government in America is to look at the economy as a whole. This immediately emphasizes the comparatively high level of private-sector spending upon health, education, and savings for old age.

[42] See Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: the Expansion of National Administrative Capacities 1877–1920* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Theda Skocpol, "A Society without a 'State': Political Organization, Social Conflict and Welfare Provision in the United States," *Journal of Public Policy* 7 (October 1987).

[43] See Eric Nordlinger, *The Autonomy of the Democratic State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Theda Skocpol and Edwin Amenta, "States and Social Policies," *Annual Review of Sociology* 12 (1986): 131–57.

[44] For a detailed exposition of the analytic framework invoked here, see Richard Rose, "Common Goals but Different Roles; the State's Contribution to the Welfare Mix," in Rose and R. Shiratori, eds., *The Welfare State East and West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 13–39; for empirical evidence, see Richard Rose, "The Dynamics of the Welfare Mix in Britain," 80–106.

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While America ranks eighteenth among twenty-one nations in public spending on health as a proportion of the national product, it ranks first in societal effort, spending 10.8 percent of GDP on health. Due to payments by individuals, insurance companies, and not-for-profit health schemes as well as government, Americans have nearly double the OECD median spent on health care.[45] The United States also has an abnormally high proportion of students in private and in tertiary education; this explains its relatively low ranking in public effort on education. Employer-financed fringe benefits are also important in America.[46]

The economy is the ultimate constraint upon public spending by government, and thus upon the absolute size of government. In political economies with a per capita GDP below the OECD mean, the immediate pressures on government are to generate and sustain a high rate of economic growth. As the economy grows, not-so-rich nations have a choice about what to do with increasing affluence. The choice is particularly critical for two groups of nations that can in the next decade expect to approach or surpass the present mean per capita income of OECD: Mediterranean nations and Pacific Basin nations (Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong). Neither group can necessarily be expected to emulate Scandinavian welfare states.

Given histories of authoritarian rule in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, citizens of these countries cannot identify individual welfare with state action in the way that civic solidarity underpins Scandinavian welfare states.[47] Nor are fiscal standards and bureaucratic levels of efficiency likely to encourage trust in fair, rational, and effective public action that is another important condition of big government in northern Europe. Among Pacific Basin nations, Japan is the immediate model. Japan is distinctive, because it has an even smaller government than the United States and is promising to achieve a higher GDP per capita. The Japanese consciously reject state-centered reliance upon welfare, relying as much upon the market and family for the provision of education, health, and savings for old age. A semi-official report, *Japan in the Year 2000*, has noted: "Now that the social troubles of the West European-type welfare society are becoming clear, a society of the Western type can no longer be a model for Japan."[48] Given that Japan is a political economy that has grown rapidly from a poor, agrarian base, other newly industrializing countries can happily take it as their model, thus increasing the divergence from Eurocentric models of political economy.

In countries that are already rich, the question is whether a nation chooses to have a big government or a not-so-big government. America's shift in the past

[45] See OECD, *Measuring Health Care, 1960–1983* (Paris: OECD, 1985), Tables 1, 2.

[46] See Martin Rein and Lee Rainwater eds., *Public/Private Interplay in Social Protection: a Comparative Study* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1986).

[47] See Erik Allardt, "The Civic Conception of the Welfare State in Scandinavia," in Rose and Shiratori, eds., *The Welfare State East and West*, 107–125.

[48] Quoted in Staffan Linder, *The Pacific Century* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1986), 126. See also Richard Rose, "Welfare: the Lesson From Japan," *New Society* (London), 28 June 1985.

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quarter-century emphasizes that there is nothing deterministic about the rate at which government grows. Of course, government remains prominent as a source of collective and private goods, but the whole can only be understood in terms of an overarching model of total welfare in society. American well-being cannot be understood solely through a state-centered model. While the distributional characteristics of American society are often criticized for inequalities of access, the failure of critics to convince Republican and Democratic administrations is a reminder of the absence of social democracy as well as socialism in contemporary America. Yet because America has a not-so-big government, it is representative of the dominant form of political economy in a world in which advanced industrial societies are now diverging.*

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# The Anzus Dispute: Testing U.S. Extended Deterrence in Alliance Politics

WILLIAM T. TOW

Thirty-five years after its founding in San Francisco during September 1951, the ANZUS alliance (composed of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) has become the latest victim in the steady dissolution of Washington's postwar collective defense framework. Formed as part of the settlement between Pacific nations that led to a peace treaty with Japan ending World War II, ANZUS signified both Australia's and New Zealand's acknowledgment of their dependence on Washington to underwrite their own security. From Washington's perspective, ANZUS was designed to serve as part of its global network of extended deterrence against Soviet military power stretching beyond Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China into the outer maritime reaches of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Requisite military intelligence and logistical arrangements such as the Radford-Collins Agreement (formulated soon after the ANZUS Treaty itself), moreover, gave both the Australians and the New Zealanders at least a symbolic role in the planning and implementing of western maritime strategy in the Southwest Pacific.[1]

[1] The Radford-Collins conference between the commander-in-chief of U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC) and the First Naval member of the Australian Naval Board took place between 27 February–2 March 1951. The conference was described in U.S. Paper, No. D-212 (Lot 59 D95, CF119) and summarized in "Background Paper prepared for ANZUS Council Meeting, by the Deputy Director of the

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Over the years ANZUS seemed immune to the erosion of global containment politics that affected most other U.S. alliances and that ultimately led to their dissolution. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), for example, was dissolved following the pullout of U.S. military forces from Vietnam in 1977, while the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in Southwest Asia formally collapsed following the Shah of Iran's downfall in 1979. SEATO and CENTO were of questionable utility anyway—both from the perspective of U.S. strategists and from the point of view of the Third World nations originally designated to be their beneficiaries. The proponents of these defense pacts contended that notwithstanding their failure "to foster regional cohesion or to subordinate local divisions to global concerns," they still allowed the West "points of contact and access that were useful in extending and reinforcing containment."[2] In fact, neither CENTO nor SEATO were organized for defense against a specific and commonly perceived threat, and the actual effectiveness of these treaties was questioned by many western and Third World observers from their outset.[3] The Nixon Doctrine, which signaled a modification of U.S. extended deterrence from a "two-and-a-half war" strategy to a "one-and-a-half" war posture in August 1969, hastened the final demise of these two organizations. No longer would Washington commit itself to fighting a major war in Europe, a second full-scale conflict in Asia, and a minor skirmish in a Third World locale all at the same time. Instead, the United States would sustain only enough military power to wage one major war in Europe or Asia and one minor one beyond either of those two theaters of operations.

ANZUS, however, had little in common with other more ambitious U.S. postwar collective defense treaties maintained beyond NATO Europe. It was created to be simple and small—relatively limited in its purposes and in the obligations it imposed on the signatory members. Even without a formal military command structure along the lines of NATO, ANZUS worked smoothly through frequent and cordial consultations between the members on a wide array of issues concerning

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Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Foster)" in *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) *1952–1954*, vol. 12, part 1 *East Asia and the Pacific* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 1984), 163; and "Recognition of the Status of the ANZAM Region As A Possible Theater of War (Paper by Australian Military Representative)" in ibid., 225. Also see Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand's Dilemmas," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 111/8/989 (August 1985), 53–54; and Young, "Australia Bites Off More Than the RAN Can Chew," *Pacific Defense Reporter (PDR)* 13 (September 1986): 16.

[2] Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 116–117. Also see Terry Diebel, "Alliances and Security Relationships: A Dialogue With Kennan and His Critics" in Diebel and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., *Containment: Concept and Policy* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986), 206, where it is argued that SEATO and "the ill-fated Vietnam conflict" at least bought "critical time" for Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia to develop stable pro-West and reasonably prosperous regimes.

[3] For argumentation along these lines, consult Ronald Steel, *Pax Americana* (New York: Viking Press, 1970). For coinciding assessments, see Charles Mohr, "CENTO and SEATO: Some Old Alliances Fade Away," *New York Times*, 22 May 1977; and David DeVoss, "A Small World of Obsolete U.S. Alliances," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 August 1986.

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both global and Southwest Pacific security. This consultative arrangement seemed natural and desirable to all three treaty signatories, because the principals shared broadly parallel cultural and social values. Henry Albinski, perhaps the most respected American expert on U.S.-Australian politico-strategic relations, has best characterized the essence of the ANZUS legacy:

> It is an alliance much of whose virility has been drawn from uncommonly comparable cultural traditions and compatible international outlooks, which have produced a quality of intimate and efficient style and in turn invested the alliance with utilitarian flexibility. "ANZUS" therefore became a kind of code word, or shorthand, for a special working relationship among three partners, whether or not what was done was literally undertaken in tripartite and textually prescribed fashion. Its success was noted by friends and adversaries alike.[4]

Indeed, over the years, both Canberra and Wellington tended to support the United States on a number of issues where the NATO allies were reluctant to do so: for example, the non-recognition of the People's Republic of China, deployment of military advisers in support of the American war effort in South Vietnam, and the frequent Antipodean contributions to various peacekeeping operations conducted throughout the Third World.

In July 1984, however, ANZUS suddenly and unexpectedly began to unravel. What followed over the next two years was an unfortunate but instructive example of how an apparently stable alliance can be tested and found wanting. In the case of ANZUS, the United States was unable to accommodate the growing strength of public support for nuclear-free zone politics in New Zealand that helped catapult the Labour Party to power in July 1984. Yet it is also contended here that the Labour politicians who came to power in Wellington seriously misread the priority that the United States attaches to preserving the flexibility of its global deterrence posture at both the nuclear and conventional levels. New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange's rejection of U.S. nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable American naval units visiting New Zealand ports constitutes a principled stand of a small and remote Pacific state. Washington, however, regards the ANZUS imbroglio as an unwarranted disruption of its Asian-Pacific strategy at the very time when the Reagan administration had set out to rebuild the United States's global military power. Moreover, developing rifts between the United States and Australia over international trade problems and changes in Australia's internal defense policies have led to increasingly strained relations between Washington and its other ANZUS partner as well. Whether or not ANZUS survives as an institution, these trends represent a more fundamental threat to the essence of the Antipodean security relationship with the United States, which has been regarded until recently as among the most stable and enduring in the western world.

[4] In Prepared Statement for Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee On Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, *Security Treaty Between Australia. New Zealand,* and the *United States,* 99th Cong., 1st sess., 18 March 1985, 111.

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By late 1986 the formal ANZUS treaty structure appeared to be substantially eroded. The American perspective was summarized in gloomy terms by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz at an August 1986 ANZUS Council meeting held (ironically) in San Francisco and not attended by New Zealand. As the United States and Australia were moving to coordinate New Zealand's exclusion from long-standing tripartite intelligence-sharing arrangements and other ANZUS functions, Shultz concluded that New Zealand's nuclear "hypersensitivity" could well spill over to remaining western collective defense arrangements, including NATO, as well as to the Mutual Security Treaties the United States still maintained with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Shultz described New Zealand's posture on the nuclear deterrence issue as effectively "encouraging those who hope to tear at the fabric of Western cooperation."[5] Even so, Canberra still hoped that the Reagan administration and Lange government could find a solution for reconciling their opposed positions over regional deterrence strategy and in ways that might allow the ANZUS partners to recover from the otherwise inevitable erosion of defense cooperation that was bound to occur. After meeting with Shultz in Manila just prior to the San Francisco conference (June 27), moreover, Prime Minister Lange stated that New Zealand would not formally withdraw from ANZUS and would remain on "friendly terms" with the United States.[6]

The ANZUS crisis above all relates to how the United States can continue to pursue collective defense with its allies in both the Asian-Pacific region and in other theaters at a time when the utility of its traditional extended deterrence strategy is coming under increasing criticism. New Zealand and, increasingly, Australia have questioned how the Reagan administration's warfighting-oriented strategies such as "horizontal escalation" or the "doctrine of maritime supremacy" could really be seen as complementing effectively the traditional war avoidance orientation of most postwar U.S. deterrence behavior. They are increasingly concerned that a revised and more aggressive American strategy could now draw the Antipodes into an Asian or global conflict apart from their own national security interests. They are also worried that the development of new and exotic U.S. weapons technologies (such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI) may well lead to a fatal compromise of extended deterrence as it has effectively operated to date by needlessly involving the Southwest Pacific area in future superpower military confrontations.

Washington has responded to such concerns by arguing that the strength of western deterrence is still derived through maintaining unity of purpose and strategy between the United States and *each* of its security partners. If this contention is valid, a good and faithful western ally cannot "qualify" its acceptance of its secu-

[5] Shultz's observations are cited by Norman Kempster, "Shultz Blasts New Zealand Port Ban," *Los Angeles Times*, 12 August 1986.

[6] Quoted in "Parting As Friends," *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* 36 (April-June 1986): 7. Also see remarks by New Zealand Foreign Ministry official Michael Powles, "The Americas and NZ," ibid., 25.

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rity obligations to the United States through accepting only certain (in New Zealand's case, non-nuclear) components of the overall deterrence equation. To do so, Washington argues, is to impair the finely-tuned balance upon which the ultimate credibility of western deterrence rests.

As disturbing to the Americans is the possibility that dissent from Washington's version of extended deterrence in New Zealand could generate eventual ripples or pressures for unilateral disarmament throughout other western societies. American fears generated by this prospect are particularly applicable to Australia—clearly the more strategically important Antipodean component of traditional ANZUS operations. The recent U.S. failure to endorse, at least in principle, a compromise version of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZT)—largely engineered by Australian diplomats—has generated widespread disillusionment in Canberra over what is now perceived as an unnecessarily insensitive U.S. policy approach to the South Pacific island-states' increased feelings of economic vulnerability and their strong concerns over environmental issues.[7] The U.S. nonratification has also further aggravated already strained relations between Washington and Canberra over U.S. insistence on maintaining a highly visible nuclear presence in the Pacific and on refusing to oppose French nuclear testing there more openly and more forcefully. Finally, the U.S. rejection of SPNFZT also coincided with a highly publicized visit in early 1987 by Eduard Shevardnadze to Australia—the first visit ever by a Soviet foreign minister to that country. The Soviet diplomat made it clear that the USSR felt entitled to pursue greater strategic influence throughout the Pacific, even though Moscow had moved quickly to sign the SPNFZT protocols, thereby scoring a propaganda and diplomatic victory over the United States in the process.[8] Washington's present difficulties in dealing with New Zealand on non-nuclear related issues could eventually be repeated in Australia, the Philippines, Greece, or in other countries where a U.S. basing presence or related military activities have formerly supported overall American extended deterrence strategy.

Of major concern is why the ANZUS partners failed to resolve the crisis facing their alliance and what the strategic implications might be for the West's overall security position. Initially, the basic differences underlying the nuclear dispute between the United States and New Zealand will be briefly reviewed. The politico-strategic implications of the ANZUS imbroglio for U.S.–Australian security ties will then be considered, as will the ramifications for U.S. strategy at both the Asian-Pacific and global level. Lastly, some U.S. future policy options will be weighed in terms of how a viable western collective defense strategy for the ANZUS region might yet be preserved in a post-ANZUS environment.

[7] The U.S. State Department issued a somewhat terse memorandum explaining the Reagan administration's decision to reject SPNFZT. See "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty," *Department of State Bulletin* 87 (April 1987): 53.

[8] For background on the Australian impressions of the Shevardnadze visit, see "Superpower Fallout May Hit Pacific Mini-States," *New Straits Times*, 21 April 1987.

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## Extended Deterrence[9] and Divergent Threat Perceptions

Differences between the United States and New Zealand over the application of extended deterrence strategy to ANZUS intensified following the New Zealand Labour Party's election in 1984, reaching its zenith when New Zealand subsequently moved to deny port entry to U.S. nuclear-capable naval units. From the outset of the alliance, however, at least some uncertainty has existed over how U.S. security guarantees embedded in both the spirit and letter of ANZUS were to be interpreted by the treaty's other signatories. Equally unclear was precisely how Canberra and/or Wellington would contribute to the ANZUS deterrent. Indeed, in the early days of the cold war, American military planners tended to downplay prospects for *any* Australian/New Zealand deterrence role in the Pacific. Just before the first ANZUS Council meeting in spring 1952, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that the ANZUS agreement was designed "to get some Australian and New Zealand troops into the Middle East. . . . (t)he whole point of this has been to protect them in the Pacific in order that they could do something in the Middle East."[10]

Such American thinking about the extraregional role of Australian and New Zealand troops proved to be temporary, however. Canberra and Wellington opposed subsequent U.S. pressures for troop deployments to the Middle East. Furthermore, both Australian and New Zealand forces were deployed in Korea and provided military assistance to U.S. war efforts in Vietnam to demonstrate their utility as valuable western allies in the Asian-Pacific region. By 1969, the Nixon Doctrine acknowledged the relative contraction of U.S. strategic commitments in the Far East and prompted Washington to reassess the defense roles of its ANZUS partners. It also endorsed the Asian-Pacific orientation, which Australian and New Zealand defense planners had already been implementing for well over a decade.

Australia's defense facilities were also becoming more important to U.S. strategic operations at the global level. U.S. naval signals intelligence and tracking operations began at the Harold E. Holt communications station on Australia's Northwest Cape in 1968. In 1973, the Americans used this installation (without Canberra's prior consent) to coordinate U.S. naval maneuvers during the Yom

[9] There is no consensus within the West's security studies community on exactly how to define this term. For the purposes of this analysis, however, extended deterrence can be viewed as the application of American strategic power—including nuclear-capable forces—in the ANZUS Treaty region to protect the ANZUS allies from external attack and to prevent the outbreak of regional war in the Southwest Pacific through the neutralization of extraregional threats. This definition is a rough composite of those found in Anthony H. Cordesman, *Deterrence in the 1980s: Part I—American Strategic Forces and Extended Deterrence*, Adelphi Papers 175 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1982), 2; and Richard Smoke, "Extended Deterrence: Some Observations," *Naval War College Review* 36 (September/October 1983): 37.

[10] Army Chief-of-Staff General J. Lawton Collins, as quoted in "Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting," Washington, D.C., 23 April 1982 in *FRUS*, 84.

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Kippur War. More recently, North-West Cape was incorporated into the United States' National Security Agency's Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS), although there now appears to be some debate as to how important the Cape actually has been in supporting U.S. nuclear defenses.[11]

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began monitoring Soviet missile testing and related intelligence activities at Pine Gap near Alice Springs the same year. In 1971, the U.S. Air Force began operating at the Nurrungar base, some 300 miles northwest of Adelaide. Nurrungar has now become the most important control center for U.S. early-warning satellites located in the eastern hemisphere.[12] U.S. early-warning satellite monitoring at Nurrungar, as well as satellite reconnaissance carried out at Pine Gap, have become increasingly important to U.S. strategic planning and operations, with the latter installation even rumored to be involved in the U.S. SDI program, even though SDI is officially opposed by the Australian government. As importantly, Australia and New Zealand have become key transit points for U.S. nuclear-capable air and naval units operating throughout the Asian-Pacific region over the years—a significant turn of events considering U.S. reluctance to involve its ANZUS partners in *any* form of Pacific defense planning during the early days of the cold war.

Even as Australia and New Zealand were realizing their objective of shifting their primary defense missions from the more geographically remote Middle East to an Asian-Pacific security priority, the American deterrent was simultaneously coming under increased Antipodean scrutiny. In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur-related incident at the Northwest Cape, Australian Labor Prime Minister Gough

[11] On the 1973 Yom Kippur incident, see Henry Albinski, *The Australian-American Security Relationship* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 224. The specific functions of the Northeast Cape illustration were officially described in U.S. Navy, "U.S. Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt: Mission and Function of," NAVTELCOM Instruction 5450.25C (2 February 1983) as cited in William Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, *Nuclear Battlefields* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985), 214, 247. More recently, information has surfaced both from the Australian government and from knowledgeable independent defense observers that the importance of the Northwest Cape installation has decreased with a reduction in signalling strength and a dispersion of very low frequency (VLF) American transmitters for communications to nuclear submarines to other sites outside Australia. See Michael Richardson, "North-West Cape's Surprising Secret," *Pacific Defense Reporter* 13 (October 1986): 10, 34.

[12] For background on Nurrungar and Pine Gap, consult Desmond Ball, *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, November 1980); Defense Science and Technology Division, Australian Department of Defense, *Summary of Official Statements on the Joint Defense Research Facility Pine Gap Near Alice Springs and the Joint Defense Communications Station at Nurrungar, Near Woolmera* (Canberra: Australian Department of Defense, 1 May 1978); P. Lewis Young, "The Future of U.S. Bases," *Asian Defense Journal*, January 1987, 40–42; and Geoffrey E. Smith, "Your Guide to Australian-U.S. Bases," *The Sun-Herald* (Sydney), 23 February 1986. On the DSCS linkage, see Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties that Bind* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 206; "Aussie To Link Up With U.S. System," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 24 March 1987; and William T. Tow, "ANZUS and American Security," *Survival* 23 (November/December 1981): 265–266.

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Whitlam directed that U.S. intelligence operations carried out at Australian installations be reassessed in terms to how these activities may have compromised Australia's sovereign prerogatives. He also became more active in lobbying for general disarmament in the Indian Ocean.[13] The Whitlam Government also moved toward reversing Australia's long-standing "forward defense" posture in Southeast Asia, arguing that the rationales of a resurgent Japanese or expansionist Chinese military threat had receded over time and that the Nixon Doctrine had all but acknowledged this reality by the time the Australian Labor Party had come to power in 1972.[14]

Similarly, the New Zealand Labour Government, initially led by Norman Kirk and following Kirk's untimely death in office by Wallace Rowling, adopted a more independent line concerning Pacific nuclear free zones and U.S. nuclear-powered vehicles (NPVs) entering New Zealand ports. But the U.S. Congress passed legislation in 1974 liberalizing indemnification stipulations in the event a nuclear accident involving American units did occur in New Zealand. This move went far to meet a number of New Zealand's grievances on the entry of such American vessels into its ports at that time, and the first antinuclear crisis within ANZUS receded into the background without much further debate.[15]

Following the return to power of Conservative governments in both Canberra and Wellington by late 1975, ANZUS relations reverted to more familiar patterns of overall collaboration and reaffirmation of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. A growing Soviet commercial maritime presence in the South Pacific, moreover, raised serious Antipodean concerns that the tiny South Pacific island-states might be susceptible to accepting Soviet offers of economic assistance and diplomatic ties in return for granting Moscow greater maritime or even strategic access to the area. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser and his New Zealand counterpart, Robert Muldoon, called for an ANZUS Doctrine to extend deterrence more effectively into that region.[16] The immediate result was somewhat less comprehensive: in 1977 Wellington entered into the maritime surveillance and reconaissance agreement already in force between the U.S. and Australia since the early days of the

[13] See Henry Albinski, *Australian External Policy Under Labor* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), 253; and G. St. J. Barclay, "Problems In Australian Foreign Policy," *Australian Outlook* 21 (April 1975): 6–7.

[14] See T. B. Millar, *Australia In Peace and War* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978), 408–411, for background on the Whitlam government's revisions of forward defense.

[15] Conservative New Zealand opposition politicians have recently asserted that if Rowling had been returned to office following the 1975 national election, he would have honored an understanding reached with Americans shortly before, allowing U.S. nuclear ships to enter New Zealand ports. The definitive opposition statement was made public by (then) Conservative Party leader Jim McLay, "Disarmament And Security: An Alternative Viewpoint," *New Zealand International Review* 10 (May/June 1985): 21.

[16] Albinski, *The Australian-American Relationship*, 186; and Stephen Levine, "The Politics of Pacific Security" in Roderic Alley, ed., *New Zealand and the Pacific* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984), 283, notes that ANZUS members' economic assistance to the Pacific islands following the "Russian scare" in 1976 increased markedly.

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cold war. This arrangement – referred to as ANZUS MARSAR – facilitated coordination of surveillance activities between New Zealand's air and naval forces in the South Pacific and Australian and American units originating from both Diego Garcia and Butterworth Air Base in Malaysia. ANZUS MARSAR was designed to ensure more widespread maritime coverage of the Pacific, as well as parts of the Indian Ocean.[17]

Even while pressing for more extensive U.S. guarantees in the South Pacific, however, Australia and New Zealand were still reluctant to become too involved in Washington's global strategic contingency planning as a quid pro quo. To illustrate, following the escalation of the Iran-Iraq conflict in the Persian Gulf during 1979–1980 and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the United States raised the prospect of an Australian contribution to Washington's Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). However, any prospect of direct Antipodean participation in future RFD operations was quickly deflected by Canberra.[18] Occasional ANZUS air and naval exercises (such as Operation Sandgroper and Operation Beacon Compass) were conducted in eastern Indian Ocean waters during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the Australians did allow the United States to coordinate B-52 surveillance missions over the Indian Ocean through transit facilities at Darwin. Overall security collaboration with Washington, however, was viewed by its ANZUS allies as best pursued in a Pacific context, where the growth of Soviet naval power was viewed with increasing concern and where the nature of the external threat seemed more obvious in relation to their own national security interests.

Successive New Zealand Defense White Papers have also reiterated the belief that the South Pacific must be designated as the unquestionable regional priority for New Zealand's own security efforts. The 1983 *Defense Review*, for example, served notice that Wellington intended to work "with like-minded countries in the

[17] A sensationalist press dispatch labeling ANZUS MARSAR a "secret ANZUS pact" was carried by *The Evening Post* (Wellington) 11 May 1985, reprinted in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Southeast Asia-85-108, 10 July 1985, 11. A prominent New Zealand peace researcher, Keith Burgess, has contended that ANZUS MARSAR might place "profound restrictions" on the New Zealand Labour government's plans for greater military independence. A more rational letter on the subject was submitted by Dagger Dirk in "Comment And Discussion," *PDR* 13 (September 1986): 3–4.

[18] The U.S. RDF request is covered by Albinski, *Australia–American Relationship*, 132. By the following year at the ANZUS Council in Wellington, the U.S. and Australia noted that their Indian Ocean military operations "had been made . . . on an independent national basis following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." *Department of State Bulletin* 81, No. 2053 (August 1981), 45, 48. By 1983, New Zealand Foreign Minister Warren Cooper concluded that while ANZUS Treaty area itself wasn't defined precisely, its major concern lay in the Pacific, even though, Cooper admitted, the Indian Ocean remained "relevant" to New Zealand security interests as well. See "Joint News Conference [Following the 32nd ANZUS Council Meeting]," *Department of State Bulletin* 83, No. 2078 (September 1983), 71. For further comments on New Zealand's position regarding the Indian Ocean, see Dora Alves, *The ANZUS Partners* Significant Issues Series 6, No. 8 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1984), 31.

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region" to secure what it regarded as a "wider horizon" in the Pacific as a whole.[19] As the current U.S.–New Zealand dispute was intensifying in late 1984, various officials within New Zealand's Ministry of Defense lamented their country's pending loss of access to the American defense lifeline, speculating that New Zealand would be unable to check Soviet maritime penetration throughout the wider Southwest Pacific without it.[20]

As a Labor government once again assumed power in Australia in March 1983 under Bob Hawke and the New Zealand Labour Party was elected to power some sixteen months later under David Lange, the question of what threats ANZUS was specifically meant to deter once again became a key issue, and both countries undertook strategic reassessments. In Canberra, Foreign Minister Bill Hayden oversaw a formal defense review to specifically assess how his government's determination to accelerate Australia's shift away from the forward defense strategy and toward a more self-reliant and cost-effective security approach would impact upon defense ties with the United States in general and upon ANZUS in particular. While the conclusions of this review supported Australia's continued membership in ANZUS without substantial revision, the exercise also served notice to Washington that Australia was becoming a more mature and independent ally and that future Australian participation in the treaty could not be taken for granted.[21] Many Australians also remained concerned that the Reagan administration was overly prone to incorporate Australian bases and tracking installations into a U.S. global warfighting strategy, at odds with Canberra's own rejection of forward defense strategy in the post-Vietnam era.[22]

David Lange's election as New Zealand's prime minister in 1984 had an even greater impact on U.S. security planning in the region, ultimately leading to the compromising of ANZUS itself. Having developed its platform of resistance to the nuclear component of the U.S. extended deterrence strategy in the Pacific while in opposition, Labour set in motion what was to become the most serious challenge to overall U.S. collective defense strategy in the Asian Pacific during the

[19] Ministry of Defense, *Defense Review 1983* (Wellington: P.D. Hasselberg, Government Printer, 1983), 17.

[20] Several background papers advancing such arguments were released in October 1984 and were circulated among a wide array of New Zealand and foreign diplomats, journalists, and interested observers.

[21] Hayden summarized the basic findings of the review on September 1983 and his statement to Parliament is reprinted in full in *Australian Foreign Affairs Record* 54 (September 1983): 513–517. Also see a statement by Australian Defense Minister Gordon Scholes, as condensed into the article, "Australia's Strategic Outlook and Defense Policy," *Australian Outlook* 38 (December 1984): esp. 140–141; F. B. Mediansky, "Nuclear Weapons and Security in the South Pacific," *The Washington Quarterly* 9 (Winter 1986): 31–43; and Mediansky, "ANZUS In Crisis," *The Australian Quarterly* 57 (Autumn/Winter 1985): esp. 13–14.

[22] Typifying such concerns are the observations of Andrew Mack, head of the Peace Research Center, Australian National University in "Crisis In the Other Alliance: ANZUS In the 1980s," *World Policy Journal* 3 (Summer 1986): 447–472.

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postwar era. Lange adopted a more active form of non-nuclear politics than was the case during New Zealand's previous postwar Labour governments. Specific aspects of the revised policy included: the banning of all nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered vessels from entry into New Zealand ports (this ban extended to British and French ships, as well as American, and to conventionally-powered ships that did not specifically deny their nuclear capabilities; rejection of any New Zealand participation in the nuclear aspects of the ANZUS alliance; and acceleration of the Labour Party's long-term quest for the establishment of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone.[23]

The United States initially adopted a low-key response to New Zealand's challenge to nuclear extended deterrence. It believed that once a comfortable amount of time had passed, Lange would eventually modify his defense politics in conformity with what Washington regarded as the imperatives of global power politics. (In much the same way postwar British Labour leaders had abandoned their campaign commitments to nuclear disarmament upon reaching office.) While the specific content of many key discussions conducted between U.S. and New Zealand officials between July 1984 and August 1986 remain classified, my subsequent interviews with knowledgeable mid-level U.S. officials reveal that they perceived that Wellington had communicated at least *tacit* assurances about forthcoming modifications of the Labour government's policies. The U.S. position has since been described by Albinski:

> Washington *expected* as well as *hoped* that after months of careful and sensitive negotiations, a working arrangement had been achieved and that an old, conventionally powered destroyer of a class that *could* but that did not necessarily carry nuclear-tipped anti-submarine armament would be admitted. . . . [when] New Zealand [eventually] balked. . . . (t)he American side felt bitter, even deceived.[24]

Throughout most of 1984, U.S. officials continued to pursue quiet diplomacy on the ANZUS front, assuming that New Zealand would eventually be swayed to modify or alter its non-nuclear stance.

[23] The basic components of Labour policy are summarized by Ramesh Thakur, *In Defense of New Zealand* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), esp. 184. New Zealand's ANZUS policies directly concerning nuclear weapons as they evolved from the 1960s to the present are analyzed by Michael McKinley, *ANZUS, New Zealand and the Meaning of Life*, Legislative Research Service, Australian Parliament Discussion Paper No. 6 1985–86, 39–46; and McKinley, "Labor, Lange, and Logic: An Analysis of New Zealand's ANZUS Policy," *Australian Outlook* 39 (December 1985): 133–138. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone policy was spelled out most comprehensively in a statement by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense Minister Frank D. O'Flynn in Parliamentary debate on 28 November 1984, with excerpts reprinted in *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* 34 (October-December 1984): 12–13; and in an address by Lange before the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 5 March 1985, reprinted in ibid., 35 (January–March 1985): 12–17.

[24] Henry Albinski, *The United States, Pacific Security, and ANZUS* (New York: Asia Society, forthcoming), 52 in ms. version. (Emphasis in original.) Also consult "ANZUS' Long Shadow," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6 September 1984; and "ANZUS Break Up 'Due to Lack of Diplomacy'," *New Zealand Herald* (Auckland), 16 August 1986.

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Any hopes that Lange would do so, however, proved to be ill-founded. During late September 1984, in his maiden address to the United Nations, Lange reaffirmed New Zealand's nuclear ban in highly emotional and idealistic terms. He contended that because of his country's geography "no other country has New Zealand in its [targeting] sights."[25] On 31 January 1985, New Zealand crossed the rubicon in its nuclear dispute with the United States by turning down Washington's request that the USS *Buchanan*—a conventionally-powered frigate, but one still capable of deploying antisubmarine nuclear depth charges—be allowed to enter Auckland harbor on a no confirm/no deny (NCND) basis, which Washington believed had to remain in place as the primary modus operandi for ANZUS to continue its role in overall U.S. extended deterrence strategy. U.S. defense officials were outraged by New Zealand's continued antinuclear posture, because the United States had refrained from dispatching any naval vessels into New Zealand's vicinity since Lange's assent to power and because American F-16 combat aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons *had* been allowed to land in New Zealand the previous October.[26] The United States was also concerned that future New Zealand prime ministers who submitted to political pressures levied by the New Zealand peace movement could veto the regular American conduct of ANZUS-related missions on the basis of antinuclear rationales.[27]

The United States appeared to have underestimated the Lange government's determination to stand by its principles at this critical juncture of the ANZUS crisis. The Americans may also have overrated the ability of New Zealand's military establishment and pro-defense bureaucracies to craft a solution that both sides could eventually have accepted.

After the *Buchanan* incident, ANZUS relations deteriorated rapidly. New Zealand forces were ostracized from an ANZUS naval exercise, Sea Eagle I-85, as well as from a more comprehensive set of Pacific defense maneuvers known as Operation Roll Call conducted in the western Pacific with U.S., British, Canadian, and Australian forces participating. By August 1985, some twenty-two joint military exercises, defense seminars, or other related ANZUS functions had been canceled or restructured to exclude New Zealand. Wellington was also gradually cut off from CINCPAC (commander-in-chief of U.S. Pacific Command) intelligence flows at the Command Intelligence Center at Honolulu, as well as from British Intelligence Council briefings in London. Visits by New Zealand military units to the United

[25] Speech reprinted as "Nuclear Disarmament: The Prime Minister in New York," *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* 34 (July-September 1984): 8.

[26] See especially the testimony of U.S. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz in hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States*, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 18 March 1985, 167.

[27] For a background assessment of growing U.S. frustrations over New Zealand's stance on the nuclear-ships issue and over the *Buchanan* incident in particular, see Nayan Chanda, "Waving the ANZUS Rules," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 October 1985, 36–37.

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States were no longer welcome, and as New Zealand military liaison and exchange personnel reached the end of their tours of duty, they were not replaced.[28]

Throughout 1986, various eleventh hour efforts were made by both sides to salvage U.S.–New Zealand defense ties. But U.S.-proposed variations to the American NCND formula without compromising it proved unacceptable to New Zealand. By mid-1986 the recommendations of a U.S. Department of Defense internal review of ANZUS were reluctantly approved by President Ronald Reagan: New Zealand could not be written out of the treaty; but it could and should be merely "ignored" in future ANZUS proceedings until such time as Wellington's non-nuclear stands were reversed.[29] In the meantime, the Lange government moved ahead to introduce formal legislation into New Zealand's Parliament converting the Labour Party policies on nuclear port bans into law by passage in December 1985 of the Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Bill.

The culmination of the U.S.–New Zealand dispute on ANZUS took place in late June/early July 1986, when Shultz met with Lange for several hours during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ministerial conference in Manila. Little new ground was covered in those discussions, and the respective sides subsequently engaged in somewhat acrimonious blame-shifting. Shultz publicly announced that the United States no longer accepted any ANZUS obligations toward New Zealand, noting that "we part company as friends, but we part company."[30] The United States would formally withdraw from its military commitments and assistance extended to a friendly country for the first time since the beginning of the cold war. During what originally was to be the 35th annual ANZUS council meeting, convened in San Francisco during early August 1986, a joint U.S.–Australian communiqué was drawn up that criticized New Zealand for its rigid assertion of antinuclear politics into the interworkings of ANZUS and the overall western alliance.[31]

Australian Foreign Minister Hayden subsequently announced that while Canberra would still pursue close defense cooperation with Wellington—both under the ANZUS instrumentalities that still allowed for the pursuit of bilateral security relations by Australia with New Zealand, as well as under the 1944 ANZAC defense arrangements between these two countries. Canberra nonetheless admitted

[28] Background on New Zealand's military damage suffered as a result of downgraded ANZUS ties is offered by John Beaglehole, "Labor's Dangerous New Course," *Pacific Defense Reporter* 12 (December 1985/January 1986): 14–16; and Ross Coutthart, "How ANZUS Will Run Without New Zealand," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 June 1986. Also see testimony of Karl D. Jackson, deputy assistant secretary of Defense, East Asia and Pacific Affairs, in *United States Policy Toward Australia and New Zealand And The Current State of ANZUS*, 1–8.

[29] The Department of Defense (DOD) study is cited in Michael Weisskopf, "U.S. Will Weaken Its NZ Links," *The Age* (Melbourne), 24 December 1985; also see Jenni Hewett, "U.S. Warns Lange Again on ANZUS," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 12 December 1985.

[30] Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Aim To Defend New Zealand Ends," *New York Times*, 28 June 1986.

[31] See "Australia-U.S. Relations: Ministerial Talks—Joint Communiqué," *Australian Foreign Affairs Record* 57 (August 1986): 714–742.

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that this was a less-than-optimal arrangement. "Australia," Hayden noted, "regard[s] its alliance relationship with the United States, expressed through ANZUS, as of prime importance to its security . . . [and] . . . for obvious practical reasons, Australia cannot realistically be expected to provide a substitute for the United States as a security partner for New Zealand."[32] The Hawke government seemed prepared to accept the reality of an ANZUS bilateralization within a still pro forma multilateral framework to avoid the wider security complications that New Zealand's defection from the American extended deterrent might otherwise precipitate throughout the Asian-Pacific region.[33] While the ANZAC tie still accorded Wellington at least a peripheral standing within western defense planning circles, for all practical purposes ANZUS had been reduced from a trilateral to bilateral alliance, replaced by ". . . a double-bilateral arrangement—U.S.-Australia in ANZUS and Australia-New Zealand in the ANZAC Agreement."[34]

The pattern of deterioration in U.S.-New Zealand security relations continued throughout early 1987, as the Reagan administration declined to renew its five-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on logistical support, giving Wellington "special preferences" in purchasing U.S. arms and characterized by U.S. government officials as the last tangible link between the United States and New Zealand under the traditional ANZUS relationship.[35] The Labour government's long-awaited Defense White Paper tabled in late February 1987 conceded that the United States had "suspended most of its defense and intelligence cooperation" with New Zealand as a result of its non-nuclear policies and that New Zealand's "defense planning must proceed in recognition of the reality that, between the United States and New Zealand, ANZUS is 'inoperative.'"[36] On 5 June 1987, the Lange government's nuclear free-zone bill was passed in Parliament by a 39–29

[32] News release issued by the minister for foreign affairs, Bill Hayden, MP, on 10 December and reprinted as "Visit by Minister for Foreign Affairs to New Zealand," in *Australian Foreign Affairs Record* 57 (December 1986): 1108. For background on ANZAC, see Desmond Ball, ed., *The ANZAC Connection* (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1985). See also *Los Angeles Times*, 12 December 1986; and Paul Smith, "Hayden Spells Out Disagreement with Lange Over New Zealand Defense Role," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 12 December 1985.

[33] Increasing alliance drift in the Asian-Pacific region caused by the "bilateralism" factor as well as by "dissonance" from one Asian-Pacific subsystem spilling over to cause similar disruptions in other western defense arrangements throughout the region is addressed by Chin Kin Wah, "Prospects for Wider Cooperation in the Pacific" in Douglas T. Stuart, ed., *Security Within The Pacific Rim* (Aldershot, England: Gower Publishing, 1987), 136–137.

[34] Coral Bell, "U.S. Military Power in the Pacific: Problems and Prospects: Part II" in The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *East Asia, the West and International Security: Prospects for Peace*, Adelphi Paper #216 (London: IISS, Spring 1987), 57.

[35] Michael Richardson, "Labor Under Pressure to Change on ANZUS," *Pacific Defense Reporter* 13 (March 1987): 35. Also see New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *New Zealand News* (Los Angeles Consulate dispatch), 2 February 1987, 1.

[36] Ministry of Defense, *Defense of New Zealand* (Wellington: V. R. Ward, Government Printer, February 1987), 18. Also see David Barber, "Self-Reliant Security," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 12 March 1987, 25.

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vote. The U.S. State Department simultaneously moved to back a U.S. congressional plan for downgrading New Zealand's official status from U.S. ally to that of a friendly country.[37] Several months earlier, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage asserted during a briefing with foreign journalists that the ANZUS dispute had caused serious damage to the West's entire collective defense system and had opened up the Southwest Pacific in particular to Soviet strategic penetration.[38]

## The Post-ANZUS Era: Ramifications for U.S. Collective Defense Strategy

U.S. officials have maintained since the Lange government came to power that extended deterrence cannot be divided into separate parts and that New Zealand's behavior has actually demonstrated the very type of risk and uncertainty that can arise if deterrence is not pursued at all possible levels of conflict.[39] They have emphasized that regions of the world are geopolitically interdependent and that neither superpower can be expected to accept restraints on nuclear planning or deployment, given the wide array of conflict scenarios in the overall global balance of power. The ANZUS dispute has impeded the U.S. global deterrence posture, according to U.S. defense officials by:

> signalling that some democratic societies affiliated with the Western Alliance may now be prepared to disengage from the U.S. extended deterrence system in ways which could encourage Soviet divide and rule tactics and disrupt confidence in U.S. security guarantees in the process;
>
> increasing the risks of superpower confrontation in the Pacific by encouraging the Soviet Pacific Fleet to test Western control over sea lanes of communication from Australia to the U.S. west coast;
>
> compromising U.S. force presence in the South Pacific by port access denial since "port access" is, in effect, an operational demonstration of the joint commitment of the partners to the deterrence symbolized by the [defense] alliance.[40]

[37] Charlotte Evans, "New Zealand's Nuclear Aversion," *New York Times*, 14 June 1987; and *Los Angeles Times*, 5 June 1987.

[38] Armitage's statement was made in response to a question asked by Australian journalist Geoff Barker at a Washington, D.C. Foreign Press Center briefing on 23 March 1987. The briefing was entitled "Current Issues Concerning the United Defense Policies Toward the Pacific, the Middle East and Central America." The author also confirmed the accuracy of this statement in telephone conversations with DOD officials.

[39] An illustration of this U.S. position is Secretary of State Shultz's address, "On Alliance Responsibility" reprinted in *Current Policy* No. 724, 17 July 1985, 1–2.

[40] See testimony of James Kelly, deputy assistant secretary of defense, East Asian Affairs in *Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States*, 162–163; and Marc Liebman, "Soviet Naval Initiatives in the Pacific," *Armed Forces Journal* 124 (April 1987): 58–63.

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The United States also deplored what it calls Lange's "misrepresentation" of U.S. port and basing relationships with its other allies, particularly in northern Europe. Contrary to Lange's claim that Denmark and Norway imposed bans against U.S. nuclear ships similar to those which New Zealand was introducing, Denmark accepted nine U.S. frigates and two American battleships on a NCND basis during 1985 alone. A U.S. official concluded with noticeable bitterness: "He [Lange] may not be able to imagine that (the United States would refuse to help New Zealand in an emergency), but it's hard for us to imagine that New Zealand would not allow our ships into its ports."[41]

Critics of these arguments in New Zealand and elsewhere, however, have countered that it is the United States, rather than New Zealand, which has violated Article 2 of the ANZUS Treaty by obfuscating the specific *regional* context of Wellington's ANZUS commitments and by relegating New Zealand's regional defense contributions to secondary status in favor of pursuing America's own global power concerns. Lange and his supporters have argued that New Zealand never intended to become an integral part of the United States' global deterrence strategy, and that ANZUS *does* allow for the separation of conventional regional deterrence in the Pacific from U.S. global deterrence with its nuclear dimensions.[42]

Beyond its ramifications for continued U.S.–New Zealand defense relations, the ANZUS crisis raises three questions regarding western collective defense politics. First, to what extent will New Zealand's antinuclear idealism spill over to affect Australia's continued willingness to support the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy? Second, will alternatives to that strategy in the form of nuclear-free-zone movements or increased anti-West political initiatives become more popular throughout the South Pacific, gradually eroding U.S. influence there in the process? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, does the disruption of ANZUS encourage similar trends within those remaining elements of the overall western collective defense network? This last question appears to be especially significant when it is recalled that apart from NATO and the few mutual defense treaties Washington still observes with selected East Asian states (Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, all of which could become politically volatile in the near future), ANZUS was the only remaining western multilateral collective defense agreement that had survived intact into the 1980s.

[41] Norman Kempster, "U.S. To End Defense of New Zealand," *Los Angeles Times*, 28 June 1986. Also see John M. Goshko, "U.S. Dispute Lange Over Ship Visits," *Washington Post*, 3 July 1986; and *New Zealand News* (U.S. West Coast Edition/New Zealand Consulate Post Dispatch), 2 July 1986 and 4 July 1986.

[42] New Zealand's 1987 Defense White Paper contends that "(t)he ANZUS Treaty does not contain any stipulation that the parties must accept nuclear weapons. The New Zealand Government does not accept that such a far-reaching obligation can be implied, or that its ban on the entry of nuclear weapons into New Zealand is contrary to the Treaty," 18. Also see Thakur, *In Defense of New Zealand*, 194–195.

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*The Australian Dimension*

Certainly the circumstances forcing changes in defense relations between the United States and New Zealand were very different from those influencing ongoing security cooperation between the United States and Australia. In 1981 the Australian Parliament's Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense released a threat assessment study pertaining to Australian security. This report still appears to constitute the basis for Canberra's approach on questions of Asian-Pacific regional deterrence as it interrelates to more general problems of international security. The committee observed that Australia's ultimate security depends upon the United States's ability to maintain a global balance of power between itself and the USSR. While American defense operations at Northwest Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar in Australia could well be targeted by Soviet nuclear missiles, the committee nevertheless asserted that the existence of these facilities strengthened overall U.S. efforts for deterring nuclear war and that a widespread conventional war fought in the Asian Pacific apart from nuclear escalation seemed unlikely. Under these circumstances Australia needed to "play [its] part in contributing to the Western Alliance [at the global level] and in improving [its] own self-reliance within [the] region."[43]

The present Australian government's review of ANZUS undertaken in 1983 reaffirmed the committee's argument that Australia must contribute to the American extended deterrent by hosting defense installations and providing transit points for U.S. air and naval units in order to derive the maximum benefits of that deterrent for Australia. In summarizing the review, Foreign Minister Bill Hayden noted to the Australian Parliament that ". . . while the provisions of the [ANZUS] Treaty do not define precisely the nature of the response which partners might provide according to their constitutional processes in the event of attack or major threat, the Treaty has significant deterrent value. . . ." Although the joint installations arrangements are not part of the ANZUS obligation, per se, Hayden added, they " . . . clearly represent an important reflection and instance of the shared interests which the Treaty embodies . . . the contribution made by the joint defense facilities to the deterrence of nuclear war fully justifies any risks that might be seen as arising from our having those facilities in Australia."[44]

An independent review of Australia's defense capabilities recently commissioned by the Australian Defense Department and prepared by a widely respected defense analyst, Paul Dibb, reiterated the Labor Government's position that Australia in

[43] Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, *Threats to Australia's Security, their Nature and Probability* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Services, 1981), 25–26. Also see T. B. Millar, "ANZAC Perspectives On Soviet Power In The Pacific" in Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., *The Soviet Far East Military Build-up: Nuclear Dimensions and Asian Security* (London: Croom Helm, 1986): 158–159.

[44] "Review of ANZUS" in Weekly Hansards, *Australian Parliamentary Debate*, House of Representatives, 33rd Parliament, 1st sess. 2nd period, 15 September 1983, 899–901.

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the final analysis still depends upon the United States for its own survival. The Dibb Report contended that while ANZUS consultation procedures offer no explicit guarantee for an automatic U.S. military intervention on Australia's behalf for every potential defense contingency that may arise, the ANZUS Treaty remains indispensable to Australian security because "ANZUS remains as a deterrent, particularly against higher level threats. A potential aggressor must take into account possible United States involvement in the defense of Australia."[45]

The Dibb Report also asserted, however, that ANZUS has actually strengthened Australia's determination to build up a more independent defense capability over time. Canberra's access to U.S. intelligence resources—sophisticated military intelligence data, high technology, and logistical support programs—has allowed Australia gradually to become a more formidable regional military power in its own right. As a result, the report maintained, the defense relationship with the United States should now be viewed as one characterized by increased reciprocity; Canberra's own defense technology, weapons systems, and logistics now rival American extended deterrence as the most important factor in mutual U.S.–Australian defense planning for the Southwest Pacific and eastern Indian Ocean regions. Accordingly, Dibb concluded, "there is no requirement for Australia to become involved in United States contingency planning for global war." Future Australian military contributions in support of "distant diplomatic interests" of the western alliance as a whole should be regarded as a gesture of Australian good will by the United States, not as an inherent Australian defense obligation under the ANZUS auspices.[46]

In March 1987, the Australian Defense Department issued a new Defense White Paper based largely on the Dibb Report but departing from it somewhat by its less restrictive interpretation of what Australia's defense perimeter should actually be. The White Paper emphasized that Australian defense modernization should be pursued with the goal of achieving a "favorable strategic situation in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific through the defense of Australian interests around the country's surrounding maritime areas and through the maintenance of a strong defense relationship with the United States." In specific terms, Australia would provide its army with greater mobility for operations north of the continent and would strengthen its over-the-horizon radar as well as its integrated air defense capabilities. Australia would also deploy a more powerful surface combatant force (up from twelve destroyers to sixteen–seventeen destroyers/frigates/escorts) and modernize its submarine force (to operate on both the country's east and west coasts). Even some remnants of the old forward defense posture would be maintained with a rotational deployment of both F/A-18 jet and P-3C aircraft to But-

[45] Report to the Minister for Defense by Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defense Capabilities* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, March 1986), 46.

[46] Ibid.; and "Security Problems in the South Pacific" in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1986–1987* (London: IISS, Spring 1987), 176.

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terworth Air Base in Malaysia under the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA). The U.S. Pacific Command applauded Canberra's defense plans, noting that "Australian . . . force modernization and reorganization stressing joint operations will improve Australia's military capability and therefore promote regional stability."[47]

Australia's security objectives depart from those now promoted in New Zealand, for it may be surmised that the Australian government still views the U.S. security tie as indispensable to its own geographic and strategic situation even to the point of accepting the U.S. extended deterrent with its nuclear dimensions. As Australian strategic analyst Coral Bell has concluded: "Short of a complete revolution of feeling in the Australian Labor Party, no change from the present adhesion to the American connection appears likely."[48]

Yet the Australian Labor Party (ALP) has not been totally immune from applying some non-nuclear politics of its own during the ANZUS dispute. The antinuclear mood within ALP reached its apex during January/February 1985, when much of Prime Minister Hawke's cabinet and most of the Labor Party's elected parliamentary ministers opposed a commitment originally made by Malcolm Fraser and subsequently honored by Hawke to provide support facilities for U.S. surveillance planes monitoring the testing of America's new MX missile in the Tasman Sea. This weapons system is regarded by many Australians as having potential first-strike strategic nuclear capabilities and thus as a weapons system that destabilizes rather than reinforces extended deterrence in the Pacific. It also was viewed by Labor disarmament activists as contradictory to the Hawke government's public support for arms control measures over global nuclear warfighting doctrine. Any estrangement in Australian-American security cooperation instigated by the MX incident, however, was soon repaired. Under fire at home, Hawke journeyed to the United States, where he not only secured an exemption from MX logistical support commitment, but was even allowed to air his government's opposition to SDI in Washington without raising the ire of his hosts.

Hawke was able to generate the leverage he needed with the Americans by sending and publicizing a letter to Lange in which he concluded that Australia "could not accept as a permanent arrangement [that] the ANZUS alliance had a different meaning and entailed different obligations to different members."[49] Senior U.S. officials also downplayed the MX episode, because the United States could find other ways to monitor its testing without involving Australian logistical support and because Australia was continuing to support overall U.S. naval and air activi-

[47] For the CINCPAC response to Australia's latest defense policy announcements, see "Defense White Paper," *Pacific Defense Reporter* 13 (1 April 1987): 20. On the specific guidelines regarding Canberra's FPDA commitments, see "Australia To Maintain Air Base In Malaysia," FBIS *Asia & Pacific* (*Daily Report*), 21 April 1987.

[48] Coral Bell, "U.S. Military Power in the Pacific: Problems and Prospects: Part II," in IISS, *East Asia. The West and International Security: Prospects for Peace*, Part I, Adelphi Papers No. 216 (London: IISS, Spring 1987), 58.

[49] "U.S. Ship Visit Spurs Row in ANZUS Alliance," *Washington Post*, 26 January 1985.

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ties undertaken in the Asian-Pacific region. Accordingly, the Reagan administration cautiously strove to softpeddle obvious Australian-U.S. differences over SDI and other disagreements between the two nations related to the testing of nuclear weapons/delivery systems in Pacific locales.[50]

It is unlikely that any single security dispute involving Canberra and Washington could become as serious as that now separating the United States and New Zealand. Both Australian politicians and defense officials increasingly view Australia's cost-effective access on U.S. defense resources as overriding the benefits of complete independence in its security policies. The Dibb Report and the 1987 Australian Defense White Paper both endorse continuing U.S. ship visits on a NCND basis, U.S. transit rights for its B-52s, and operations of the joint intelligence facilities. The risk of an attack on Australia as a result of its continued security ties with Washington was characterized as "minimal" and is more than outweighed by the benefits of continued U.S. extended deterrence.[51]

But the current good will between American security planners and their Australian colleagues may yet prove to be deceptive. Over time the development of unexpected but clearly disparate national security priorities between Canberra and Washington could test the fabric of ongoing U.S.-Australian security cooperation. A continued decline of Australia's economy, for example, could prompt more Australians to single out U.S. trading behavior as a convenient scapegoat for their own difficulties, particularly in regard to recent strains over the Reagan administration's August 1986 decision to subsidize U.S. wheat sales to the USSR, thereby undercutting the world market price and threatening to bankrupt Australian farmers in the process. Canberra felt it was justified to point out in the strongest terms possible that while the United States "termed New Zealand a friend but not an ally, [Washington] was now in effect calling Australia an ally but not a friend. . . ."[52]

The convergence of economic and security policies in the Pacific at large has also been complicated by the U.S.-Japanese trade dispute, which has assumed global policy implications. In April 1987, Australian Foreign Minister Hayden warned that any U.S.-Japanese settlement of the trade balance problem at the expense of Australia could generate Australian public demand that the joint in-

[50] On 8 April 1986, Australian Defense Minister Kim Beazley reiterated the Australian government's opposition to the SDI concept. See "U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative Research Program," *Australian Foreign Affairs Record* 57 (April 1986): 276.

[51] *Review of Australia's Defense Capabilities*, 46–47; and Summary of Statement to the Australian Parliament by Kim Beazley, Australias's Minister for Defense, in Presenting the Government's Defense Policy Information Paper in Canberra, "Australian Defense Policy," *Australia News Release*, 19 March 1987, 4. Beazley noted that "[w]hile it would be irresponsible to depend on direct American combat support for our security, the possibility that this would be forthcoming would greatly complicate the offensive strategy of a potential aggressor."

[52] IISS, "Security Problems In The South Pacific," 175. Also see "U.S. Plans to Sell Wheat to East Upsets Australia," *New Zealand Herald*, 26 July 1986; Norman Kempster, "Subsidized Grain Issue Pits Farmers Against U.S. Allies," *Los Angeles Times*, 1 August 1986; and Kempster, "U.S. Australia Meet on Wheat, ANZUS," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 August 1986.

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stallations be closed down and that the context of ANZUS relations once more be reevaluated. Australia could hardly continue as the second biggest cash purchaser of U.S. weapons systems (after Saudi Arabia), Hayden reasoned, when a situation could develop "where, not unlike New Zealand, people start arguing for policies that seem to be moving perilously close to isolationism and nonalignment."[53]

The legacy of American isolationism, on the other hand, reinforced by the always-present budget-balancing concerns of the U.S. Congress, could also work toward encouraging Canberra to follow more closely the recommendations of the Dibb Report and the 1987 Defense White Paper in favor of greater defense self-sufficiency. Both documents outline a so-called layered defense strategy as an increasingly viable alternative to continued reliance on what is implied to be an increasingly unpredictable American defense benefactor. Under such a strategy, Australia's immediate geographic area would be defended *a priori*. The country's own military forces would be reorganized to detect, identify, and engage hostile forces approaching Australia from Southeast Asia or the South Pacific. Such a defense preferably would be conducted without U.S. assistance and through conventional means of resistance. The "layered defense" concept, however, still appears to be more idealistic than operational. The question of how sea lane approaches to Australia would be defended, for example, is glossed over in both documents by using such terms as "evasive routing." The United States, however, must contemplate seriously the prospect that Australia could foster a growing disillusionment with ANZUS if Washington continued to appear indifferent or callous toward Canberra's domestic economic problems.

At least some prominent Australian defense analysts have already questioned Washington's continued stake in maintaining a viable extended deterrent posture on Australia's behalf. The highly respected Australian military expert Ross Babbage has, for example, questioned whether or not the hosting of U.S. global strategic command, communications, control, and intelligence ($C^3I$) activities on Australia's soil is enough to reinforce U.S. "perceptions of a friendly relationship with Australia and [to] strengthen sentimental affinity [between the two countries]." A future contingency where Australia is not threatened directly by Soviet forces but by other regional powers (for example, Indonesia) may represent a more ambiguous threat to Washington's own security interests at the global level. Babbage has contended that the Nixon Doctrine provided evidence that the United States is increasingly reluctant to intervene on Australia's behalf in anything less than a global nuclear conflict involving the two superpowers.[54]

U.S. officials who regularly deal with ANZUS-related issues have responded

[53] Michael Richardson, "Trade Deal With Japan Could Threaten Bases," *International Herald Tribune*, 4–5 April 1987.

[54] Ross Babbage, *Rethinking Australia's Defense* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980), 16. Babbage has worked in both the Australian Department of Defense and Office of National Assessments and is currently one of the Labor government's key defense advisers.

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to such arguments forcefully and appropriately. They note that "any impression the U.S. would activate [the ANZUS] treaty only in the event of an attack by the Soviets but not in response to regional or other threats is simply a myth." John C. Dorrance, U.S. consul general in Sidney, has recalled U.S. willingness to intervene in the event Indonesia attacked Australia/New Zealand Commonwealth forces on the Malaysian Peninsula in 1963. He has also cited more recent assurances by the Reagan administration prior to New Zealand's extrication from the U.S. global defense network that the United States would come to the ANZUS allies' assistance in the event of a direct attack regardless of where the aggression against them may originate. Dorrance acknowledged, however, that an ANZUS "tripwire" or "automacity of response" to *every* regional contingency short of direct attack on the Antipodean homelands, could actually be detrimental to regional stability and deterrence by "unnecessarily broadening low level conflicts."[55] Such restraint would be most appropriate, for example, in future counterinsurgency operations conducted by Australian troops at selected Southeast Asian or South Pacific locales. Yet this policy approach also allows the United States to apply more enlightened discrimination in the Asian Pacific, a need painfully apparent to a superpower that only belatedly realized that it had overstepped its own sense of proportion and had mistakenly escalated the Vietnam war during the late 1960s.

### *Nuclear Free Zone Politics and South Pacific Intrusions*

Australian disaffection over future U.S. extended deterrence strategy would jeopardize more than the bilateral defense relationship between Washington and Canberra. The Hawke government has until now also backed U.S. defense interests by moving quietly but effectively to temper the growing support for nuclear free-zone politics throughout the Southwest Pacific. While Australia did support the reduction or elimination of nuclear testing in the Pacific and the ratification of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZT), its representatives to the South Pacific Forum also worked assiduously to ensure that the final language of the Treaty of Rarotonga—the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty—reflected the sovereign right of each member state to make its own decisions pertaining to allied military access to its ports and airfields. The treaty was approved by the Forum in August 1985 and presented for the endorsement by outside powers the following year. The majority of the Forum states have since followed Australia's lead by allowing transit of U.S. nuclear-capable ships and planes through their territories. In defense of his policy of continuing to permit all U.S. naval vessels to enter Australian ports, Hawke asserted that even if visiting American vessels were "nuclear-capable," their armaments could be adjusted to comply with Australian standards of nuclear safety while berthed in Australia's harbors. More-

[55] See John Dorrance, "ANZUS: Misperceptions, Mythology and Reality," *The Australian Quarterly* 57 (Spring 1985): 218–219.

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over, U.S. nuclear weapons wouldn't be "stored" on Australian soil under such conditions.[56]

American officials initially expressed their appreciation of Canberra's efforts to take into account Washington's "wide ranging global responsibilities." They were fully aware that New Zealand attempted to incorporate much stricter language into the SPNFZT, which would have precluded any individual Forum member's discretion on the entry of nuclear-capable units into its own territory.[57] In early February 1987, however, Washington announced its refusal to endorse the Australian-backed version of SPNFZT because of continued U.S. concern about the precedent that would be set by acquiescing to the treaty.[58] Australian officials expressed considerable disappointment over the decision and speculated that it might eventually prove to be instrumental in undermining the very politico-strategic consensus in the South Pacific needed to retain a predominant western influence there. While Great Britain—its own NCND policy also on the line as a result of New Zealand and South Pacific Forum antinuclear politics—subsequently backed the U.S. decision, the Thatcher government did at least couch its own position by announcing "it had no intention of acting inconsistently with the protocols which bar nuclear weapons storage, use and testing throughout the region."[59]

U.S. defense planners are concerned about how the ANZUS dispute may eventually affect their allies' support for the U.S. extended deterrence as it functions either in the entire Asian-Pacific theater, in NATO, or elsewhere. New Zealand has represented its current antinuclear politics, at least in part, as a constructive prescription for other western states who may be uneasy about Washington's insistence on pursuing alliance politics on its own nuclear terms. From the outset of the ANZUS dispute, therefore, Washington has been especially wary that New Zealand's dissent from U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy could affect other U.S. allies throughout the world, especially in those countries where large segments of the electorate have become increasingly sympathetic to the ideals of the antinuclear factions.[60]

New Zealand's challenge to American extended deterrence in the form of nu-

[56] Melbourne Overseas Radio Service report reprinted as "Hawke Reaffirms All Ships of Allies Welcome," FBIS, *Asia & Pacific (Daily Report)*, 30 August 1984, M-1 and "Hayden On Visiting U.S. Warships, Nuclear Issues" ibid., 29 November 1984, M-1. Also see Mediansky, "Nuclear Weapons and Security in the South Pacific," 35–36.

[57] See Statement by (then) Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James R. Lilley before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, *U.S. Policy Toward Australia and New Zealand And the Current State of ANZUS*, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 22 September 1986, 9–10 of the preliminary transcript.

[58] Norman Kempster, "U.S. Rejects Nuclear-Free South Pacific Zone," *Los Angeles Times*, 6 February 1987; and Neil A. Lewis, "U.S. Bans Plan for Nuclear Free Zone," *New York Times*, 5 February 1987.

[59] "N.Z. Regrets U.K. Refusal To Sign N-Free Pact," *The Daily Yomiuri* (Tokyo), 22 March 1987.

[60] In-depth analysis regarding this U.S. concern is offered by Edward A. Olsen, "Anti-Nuclear Posturing: New Zealand vs. Japan," *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 March 1985; also see testimony by Eugene J. Carroll, deputy director, Center for Defense Information and by William T. Tow in *Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand And The United States*, 68, 77–78, 127.

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clear free zone politics may indeed become a precedent for a reexamination of that U.S. strategy's continued applicability in other regions as well. This would be likely especially if a number of political parties that adhere to antinuclear politics should come to power in other western states. Emboldened by New Zealand's example, West European socialist leaderships might demonstrate that they too could disengage from their American security ties on the basis of what they regard as a principle of antinuclearism, which supercedes the value of continued support for U.S. nuclear deterrence. Yet as the superpowers have negotiated a sweeping intermediate and short-range nuclear arms control agreement for the European theater, West European political leaders are realizing that Soviet military power as it is deployed in Europe defies comparison to force balances that operate in the relatively more fluid maritime environment of the Pacific.

In New Zealand itself there is no guarantee that the current government's policy of rejecting the nuclear element of ANZUS will be overturned by its successors, even if they are from New Zealand's more conservative political wings. Any future government in Wellington will be sensitive to the fact that public opinion in that Pacific country remains divided, with around a 70 percent majority in favor of the Labour Party's antinuclear stand and about the same very impressive majority backing its country's defense alliance with the United States.[61] New Zealand's most ardent proponents of nuclear free zone politics, such as the Committee of Just Defense, have pressed for even further disassociation from the overall western collective defense framework, including the scuttling of the Royal New Zealand Navy's basic surface fleet, retirement of the Royal New Zealand Air Force's (RNZAF) Orion long-range maritime patrol planes, and a major reduction of New Zealand's overall defense budget.

The majority of New Zealanders, however, still remain committed to retention of some form of political and defense association with the United States. A continued blanket denial of U.S. military assistance to New Zealand could jeopardize the U.S. postwar security presence as it has credibly functioned in the Southwest Pacific throughout the postwar era. Even Wellington's policy makers admit this, and there were signs that as the Lange government approached a national election in August 1987, some softening in its nuclear free zone position was beginning to materialize. A secret agreement reportedly was reached in early 1987 between New Zealand and the United States, for example, on guaranteeing the continued operation of the U.S. Antarctic supply base in Christchurch without U.S. military transport aircraft having to confirm or deny whether nuclear weapons or devices were on board.[62] Immediately following his reelection, Lange emphasized that New

[61] This point is especially well developed by Michael McKinley, "Labour, Lange, and Logic: An Analysis of New Zealand's ANZUS Policy," *Australian Outlook* 39 (December 1985): 133–138. Also see IISS, "Security Problems in The South Pacific," 174.

[62] "Agence France Press On Lange's 'Secret Agreement' With U.S." in FBIS *Asia & Pacific* (*Daily Report*), 21 April 1987, M-3. "Secret Agreement to Save Supply Base," *Canberra Times*, 10 April 1987; and "PM Denies Doing Deal to Evade Nuclear Ban," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 April 1987.

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Zealand entertained a "strong interest" in pursuing positive relations with the U.S. and avoiding "anti-Americanism."[63]

In late June 1988, during meetings between U.S. and Australian officials in Washington, Shultz argued that U.S.-New Zealand military cooperation could be restored by using the so-called Danish Formula. In April 1988, the Danish parliament passed a resolution calling upon its government to notify visiting warships of Denmark's 31-year-old ban on nuclear weapons but taking no concrete measures to enforce it other than sending a letter to the country port seeking visitation rights for its naval units. This course of action would allow Denmark to reaffirm its non-nuclear principles but also preserve the United States right to apply its NCND policy by not requiring a specific disclosure of nuclear contents. Wellington, however, had already served notice that such a disclosure would be required for U.S. warship entry into New Zealand's ports and no subsequent change in its position was to be forthcoming as of this writing.[64]

### *The Deterioration of ANZUS and Regional/Global Power Balances*

U.S. problems related to ANZUS are complicated even more with the new and very dynamic foreign policy leadership demonstrated by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. In July 1986, Gorbachev delivered a seminal address at Vladivostok in which he declared the USSR would broaden its previous unidimensional military toward the Asian Pacific to one incorporating diplomatic, economic, and cultural initiatives as well. In what can be regarded as a direct challenge to U.S. extended deterrence and the Reagan administration's anti-Soviet posture sustained within the region, Gorbachev argued that "[i]n the face of the nuclear threat, it is absurd and criminal to act according to the old and moribund thesis holding that whatever is good for socialist countries must be rejected." He asserted that his country was a "regular and long time resident" of the Asian Pacific, and was therefore justified to expand its ties with and interests in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific island states as "the youngest independent participants in the region's political life." Most importantly, he concluded, the USSR was prepared to host a Pacific conference—perhaps modeled along the lines of the Conference for European Security and Cooperation, which worked so successfully for Gorbachev's predecessors as a politico-strategic policy instrument during the previous decade. Such a meeting would be convened to negotiate issues of military basing withdrawals, economic cooperation, and settlement of regional conflicts. It would be designed primarily to gain the Soviets access and influence within a region heretofore largely beyond their political or strategic reach.[65]

[63] Tom Bridgman, "We're Not Against U.S., Lange Says," *Evening Post* (Wellington), 18 August 1987.

[64] "We 'Could Use Danish Formula,'" *Canberra Times*, 4 July 1988; "Seek ANZUS Formula, Shultz Tells NZ," *The Age* (Melbourne), 4 July 1988; and "Aussies See No Change in US-NZ Ties," *Mainichi Daily News* (Tokyo, Eng. ed.), 10 October 1988.

[65] "Speech By Comrade M.S. Gorbachev at the Ceremonial Meeting Devoted to the Preservation

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As the Soviet Union is preparing to become a more assertive and more formidable geopolitical factor in the Asian Pacific, the United States increasingly is coming to terms with the limits of its own power. Washington now recognizes that it cannot afford to divert a substantial portion of its limited strategic resources to Southeast Asia and the western Pacific. Richard H. Solomon, director of the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, noted that U.S. deterrence strategy and security planning is now largely guided by the need to present Moscow with a two-front security challenge in Europe and the Far East. The need for Washington's friends in both Southeast Asia and the South Pacific to participate in containing potential Soviet "expansionist impulses" in the western Pacific through building more formidable early warning systems and strengthening air defense and antisubmarine warfare capabilities, as well as through the continued political and economic stabilization of their own societies, is no less critical today than it was in the 1950s, when Washington first implemented extended deterrence and containment strategies toward the region.[66]

Strategic competition between the USSR and United States in the ASEAN and ANZUS areas since 1975 has been characterized by a gradual expansion of Soviet offshore power from Vietnamese and Kampuchean coastal launching points, as well as by U.S. efforts to redefine what Richard Betts has since labeled "the diffusion of deterrence" in the region.[67] The USSR could well become more successful in complicating U.S. deterrence strategy there through pursuing geostrategic "windows of opportunity," as the unraveling of ANZUS has demonstrated. The U.S. Defense Department has identified a number of "direct strategic advantages" that the USSR could obtain by eventually developing basing facilities and greater power projection capabilities in the South Pacific: greater proximity to U.S. territory; surveillance of U.S. missile and SDI research at Kwajalein; operational benefits for the Soviet space and military satellite program; missile testing advantages; support for Soviet strategic mineral extraction in the Pacific; and better Soviet cross-Pacific air traffic capabilities.[68] All of these benefits, however, are related to stra-

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of the Order of Lenin to Vladivostok," *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, 29 July 1986, as translated and reprinted as "Gorbachev Accents Soviet Role in Asia" in *The Current Digest Of The Soviet Press* 38 (27 August 1986): 1–8, esp. 5. For excellent analysis of the implications of Gorbachev's initiatives, see Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Union, East Asia and the West: The Kremlin's Calculus of Opportunities and Risks" in IISS, *East Asia, the West and International Security: Prospects for Peace*, Adelphi Paper no. 217 (London: IISS, Spring 1987), 3–26; and Robert A. Scalapino, "Soviet Influence in East Asia and the Pacific in the Coming Decade: Part I," in ibid., 27–42.

[66] Solomon, "The United States and East Asia in the latter 1980s: Will Our Strengths Become Our Vulnerabilities?" in Stuart, *Security within Pacific Rim*, 126–127.

[67] For in-depth analysis of this point, see Richard Betts, "The United States: Global Deterrence" in James W. Morley, ed., *Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1985), esp. 54–59.

[68] Offered in U.S. Congressional hearings during late 1986 and cited in Center for Development Studies, "The Soviet Union In The South Pacific," *Network* (Canberra: The Australian National University, October 1986), 4.

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tegic interdiction rather than to strategic control of the Pacific sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and could still be neutralized by U.S. naval and air assets under the present military balance of power.

Of greater significance, however, is the appearance of a shift in both the Asian Pacific regional and global strategic momentum away from the West and toward the USSR. This trend has recently been illustrated by the USSR's offers of economic assistance to various Pacific island states in return for Soviet commercial maritime access to shore facilities of these impoverished nations (specifically in Kiribati, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, and the Solomon Islands). These Soviet initiatives, the Australians insist, must be considered as serious challenges to western security. The presently strained economies of both Australia and New Zealand, moreover, have made it impossible for Canberra and Wellington to sustain their own traditional economic assistance programs. The well publicized South Pacific Agreement on Regional Trade and Economic Association or SPARTECA is a noteworthy exception.[69] Some progress on South Pacific economic assistance was made by the U.S. State Department and Agency for International Development (AID) in late 1986 when the United States entered into a five year, $60 million Regional Fisheries Treaty with the South Pacific Forum, which encompassed economic assistance funds, licensing fees, and related technological support.[70]

The strategic implications of future Soviet and/or Libyan efforts to exploit Pacific-island politicoeconomic vulnerability—especially at a time when the United States is vying with nuclear free zone sentiments in New Zealand and throughout much of the South Pacific—have been spelled out in graphic terms by Admiral James A. Lyons, Jr., the current commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command. Lyons has observed that New Zealand's denial of port entry to U.S. nuclear powered/nuclear capable vessels—which, in turn, has led to a severance of coordination between the U.S. and New Zealand navies—leaves overall western offshore projection forces in the Pacific in a visibly weakened state. Specifically, the loss of New Zealand's naval support complicates U.S. efforts to counter Soviet naval forays from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam into the South Pacific area, thus giving substance to the long-held Australian/New Zealand concerns that the Pacific microstates are susceptible to Moscow's diplomatic and potential military penetration. Overall, according to Lyons, New Zealand's departure from ANZUS has left a "gap in the West's extended deterrence structure by disrupting the continuity of U.S. naval operations projected throughout the Southwest Pacific and the entire Asian–Pacific region."[71]

[69] SPARTECA as a Western *strategic* asset was recently weighed by Australian Defense Minister Kim C. Beazley in an unpublished address to the Pacific Forum/Australian Institute of International Affairs, 9 February 1986, 9–10 of draft copy.

[70] Information derived from telephone conversations with U.S. Department of State officials, 22 December 1986.

[71] David Devoss, "So Says Adm. James A. Lyons Jr.," *Los Angeles Times Magazine*, 10 August 1986, 17.

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While it is unlikely that a *Pax Sovietica* will develop in the South Pacific to rival the still formidable American or Antipodean influence over the near future, there are signs that the USSR is moving more openly to secure at least a politicoeconomic foothold there. A much publicized 1985 fishing accord between the Soviet Union and Kiribati lasted only a year, when the Soviets failed to obtain the shore access to the island state, which they originally coveted, after unnecessarily renegotiating the fishing agreement. But the Soviets later negotiated a more comprehensive package with Vanuatu, which allowed limited shore access for Soviet fishing trawler personnel, as well as permission to take on supplies at the capital city of Port Vila and at two other sites.[72]

In early May 1987, Australian Foreign Minister Hayden visited Wellington to discuss the increase of Soviet and Libyan influence within the Vanuatu government under the direction of Prime Minister Father Walter Lini. Hayden speculated that Libyan disruptions of regional stability in the South Pacific were facilitated by the "political fallout" from New Caledonia's decolonization movement against France. He concluded that Libya wanted to "twist the tail" of France and other western powers in the South Pacific because Libyan forces had suffered defeats in northern Chad as a result of U.S. and French military assistance efforts there. Hayden and New Zealand officials also discussed intelligence evidence that seventy or more so-called political activists were being sent from New Caledonia to Libya for paramilitary training.[73] Australia was further alarmed by Lini's imposition of a so-called defense ban against visits of Australian warships and military aircraft to Vanuatu, even though Port Vila significantly continued to accept funds through Canberra's $A5 million annual military assistance allocation directed toward Vanuatu.[74]

The recent political instability on Fiji also illustrates just how fragile the very sovereignties, much less economies of these island microstates really are. In the aftermath of the 14 May 1987 military coup d'etat led by Colonel Sitiveni Rabuku against the newly-elected government of Timoci Bavadra (an election reflecting the growing power base of the Indian population on that island state) Australia refused official recognition of a council of advisers appointed by the island's governor-general to run Fiji and review its constitution. Canberra believed that Rabuku's appointment to that council compromised the democratic process of government on Fiji. While New Zealand has been less outspoken than Australia on the Fiji crisis, Prime Minister Lange revealed that the deposed Bavadra took refuge in the homes of New Zealand's High Commission staff residing in Fiji on several occasions "when he . . . felt imperiled."[75] While this incident seems re-

[72] For background, see Frederic A. Moritz, "Global Powers Vie in South Pacific," *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 January 1987; and IISS, "Security Problems In The South Pacific," 178–179.

[73] Michael Richardson, "Australia, New Zealand Meet for Unannounced Talks on Libyan Moves," *International Herald Tribune*, 2–3 May 1987; and Mark Baker, "Hawke Unrepentant After Vanuatu Defense Ban," *The Age* (Melbourne), 12 May 1987.

[74] Baker, "Hawke Unrepentant."

[75] "Australia Refuses to Recognize Fiji Council," *International Herald Tribune*, 23–24 May 1987.

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moved from the build-up of superpower rivalry in the South Pacific for the time being, internal subversion represents the type of political security threats to the area that increases the politicoeconomic vulnerability of its populations over time. As the respected Commonwealth Consultative Group argued in late 1985, "a small state is . . . inherently vulnerable largely because it can be seen as a potentially easy victim for external aggression in all its guises."[76]

The fundamental U.S. strategic problem in the Asian Pacific, as it is unfolding in a post-ANZUS context, is largely one of identifying and implementing more effective allied burden-sharing measures, especially as they might pertain to Japan and Australia working together more effectively under a U.S. extended deterrence framework. The defining and implementing of such measures has become more critical, because the intraregional context of U.S. extended deterrence now mostly centers on an American ground force presence in South Korea, which is threatened by possible domestic upheavals in Seoul's political infrastructure, and by the naval/air basing complex in the Philippines, which becomes equally tenuous with the uncertain political future of that country. Under such circumstances, Hayden's previously cited attempt to link U.S.–Japanese differences over economics to Canberra's own propensity to continue its defense cooperation with Washington in the Asian Pacific was unfortunate and did little to serve overall western security interests or to generate a more facilitating spirit of cooperation.

In any case, there is, growing evidence that Japan is ready to extend higher levels of economic assistance to the South Pacific region. In early January 1987, Japanese Foreign Minister Tudashi Kuranari attended the ninth annual Japan-Australia Ministerial Committee Meeting in Canberra and reportedly agreed that Tokyo would work with the Australians in a "South Pacific axis" for ensuring economic and political stability in the area.[77] Kuranari also made a special point of visiting Vanuatu, Kiribati, and Fiji—Pacific ministates specially cultivated by Moscow. While in Fiji, he announced that Japan would set up $U.S. 2 million Special Pacific Islands Fund to be administered under the United Nations Development Program.[78] This Kuranari Doctrine, backing the independence, autonomy, and economic development of the South Pacific Forum nations, reflects an underlying set of Japanese security concerns. An accelerated Soviet military presence in the South Pacific could directly threaten Japan's air and sea routes to Australia and New Zealand, and both of these countries are important sources of coal, iron ore, and beef for the Japanese consumer.[79]

The legacy of Japanese colonialism in Micronesia and throughout the South Pacific earlier in this century, however, still must be weighed as a potential im-

[76] Commonwealth Secretariat, *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat—Marlborough House, August 1985), 15.

[77] "Canberra Meeting Ends With Pledge of 'S. Pacific Axis,'" *The Japan Times*, 10 January 1987.

[78] Robert Y. Horiguchi, "New Aid Programs Reflect Japan's Strategic Concern for Sea Lanes," *Pacific Defense Reporter* 13 (April 1987): 43–44.

[79] Ibid., 44.

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pediment to any intensified Japanese profile exercised beyond its immediate confines. Earlier speculation about incorporating Japanese industrial-military strength into a closer military relationship with ANZUS (to form a tacit, if not formal, JANZUS) has proven to be ill-founded.[80] The Japanese electorate has remained hesitant about its leaders undertaking large-scale strategic responsibilities throughout the Asian Pacific beyond the constitutional restraints of self-defense. Japan has moved gradually, however, to supplement U.S. extended-deterrence strategy in the Asian Pacific to a qualified extent. It has increased its maritime surveillance role in areas proximate to its own shores; has participated in the biannual Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) participation in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercises with U.S., Australian, Canadian, and British (in lieu of New Zealand) forces; has entertained a growing military technology collaboration with both the United States and Australia; and has recently increased its military spending to exceed 19 percent of its gross national product (GNP)—a critical spending barrier unsurpassed for many years in Japan.[81] The Japanese pattern of restrained military behavior, combined with Tokyo's low-key diplomacy consistently applied throughout the Asian–Pacific region, still appears to have been unsuccessful in erasing the traditional anxieties shared by China, the ASEAN states, and the South Pacific nations over prospects of a remilitarized Japan. Consistent with its sensitivity over such perceptions, Japan has properly distanced itself from the current ANZUS dispute.[82] But Tokyo remains mostly satisfied with U.S. extended deterrence as it still applies to the U.S.–Japan Mutual Security Treaty, which allows Tokyo to continue pursuing a low-key strategic profile with all of its neighbors (including the USSR) and to simultaneously enjoy the inherent economic advantages provided by the American security guarantee.[83]

Constrained by greater financial exigencies than those confronting Japan, Australia's regional defense policy has vacillated in recent years. Canberra still underwrites a viable, if limited forward defense posture in Southeast Asia through its continued participation in the FPDA with Malaysia, Singapore, Great Britain, and New Zealand and through bilateral military assistance programs to most of the ASEAN states. As previously noted, however, it is gradually moving away from

[80] William T. Tow, "The JANZUS Option: A Key To Asian–Pacific Security," *Asian Survey* 18 (December 1978): 1221–1243; and Edward A. Olson, "Adding a J to ANZUS," *New York Times*, 13 May 1981.

[81] For RIMPAC background and overall Japanese security behavior in this context, see Tow, "Australian-Japanese Security Cooperation: Present Barriers and Future Prospects," *Australian Outlook* 38 (December 1984): 220–206; and Tow, "U.S. Alliance Policies and Asian-Pacific Security: A Transregional Approach" in Tow and William R. Feeney, eds., *U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian Pacific Security* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 32–33, 40, and 62.

[82] For background on Japan's approach to the ANZUS crisis, consult Hamish McDonald, "Welcome to the Club," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 31 January 1985, 28–29; and a Kyodo press report to FBIS, *Asia and Pacific* (*Daily Report*), 28 January 1985, C-2.

[83] For analysis of Japanese perceptions concerning U.S. extended deterrence policies in the Asian Pacific, see Terumasa Nakanishi, "U.S. Nuclear Policy and Japan," *Washington Quarterly* 10 (Winter 1987): 81–97.

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forward defense in favor of embracing the Dibb Report's vision of a "layered defense" or "strategic zone of denial," which is mainly concerned with protecting Australian territory.[84] While Canberra's identity crisis has yet to impose the final *coup de grace* on FPDA, it remains uncertain how much longer Australia's commitment to that arrangement can be salvaged in the face of the cost-effectiveness arguments that seem to have prevailed over Australia's defense politics in recent years. In December 1986, New Zealand announced that it would pull out its 740-strong defense force from Singapore over a three-year period and leave only a "modest administrative presence" there to reaffirm its FPDA affiliation. For the time being, however, the Hawke government insists that defense of Australian sovereignty is compatible with at least a qualified regional defense posture. In early 1987, Defense Minister Kim Beazley has expressed concern that an "unfriendly maritime power" operating in either Southeast Asia or in the South Pacific "could inhibit our freedom of movement through these approaches and could place in doubt the security of overseas supply to Australia of military equipment and other strategic materials."[85]

## Conclusion

How can the United States, as well as Australia and New Zealand, best confront their strategic challenges individually and collectively in a post-ANZUS setting? Perhaps the most fundamental need is for each country to review its mutual security interests with the other and to gauge honestly the present applicability and credibility of the extended deterrence strategy within the current international environment. The ANZUS covenant itself is still based on deep cultural and political affinities and common values. This is true notwithstanding the mutual recriminations between Washington and Wellington in recent times.

Over the next few years Washington must approach strategic differences between itself and South Pacific nations with more sensitivity than has been the case until now. Most important, the Bush administration will need to weigh the value of rejecting the SPNFZT against prospects that South Pacific island states, justifiably or otherwise, may come to perceive the United States as the predominant security threat to their own region through its insistence on retaining the nuclear option for any military contingency that may arise in their neighborhood. In essence, the United States will need to define and implement more effective and more timely responses to growing tendencies throughout the region to gain increased strategic independence from Washington's nuclear deterrent. The United States will also need to calibrate an acceptable balance between its own strategic force

[84] *Review of Australia's Defense Capabilities*, 50–51.

[85] Australian Defense Ministry, "Defense White Paper," 21. Also see David Barber, "Phasing Out the Force," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 January 1987, 15–16; and Hamish McDonald, "The Zone of Denial," ibid., 12 March 1987, 26–27.

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presence in the Pacific and diplomatic settlements that can lead to reducing such nuclear capabilities in the ANZUS region over time.

Equally critical is the need for U.S. military planners to confront frankly and critically the implications of both Australian and New Zealand defense planning, which seems to be moving toward greater insularity and more concern with cost effectiveness while appearing to be less concerned with the wider regional and global dynamics of extended deterrence. The future quality and structure of Canberra's defense force will invariably affect overall western capabilities to project military power throughout the Asian Pacific region and beyond. Washington should also encourage Australia to remain an active Pacific security partner, working with both the United States and New Zealand, but not in a way designed to play the powerbroker in an unfortunate quarrel between old and valued friends.

Washington also needs to determine how it can live with a New Zealand defense force and political climate most likely incapable of and unwilling to support any security mission greater than carrying out a conventional defense for its homeland for some time to come. New Zealand still remains a pro forma member of ANZUS despite the U.S. decision to severe its military ties. Wellington, moreover, will continue as an affiliate of ANZUS until it serves notice of its intent to withdraw from the treaty.

The prospects of a rapprochement between New Zealand and the United States are mixed. Any conservative New Zealand government elected to power in 1989 or beyond could play to the 70 percent pro-United States alliance mood of its electorate in an attempt to erode the formidable antinuclear politics found in that country. Such tactics could well backfire, however, if the antinuclear factions were successful in making a case that the price for reaffiliation with the U.S. nuclear deterrent involved an unacceptable compromise of New Zealand's hard-won strategic independence obtained under the Lange government's tutelage. A Conservative successor government would need to create and implement positive and compensating initiatives to counter perceptions by its electorate that the diplomatic inertia Lange has generated on behalf of nuclear disarmament would not be completely lost.

Until a full ANZUS rapprochement is achieved, therefore, the U.S. should keep the channels of communication open to as many political sectors of New Zealand society as are receptive to it. This can be done through regular discussion and debate between U.S. and New Zealand officials, as well as through concerned private-interest groups and individual citizens. A less rigid policy course for U.S. policy makers to adopt might be continued firmness in U.S. determination that complete ANZUS ties—and thus full ANZUS privileges—can be reestablished for New Zealand only when it once more opts to return as a full member of the western defense community. But limited relations might still be preserved on a case-by-case basis.

In the meantime, an unprecedented and, until recently, unthinkable dispute continues between the United States and New Zealand. U.S.–Australian defense rela-

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tions have also become more strained at a time when new strategic challenges in the Pacific demand just the opposite. The ANZUS nations need to continue seeking ways to resolve their impasse over how extended deterrence should be viewed and implemented. Otherwise, the democratic heritage cherished by each of them for tolerating differences with one's friend without compromising the overall substance of that friendship could well begin to slip away.*

*The author is grateful to Henry Albinski, Thomas Durrell-Young, Hammond Rolph, and Douglas T. Stuart for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this paper. He is also indebted to Ishtiaque Zaman for research assistance.

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# Book Reviews

The Politics of Economic Power in Southern Africa *by Ronald T. Libby. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1987. 361 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $14.50.*

Ronald Libby offers an arresting reconceptualization of the political economy of southern Africa in this valuable study, the product of more than a decade of observation and inquiry. From 1973 to 1979, he taught successively at the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (now broken into its national units), then in Malawi and Zambia. The study thus benefits from direct immersion in the turbulent changes in southern Africa set in motion by the sudden 1974 demise of the Portuguese colonial state. The prolonged period of direct observation was then completed by painstaking research.

In a few words, the provocative thesis of this volume is that interdependency within the southern African region, rather than simple dependency upon the subimperial center of South Africa, is the analytical key. An iron grid of transportation infrastructure, labor flows, capital linkages, and trade relationships creates a partially integrated economic space in the zone stretching from Zaire and Tanzania south to the Cape. From this perspective, the efforts of the states north of the Limpopo to fashion a Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), to offer alternatives to dependent incorporation in the constellation of political economies whose most powerful core is South Africa, are doomed to failure.

However, Libby denies that analysis can end with noting the hegemonical force of South Africa. Interdependency may be asymmetrical, but it is not unidirectional. Choices open to the weaker states are limited but real. And the most potent regional actor, South Africa, is constrained in turn by the exigencies of its role in the regional economy.

Libby argues that the diverse regimes in the region all confront policy choices tinctured by the overriding gravitational force of the regional economy. Regimes of whatever ideological coloration share a commitment to survival as the ultimate imperative. Declaratory resolutions in international forums are far less consequential than sustaining the resource flow, which can only come by participation in the



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regional economy. Thus the regime with the most intensively cultivated ideological personality, Mozambique, has always sought to maintain its South African economic linkages in the realms of labor supply, transportation, and energy, even at the zenith of its aspirations to construct a Marxist-Leninist state in the late 1970s.

Because Libby sees the economic bonds as defining the region, above all those created by the transport grid, he excludes Angola from his purview. This unconventional judgment is justified by the closure since 1975 of the rail link that once tied the former Portuguese colony into the zone. Angola never has been a labor supplier to the industrial areas of South Africa and, secondarily, Zimbabwe. If the importance of economic transactions defines a regional political economy, probably the island micropolities of Comores, Seychelles, and Mauritius should be included. If a region is defined by political as well as purely economic variables, the omission of Angola would be difficult to justify.

But this quibble aside, Libby is left with an ample supply of states to which his analytical model may be applied: Tanzania, Zaire, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, and Namibia, as well as South Africa itself. In each case, he demonstrates how policy choice and conflict have been dominated by the necessities of optimizing advantages from the inescapable centrifugal pull of the regional economy. But these choices should not be seen as simply truckling to South African whims; even the weakest of the states, such as Lesotho, have been able at times to combine a strategy of political distance with economic cooperation.

The cases that struck me as the most illuminating were Malawi and Namibia. The political strategy of the perennial autocrat Hastings Banda is brilliantly delineated. In the Namibian instance, the Libby model facilitates a telling prognosis of the policy conflicts likely to arise within an independent Namibia, which once again appears to be a near-term possibility.

The principal flaw in the model is the flip side of its strength: an excessive reliance on economic variables to decode political choice. Of the cases examined, the least persuasive are Mozambique and South Africa. In the Mozambique instance, the analysis seriously understates the highly ideological character of the small and cohesive political elite that has dominated the country since independence. There were no economics-minded technocrats, as in Zimbabwe, to counter the preference of the ideological elect. Only when Mozambique had been bludgeoned into submission by a vicious onslaught of military pressure, subversion, and economic sabotage by South Africa did the leadership seek, as an alternative to utter ruin, the Nkomati Accord with South Africa, subsequently subject to wholesale violations by the South African security forces. In the South African case, the heavy, if not decisive, policy impact of security calculus so well analyzed in recent works by Joseph Hanlon and Philip Frankel, among others, vanishes from view, and with it the cogency of the Libby argument.

But a book with an original and provocative thesis can only be intended to foster debate. In this respect, the Libby volume clearly succeeds and joins the ranks of

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works indispensable for an overall understanding of the turbulent political economy of southern Africa.

CRAWFORD YOUNG
*University of Wisconsin-Madison*

Foreign Intelligence Organizations *by Jeffrey T. Richelson. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger, 1988. 330 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $16.95.*

This book is a reflection of the explosion of writings on intelligence subjects that has occurred in the past decade. It is now feasible for an academic researcher to collect an enormous file of published statements—some good, many bad, and most of them indifferent—on the CIA and to a lesser extent on the major foreign intelligence agencies. File drawers full of this material, excerpted from books and articles or clipped from news media stories, have created a cottage industry of processing and reprocessing the information publicly available. Jeffrey Richelson is one of the most industrious of the academic practitioners in this business. This book is the latest in the series he has published providing a handy reference to the voluminous writing now available.

Originally the main body of source material on intelligence derived from memoirs or historical reconstructions by former intelligence officers. These books still provide the real meat of solid information and informed analysis available to the serious reader. The journalists have busily added a lot of material to the record with news stories and speculative articles containing some additional truths. Often these are filled with error and tendentious analysis from dubious and frequently anonymous sources. The truth is many journalists, as well as academics, do not have any firsthand knowledge of actual intelligence work, and they are inclined to consult their fanciful imaginations and dark suspicions in describing the fragments they are able to find out from leaks and investigative reporting. Hence the file drawers that scholars these days are filling up are a very uneven resource, a mixed bag of fact and fantasy. If it has been printed somewhere, it is likely to stay in the file and be reprocessed again and again unless some well informed person with an intelligence background takes the trouble to correct the record. Even then, many writers will simply quote both sides of the story on the assumption that intelligence fact is stranger than fiction, and it is prudent to repeat anything that is not totally implausible.

Given the uneven quality of the information available to him, Richelson has done a skillful job of weaving together a systematic description of the secret intelligence agencies of eight important nations of the world. Five of them, the mainstays of the Atlantic world, are Great Britain, Canada, West Germany, France, and Italy. The other three, selected presumably because there is at least a little written material on them, are Israel, Japan, and China. It must be admitted that

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the account of the two Asian nations, which have not built their intelligence system on the Euro-American model, is pretty sketchy and spotty. As a result the treatment is not persuasively comprehensive or authoritative.

Furthermore, the book's rather pretentious title, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, belies the fact that there is no treatment of the Soviet KGB or any of the closely associated intelligence agencies of the Marxist-Leninist states. This is a real shortcoming for the casual researcher. It is probably explained by the fact that Richelson has another file drawer accumulating the rather scanty materials published on these massive intelligence systems copied from the Soviet model, what John Dziak in his excellent book on the KGB (*Chekisty*) calls the "counter-intelligence state." Perhaps another handy compendium on them will emerge soon.

Richelson does the best job on the better known organizations, especially Great Britain and Israel. He usefully summarizes the historical background of intelligence work in each country, and he includes numerous helpful charts. The index is a blessing, especially since the structural details are somewhat submerged by the effort to include some narrative writing on recent intelligence operations. This new publication is a reference tool that, despite its limitations, will be handy on the shelf for any researcher dealing regularly with the arcane world of secret intelligence.

RAY S. CLINE
*U.S. Global Strategy Council*

Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination *by Paul Gordon Lauren. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1988. 388 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $19.95.*

This wide-ranging survey of racial discrimination in the twentieth century and in particular of the interrelations between the diplomacy of the major powers and their racial policies before and after World War II testifies to a great deal of research in archival sources, as well as in the public record. Unfortunately, the author, a historian teaching at the University of Montana, is long on indignation and moral outrage, but woefully short on explanation.

Factual information is only the first step toward the elucidation of historical events, and explanation can only succeed if it is offered within the context of theoretical and analytical modes of thought. The facts never speak for themselves. But factual information is all that is provided here. The author quotes from an enormous variety of sources and provides data from all corners of the globe from a great number of historic periods. He ranges from Hitler's genocidal policies to the horrors of apartheid, from the colonial and imperialist policies of the major European nations to accounts of the protests of colonial or former colonial nations in the various forums provided by the United Nations. But one is left at the end of the book with numbness rather than enlightenment. The deluge of factual data tends soon to become tedious.

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Racial policies, as W. E. DuBois one put it, may be "the problem of the twentieth century," but it would seem that what scholars can contribute to its solution will not amount to much if they provide only indignation and factual documentation. The subtle dialectic of masters and subjects, of conquerors and conquered, of white domination and black or yellow enslavement may be illuminated by reference to the theories of, say, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, or by such contemporary theoretically informed historians as Eugene Genovese, George M. Frederickson, Orlando Patterson, or Winthrop Jordan to the extent that such scholars are able to provide explanatory variables rather than illustrations. But theoretical analysis is almost completely ignored by the author who hardly mentions such authors.

Lauren devotes roughly half of his work to detailed accounts of debates and resolution in the United Nations General Assembly and in its specialized committees on human rights and related matters. But, alas, as in the rest of the book, he provides little illumination and much indignation. It is not very helpful either to give accounts that seem always to indict the major white powers and make the Third World nations living incarnations of justice, rectitude, and unblemished virtue.

Both the content and the presentation of this book will limit its appeal. Even though the author apparently wished to reach a wide audience, it is unlikely that his book will have wide appeal. It will perhaps be consulted by western scholars of the Third World, by policy makers and officials in the Third World, and by international civil servants; but it is not likely to have an impact beyond fairly narrow circles.

I would not like to end this review on too sour a note. The author provides from time to time some little gems of illustration that redeem the tediousness of most of these pages. Here is one illustration. A British Foreign Office memorandum on the future of Japan dated 10 October 1921 states, ". . . however powerful Japan may eventually become, the white races will never be able to admit her equally. If she can enforce her claim she will become our superior; if she cannot enforce it she remains our inferior; *but equal she can never be.*" (emphasis in the original). One only wishes that there were more such gems in this haystack of facts.

LEWIS A. COSER
*SUNY at Stony Brook and Boston College*

The Third World and Decision Making in the International Monetary Fund: The Quest for Full and Effective Participation *by Tyrone Ferguson. New York, Pinter Publishers, 1988. 262 pp. $45.00.*

This book speaks with two voices. One is analytical and interesting. It recites a well organized history of the effort by developing countries to achieve concrete objectives in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The second is rhetorical and tiresome. It invokes a contentious interpretation of sovereign equality to de-

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mand that developing countries be given more control over the Fund's decision-making processes.

The book is a doctoral dissertation, written at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, which would lead you to believe that the first voice speaks for the author's mind and the second for his heart. You would be wrong. In fact, the rhetorical voice speaks most passionately through the mouth of the author's dissertation sponsor, Georges Abi-Saab, in the foreword to the book. Sovereign equality, he says, means that "decisions directly affecting a State cannot be taken without its participation and consent" (p. vii). The initial design of the Fund, with weighted voting, he argues, was an unfortunate departure from the ideal, and subsequent developments have made matters worse. Abi-Saad is on firmer ground when he credits his student with having identified "the present possibilities, limits and obstacles facing the Third World in its quest for a fairer share not only in the final product of the international economic system but also in the running of the system itself" (pp. viii-ix).

The rhetorical voice speaks loudly in Part I of Ferguson's book, but the analytical voice pipes up from time to time. There is, it says, a crucial distinction between legal and political equality, especially in a world of economic inequality. In the Fund, it explains, money counts. Quotas determine members' rights and obligations, and they are based on the members' relative importance in the world economy.

In Part II, moreover, the analytical voice makes a vital point. The United States is the only country able to veto important decisions in the Fund. But other groups of countries, including the developing countries, have that power collectively, so that "weighted voting and majority decision making have served . . . to protect the interests of specific members or groups of members . . . and have facilitated another Fund decision-making practice—the consensus mode" (p. 65). More surprising, the analytical voice concludes that "Neither the international community nor the IMF itself has remained impervious to the clamour for change in Fund decision making by the developing countries. The response has taken many forms, but more particularly concrete action, to satisfy some of their complaints (p. 95)."

The rhetorical voice is heard again. It would attach a "novel meaning" to sovereign equality by moving towards representation by group. "Group shares and group results are the measures of acceptable operational standards of equality" (p. 102). But the analytical voice warns against carrying this notion too far. Institutions such as the African Development Bank, in which those who supply the resources do not control their use, have had trouble attracting large resources.

In Part III, the analytical voice documents its earlier assertion that the Fund has been responsive to the developing countries. It examines four subjects in detail: the decision to create the Special Drawing Right (SDR) and subsequent experience, decisions concerning the exchange-rate regime, the creation and administration of the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF), and the debate about the policy requirements conditioning use of the Fund's resources.

In the matter of the SDR, the developing countries were successful formally

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but unsuccessful substantively. By exploiting disagreements among the major industrial countries, they kept the developed countries from creating reserves for themselves. But SDR creation has been very small, and the developing countries have failed to link SDR creation with development assistance.

The developing countries have not had much influence on exchange-rate arrangements for the obvious reason that the important exchange rates are those that link the major industrial countries. In fact, the problem of exchange-rate management demonstrates most clearly the silliness of Abi-Saab's assertion that decisions affecting a state directly must not be taken without its consent. There are degrees of directness, and the yen-dollar exchange rate is seen to affect Japan and the United States more directly than it affects Korea or Brazil. (The intriguing development, too recent for Ferguson to cover it, is the growing interest of the United States in the dollar value of the Korean won—a concern that may give such countries as Korea standing to influence exchange-rate arrangements.)

The creation of the CFF was the developing countries' most striking success, although it was not what they wanted most; it was the developed countries' answer to the demand for commodity agreements. And it has been replaced by the larger, more flexible Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF), created in 1988. But they have had much less success in relaxing or reforming conditionality, Ferguson's fourth subject; and this failure has reduced the practical value of the CCFF (and the CFF before it), because access is partly conditioned on the same policy requirements to which the developing countries object so strongly. These stories have been told before, most notably in the Fund's own official histories on which Ferguson draws heavily. But Ferguson uses them effectively on behalf of his pragmatic, analytical voice.

PETER B. KENEN
*Princeton University*

Getting Elected: From Radio and Roosevelt to Television and Reagan *by J. Leonard Reinsch. New York, Hippocrene Books, 1988. 338 pp. $18.95.*

Leonard Reinsch is an insider when it comes to presidential campaigns since 1932. He served as radio and later television director of the Democractic National Conventions from 1944 to 1969. He is also a former president and chairman of Cox Broadcasting Corporation. Reinsch worked with four Democractic presidents—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson—as well as with fellow sportscaster Ronald Reagan, who was then working for an Iowa radio station.

This book represents the author's reminiscences of the campaigns he has witnessed since 1944. A 26-picture insert showing Reinsch with various candidates and high-level officials confirms that the author was, indeed, present when campaign history was made. While the book is focused on media coverage considera-

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tions during campaigns and on the political events surrounding conventions, it also encompasses a wealth of related political happenings.

Attention to individual campaigns is unevenly distributed. The first five chapters deal with the 1944 and 1948 campaigns when radio was king. Then follow seventeen chapters in which Reinsch discusses at length what he experienced on the campaign battlefields in the emerging television age from 1952 through 1968. A single brief chapter deals with the 1972, 1976, and 1980 presidential campaigns, followed by a six-chapter review of the 1984 campaign. The opening phases of Campaign '88 rate a minichapter. The final four chapters of the book cover issues likely to rise in importance in the future, such as the role of cable television, video-recorders, and satellite transmission, and the problems presented by the mounting costs of presidential campaigns. A brief chapter discusses the future of presidential debates, which Reinsch helped institute in 1960. Reinsch recommends four presidential debates during the last pre-election month to serve the information needs of voters when they are most eager to hear what the candidates have to say. In the last debate, candidates should question each other without intervention by journalists.

*Getting Elected* abounds with interesting facts and important insights into political campaigns. It adds color and life to hundreds of familiar events in the saga of America's recent presidents and their electoral and public relations ventures. The book also presents a wealth of nuts-and-bolts information for campaign managers who must handle the details of orchestrating major campaign events. These range from the proper placement of the candidates, the press, the campaign staffs, and the orchestra during televised debates, to spotlights, microphones, teleprompters, and publicity operations. Successes as well as failures are chronicled, telling campaign professionals what to attempt and what to avoid.

But the book also contains more than its share of trivial details, such as a full account of the attire worn by volunteer convention hostesses or the story about the author's problems when he tried to raise 60 degree room temperatures during the Kennedy-Nixon debates. The average reader may find it necessary to skim through many of these minutiae to avoid a bad case of information overload.

The book closes with several interesting suggestions for improving presidential campaigns. To increase turn-out, elections should be held on a Sunday, with polls staying open for simultaneous twelve-hour periods throughout the country. Registration by postcard should prevail nationwide. To bring order out of the primary election and caucus confusion, the country should be divided into four regions, each holding all its primaries and caucuses on a day unique to each region. The number of convention delegates should be sharply reduced to make conventions more manageable, and conventions should last for only two days. Campaigns should be shortened to save money and spending for television coverage should be limited.

The questions raised by these not entirely original suggestions are important and timely. They deserve wide discussion. Reinsch's book provides an excellent store of information that can make such discussions more informed and realistic.

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It, therefore, contributes significantly to the public dialogue about the strengths and weaknesses of the presidential election process.

DORIS A. GRABER
*University of Illinois at Chicago*

The Ring of Power: The White House Staff and its Expanding Role in Government *by Bradley H. Patterson, Jr. New York, Basic Books, 1988. 382 pp. $19.95.*

Books written by former White House staffers usually follow one of three formats: they are self-justifying memoirs that suggest that the aide was at the center of all the action and that his or her judgement and advice was crucial to the success of the administration (or conversely, failure to follow the advice led to the failure of the presidency); they are kiss-and-tell books designed to settle old scores; or they are political science treatises that attempt to treat objectively the processes of presidential governance. Bradley Patterson, a White House aide who served for fourteen years on the staffs of three presidents, has eschewed the standard formats to write a nuts and bolts account of the immediate group serving the president and supporting White House units. With the exceptions of the staffs involved in national security or domestic policy initiatives, his work does not include the agencies of the executive office of the president. Based on his own experiences and two-hundred interviews, and backed up with the standard sources in presidential libraries and political science literature, Patterson has produced the best overview of how the White House actually functions. Although he breaks no new theoretical ground, the book should be most useful to political scientists and can also be strongly recommended to anyone taking a position in the George Bush administration.

Part One is devoted to demolishing the myth of cabinet government and is most useful for those who are just beginning their study of the presidency. The author points out the problems that cabinet members have in serving presidents without "going native," and demonstrates convincingly that the help that presidents need can only come from staffers devoted to the presidents' interests. In the best chapter in this section, "Crisis Management," Patterson recounts his own experiences as a crisis manager in three armed confrontations between Indian tribes and government officials. In doing so, he demonstrates convincingly that the interests of the Department of the Interior and the interests of the White House diverged; this chapter could usefully be read in conjunction with Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision* and Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power.*

Part Two consists of chapters devoted to each of the major staff offices that facilitate the work of the presidency. It is preceded by a splendid chart and table listing all of these staff offices (pp. 90–91), and should be examined in conjunction with the author's table at p. 339 listing the 3,366 fulltime staffers (including

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1,300 military personnel) who work fulltime on presidential functions, as well as the 2,500 other military personnel and 500 volunteers who work part-time. Of these chapters, the most interesting are not the ones dealing with national security or domestic matters (these are better covered in the standard literature, and there are no revelations or insights here), but rather the author's coverage of offices that few political scientists know anything about: the counsel to the president, communication director, speechwriting and research, public liaison, scheduling, advance, and political affairs. Staffers who handle the vice-presidential business and the first lady are also discussed.

Patterson believes that this large establishment is necessary and serves the president well. It is not surprising, therefore, that there are few pages devoted to Vietnam (2 pp.), Watergate (p. 305), the Nixon pardon (none), or the Iran-contra affair (4 references). Interestingly, in a discussion about whether or not staffers are out of control, Patterson writes that "no major enterprises take place in the White House environs without the president's knowledge and consent. The seniormost ring of White House staff are close to the president, and he to them, their confidences intimately shared, the mutual respect intense. The chances that they would keep secrets from one another—especially they from him—are close to zero" (pp. 343–44). Exactly what some of us have been saying about the Iran-contra affair all along.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
*Barnard College*

Bifurcated Politics: Evolution and Reform in the National Party Convention *by Byron E. Shafer. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1988. 391 pp. $27.50.*

Byron E. Shafer, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of American Government at Oxford University, is also the author of the well-received *Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics.* In the present book, Shafer takes an in-depth look at the political parties' national conventions, regarding them as distinctive political events that have mirrored the changes during the post-World War II years taking place in the broader political environment. Part of the change has been contextual and gradual; part a product of reform engineering. The two strains have merged to produce a national convention less significant than before but still representing the one national meeting of the party, its leaders, and its enthusiasts of consequence; still needed to at least reaffirm the selection of nominees and to outline the party's issue priorities and policy commitments; and reflective, even a microcosm, of what has been evolving within the political system.

It is a complex work. Chapters 1–8 deal with such topics as an informal history of the nominating convention, tying it to overtime political and social trends; the

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move of the nominating decisions outside of the national convention and into the state delegate selection process, a change "institutionalized" by the reforms implemented in the post-1968 period; the reduction in influence of the formal party and its leaders over the process and the rise in influence of candidate-centered coalitions and interest- and issue-based groups; the institutionalizing of conflict within the national convention between the winning candidate and his/her coalition, eager to present themselves to the party and the voter and to begin the campaign, and the various factions, alternative candidacies, and issue groups pushing their own agendas; the use of traditional convention outlets (committee deliberations, credentials and platform fights, the presidential and vice-presidential nominating decisions) to wrest group or opposition concessions from the dominant coalition; the rise of television as the media for reaching a more general public through the national convention and the constraints and struggles for competitive advantage this has imposed on the nominating process; and the obvious and not-so-obvious charges in convention operations forced by a reliance on television and the decision making of network officials.

The arguments are subtle. The consequence of these developments, and with the national convention serving as metaphor, are a "bifurcated politics," one that on one level involves representation, negotiation, and conflict resolution through elected party and political representatives and on another encourages large-scale political mobilization and coalition building among the general public in hopes of eventually affecting policy outcomes.

It is a bold thesis meant to give order and meaning to a series of sequential developments over the last forty years that have recast political institutions such as the national convention and on a broader scale have served to reshape American electoral politics.

The strength of the book lies in Shafer's knowledge of the subject matter and his ability to develop its implications within the context of decades of basic change; the originality and thoroughness of the analysis; the general readability of the presentation; and the author's willingness to do battle with some of the most fundamental political forces of the post-war years. The book should provide a reference point and analytic touchstone by which other, perhaps less ambitious and less skilled, interpretative works will be judged.

WILLIAM CROTTY
*Northwestern University*

The Good Ruler: From Herbert Hoover to Richard Nixon *by Bruce Kuklick. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1988. 202 pp. $17.95.*

In this brief book Bruce Kuklick offers a provocative and disturbing view of American politics from the 1920s to the 1970s. Asserting that historians and political scientists can never agree in their assessments of what the presidents did over these

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five decades, he sets forth a new measuring rod – presidential popularity. It is how well a leader can understand the dominant emotion of his era that determines how effective a president he can become. Herbert Hoover, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon were unable to establish a warm bond of confidence with the American people and thus were failures in the White House. Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and above all, Franklin D. Roosevelt, on the other hand, were successful presidents because they were able to become identified with the prevailing national mood.

Kuklick's novel thesis, which at times seems to suggest that the only test of presidential leadership is to make the people feel good, stems from his conviction that scholars cannot agree on their assessments of the achievements of past administrations. Citing the differing conclusions historians and political scientists have reached over the New Deal and the origins of the cold war, Kuklick concludes that "the belief that policy counted is an illusion," (p. 179). He is equally disturbed by the tendency of scholars to engage in counterfactual arguments, claiming that everything "would have" worked out well if only presidents "would have" followed alternative policies championed by later observers. Although engaging in an occasional "would have" speculation himself, suggesting for example that if Thomas Dewey had won in 1948, the nation might have been spared the excesses of McCarthyism, Kuklick contends that it is far better simply to judge our leaders by what people at the time felt about them, nothing else.

Despite his frequent oversimplifications, Kuklick is right in pointing out how important it is for a president to establish a close emotional tie to the people he is trying to lead. His argument works best for Franklin D. Roosevelt. Unlike Hoover, whose aloof personality repelled the people after the onset of the depression, FDR seemed to care about the fate of individual Americans and act as if they were uppermost in his thoughts. Roosevelt, he claims, personalized the presidency and set standards for a deep bond between the president and the people by which all future occupants of the White House would be judged. And none suffered more by comparison than his successor. Harry Truman, the author argues, failed because he was too small a man, too insecure to instill the feeling of confidence and trust so essential to effective national leadership.

By making contemporary popularity the ultimate test of presidential greatness, Kuklick goes too far. Critical of those historians who claim that Truman's containment policy was in the national interest, he fails to see that often a leader can best serve the country by taking a course contrary to the prevailing mood. A strong case can be made for Truman's own view of presidential leadership – the ability "to persuade the people to do what they ought to do without having to be persuaded" (Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking* [New York, 1973], p. 16). And for all his praise of FDR, Kuklick avoids any explanation of why the New Deal failed to bring about full recovery. Nor does he probe into the way that Roosevelt began to lose public trust in the Court fight and the purge before the war offered him a new opportunity for creative leadership. If popularity were to become the sole measure of presidential greatness, then Calvin Coolidge might well be seen as the

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greatest of all twentieth-century American presidents! But Kuklick does remind us that how contemporaries viewed their leaders is important, and that no matter how appealing policies may seem in retrospect, what counts most is the ability of a president to convince a majority in Congress and among the public at large of the wisdom of his programs.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
*University of Texas at Austin*

Reagan and the States *by Richard P. Nathan, Fred C. Doolittle, and Associates. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1987. 375 pp. Cloth, $42.50; paper, $12.95.*

Richard Nathan and his associates once again have tackled the regalia of American intergovernmental relations to explore federal aid programs during Ronald Reagan's first term. The Nathan group examines the impact of the Reagan program in nine states, using a closely-worked, common research design of the kind that has come to characterize Nathan's projects. The book is divided into three parts. First there are five overview chapters written by Nathan and Doolittle briefly tracing the competing theories of federal aid in American history, examining the evolution of federal aid programs, the changes during Reagan's first term, state responses by program, and variations in states' responses. These are followed by nine case study chapters: Florida by Lance deHaven-Smith and Allen W. Imershein; Massachusetts by Arnold A. Howitt and R. Clifford Leftwich; New York by Sarah F. Liebshutz and Irene Lurie; Mississippi by Lewis H. Smith and Robert S. Herren; Ohio by Charles F. Adams, Jr., Joseph M. Davis, and Marilyn T. Davis; Washington State by V. Lane Rawlins and Betty Jane Narver; Arizona by John Stuart Hall and Richard A. Eribes; Illinois by Charles J. Orlebeke; and California by Christy Jensen and Ruth Ross. The final part, Conclusions, consists of a single chapter on "Implications for Federal-State Relations" by Nathan and Doolittle.

Precisely because it is the kind of empirical study that it is, the book makes a singular contribution to our understanding of intergovernmental relations in the Reagan years and of American federalism generally. What comes out of the several studies and their synthesis is a picture of the American states as vital polities, responding beyond expectation to the Reagan administration budget cuts to keep intergovernmental programs alive and often to redesign them to better meet the needs in each state. Moreover, each state has done this in its own way, determining its own policy and programmatic needs and moving ahead accordingly.

For those who grew up on the Tugwellian theory of the "natural desuetude of the states" since the beginning of the New Deal or, even more, for those who came of age in the years of the Great Society, when the states seemed to be no more than middle managers bound by federal initiatives, this book has to open a whole new world. It is especially interesting because the states were close to desuetude

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as polities by the early 1970s. Even their political leaders had never known what it meant to make their own policy decisions. Yet when the Reagan revolution began (and indeed that was what it was), the states had retained sufficient resiliency and hidden vitality to rise to the occasion. Granted they had begun to do so even earlier as a result of the Watergate crisis, which paralyzed so much of the federal government in the early 1970s, and the problems of the Carter administration, which continued to limit Washington's ability to respond in the latter part of the decade. Still, even the states' best friends had not really predicted what would occur.

Nathan and his associates correctly point out that the results were not necessarily a reflection of the correctness of Reagan's theory of federalism. Indeed, Reagan's effort to return to the days of dual federalism has not worked. The intergovernmental system is still one of sharing and interaction. What Reagan and his people did succeed in doing was in shifting the initiative and primary role in a number of programs to the states. Even this was not what the Reaganites wanted. They hoped that the states would reduce their spending as they were forcing the federal government to reduce its and thereby reduce the size of government altogether. But the states represented their own constituencies and made their policies accordingly.

Insufficient space prevents this reviewer from discussing how each state responded and the differences in their responses, some doing better and some doing less well in picking up the slack. Even here, the states' responses were not as the conventional wisdom would have predicted. California, for example, was one of the states to respond least, in part because of the very high level of state governmental activity and services already characteristic of the Golden State, in part because fiscal restrictions imposed by the referenda of the time when the citizenry did succeed in doing what Reagan had hoped—that is to say, limiting state and local expenditure as well as federal. On the other hand, Florida, where the timing was such that the state was finally beginning to respond to its great population growth and was already on a wave of governmental expansion, was one of the most active states in its response.

As an empirical study this is a very interesting book. It is less interesting when its principal authors turn to theory. There they confuse theories of intergovernmental relations with theories of federalism, and their discussion is less illuminating. Since the primary purpose of their book is empirical, this deficiency only slightly mars an otherwise important study.

DANIEL J. ELAZAR
*Temple University*

Caring for the Disabled Elderly: Who Will Pay? *by Alice M. Rivlin and Joshua M. Wiener. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1988. 318 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper $11.95.*

Having enacted Medicare catastrophic illness coverage and rejected Senator Claude

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Pepper's end run for long-term care, the Congress will shortly be faced with the inevitability of confronting the latter issue. In a larger sense, there is the necessity of rounding out the United States safety net for the elderly. The dilemma, as with catastrophic coverage, will be in the choice of a method of financing. After all, the elderly have seen their circumstances as a group rapidly improved relative to other demographic categories. Therefore, as with catastrophic coverage, the temptation will be to find some device wherein the elderly as a group pay, even while the social insurance mechanism is used.

If the Congress and the interested segments of the society want to act with their eyes open, seriously considering the major available options and knowing what can be known about costs and distributional effects, they will find no better resource than this new Rivlin-Wiener study from Brookings. Indeed, few major policy initiatives have access to a better take-off platform.

The authors begin with the case for action: demography, costs, the ways in which costs are now met. With collaboration of ICF Incorporated, they constructed a computer model that simulates the disabled elderly population over the next three decades, their likely resources, and the potential need for long-term care. Then, with a base case that assumes no change, they draw a picture that is unacceptable and demeaning for many of the elderly and costly for the public—should nothing new be done. A society that demonstrates in its social insurance programs that it understands the need to ensure against "normal risks" would be continuing to rely on a means-tested device (Medicaid), which is expensive, demeaning, and inadequate for a population that has been self-supporting and self-reliant prior to suffering the disabilities of old age.

The authors first use their simulation to evaluate the possibilities of strategies based on increased family responsibility, private long-term care insurance, and other private sector initiatives. Then, discovering that even under the most generous of assumptions the private-sector options do not do much for us, they turn to a series of possible limited and minimalist public initiatives, which are also found wanting. On the basis of reasonable decision rules that would have wide appeal and acceptance, they arrive at the inevitability, if there is to be real improvement, of a public social insurance strategy. They simulate four public social insurance options and then package proposals offering two major alternatives: one taking off from a private sector base and the other essentially a public insurance system spreading the costs of long-term care over the entire population. This latter option, which they advance, suggests that total public costs for long-term care insurance and other related programs would range from $94 billion to $130 billion by the years 2016–2020, as compared with $65 billion if nothing new is done. Although this would seem to imply a payroll tax of 2.2 to 3.1 percent a year, they note that in any case the society is going to incur these costs and the issue is whether costs will be concentrated on users or spread more broadly over the entire population. They marshal convincing evidence for the latter choice.

Policy scholars, whatever their specific interest in the substantive topic, will find here a methodology exemplar. Educators will want to use it with graduate stu-

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dents. Congressional staff should note the obvious grist for an immediate round of hearings. And those concerned with serious analysis of a major issue will find no better source.

ALFRED J. KAHN
*Columbia University*

Mario Cuomo: A Biography *by Robert S. McElvaine. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988. 449 pp. $19.95.*

Robert S. McElvaine, professor of history at Millsaps College in Mississippi, began this project when many observers were predicting that Mario Cuomo would be the Democratc presidential nominee. In deciding not to pursue the nation's highest office, New York's governor confounded his ardent supporters. What is the market for an election year biography when the subject has withdrawn from consideration as America's once and future king? Then, the book must be judged solely on it intrinsic worth.

McElvaine captures the image of a complex, enigmatic man who combines the regimen of an athlete in training, the intellect of a scholar, the values of a closely-knit family, the eloquence of an impassioned idealist, and the combativeness of a political survivor. The author perceives Cuomo as a leader who could galvanize a New Deal-type coalition of middle-class whites, Blacks, Hispanics, union members, and intellectuals. Unlike the Roosevelts or Kennedys, however, Cuomo is a populist whose roots spring from working people rather than from America's elite establishment.

The author makes much of Cuomo's heritage in shaping his persona. Growing up in a Queens neighborhood inhabited by immigrants gave him insight into New York's ethnic pluralism. His parents' relocation to a more affluent community marked the beginning of exposure to a broader, assimilated environment. At St. John's Prep and St. Johns University, the Vencentian fathers aroused his inquisitive social consciousness. The writing of the English martyr Thomas More, the Jesuit scientist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and the ecumenical Pope John XXIII sharpened the linkage between religious values and public policy. Cuomo's competitive spirit manifested itself in campus sports and professional baseball. Long after his playing days ended, Cuomo redirected these energies into law and politics. He plunged into cases, causes, and campaigns.

Rejection by Manhattan's WASPish law firms taught the young attorney that Italian-Americans had a long way to go in overcoming prejudice. After clerking for a judge, he went into practice in the not-so-fashionable Court Street section of Brooklyn. His legal skills earned him the respect of colleagues and clients. There is a revealing section on Cuomo's effectiveness as an advocate and conciliator. He represented junkyard dealers whose livelihood was threatened by Robert Moses's grandiose plan for Flushing Meadow Park. He fought for Corona homeowners

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whose property was taken through eminent domain. He forged a compromise in Forest Hills, where middle income residents expressed fear and resentment over a public housing project that would open the gates to impoverished minority tenants.

Regardless of whether Mario Cuomo reaches the presidency, he has already achieved impressive recogniton. After losing to Ed Koch in the 1977 mayoral race, Cuomo defeated New York City's feisty mayor by winning the Democratic nomination for governor in 1982. As keynote speaker at the 1984 Democratic National Convention, he electrified the delegates. From that moment, influential party leaders harbored hopes that this was the candidate who would recapture Democratic control of the White House.

What distinguishes Cuomo from other national figures? McElvaine contends that he is believable at a time when voters are disenchanted by scandals. New York's governor has the ability to inspire people. The author calls Cuomo the best speaker that the American politics has produced in recent years. Deep religious convictions enable the governor to articulate enlightened positions with a fervor unmatched by most secular liberals.

History has not yet placed Mario Cuomo in perspective, and McElvaine must overcome the pitfalls of contemporaneous reporting. Still, there is a sense of immediacy in focusing on one of America's most interesting public figures while the issues are fresh in our minds. The book contains engrossing vignettes of Cuomo's veto of capital punishment legislation as well as a confrontation with the Catholic Church over his refusal to halt Medicaid funding of abortion.

Proximity to the times has enabled McElvaine to interview the governor, Cuomo family members, and scores of politicians. He has spoken with academics, power brokers, confidants, and civic leaders who shared experiences with the governor. The published sources at the end of each chapter are extensive, but surprisingly omit vital New York state documents.

The sections on Cuomo as governor are disappointing. This is not a definitive record of the Cuomo administration, the legislative programs, or the governor's relationships with statewide officials. Instead, McElvaine has given us an exceptionally flattering portrait of a man who has the stature to seek national office but has chosen to continue as governor of the Empire State.

LEONARD P. STAVISKY
*Columbia University*

Migration and Politics: The Impact of Population Mobility on American Voting Behavior *by Thad A. Brown. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1988. 198 pp. $29.95.*

Americans are the most residentially mobile people in the industrial world. According to U.S. Census figures, an average American will move twenty times in his or her life—a figure two to three times larger than for citizens elsewhere. In-

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deed, during a single year almost 20 percent of Americans will change their address. Although most of these moves are within the same county, many involve crossing longer distances. Certainly, these figures are of demographic interest, but do they also have political consequences?

The political impact of population mobility is the intriguing and difficult subject addressed by Thad Brown in *Migrations and Politics*. The question of the effect of moving from one place to another on the political beliefs and actions of an individual is interesting not only because Americans are so mobile, but also because it is widely thought that such movement, particularly between regions, affects both the person who moves and the areas involved in the relocation. For example, has the movement of northerners to the South made those who moved more Democratic, like the area where they were transplanted? Or has the influx of Yankee Republicans made Dixie tilt towards the GOP?

Trying to untangle and isolate these various effects is a difficult task in which Brown enjoys some success. The problem of determining how movement from one place to another influences the political behavior of the person who moves is obviously formidable. The researcher must first ascertain whether there have been any permanent changes in the political behavior of the person who moved, and then determine whether the new beliefs and actions are the result of the move and exposure to the new community, or explained by other political and personal characteristics.

In an ideal world, Brown would have had access to data on the same individuals over a long period of time. This so-called panel survey design would have allowed him to directly test his hypotheses about the effects of moving on individuals. Such data are, for the most part, not available. Instead, Brown relies on the next best thing, the respected American National Election Studies. The ANES is a multipurpose survey and because of that the data it collects is not always the sort of information that the author needs to test his ideas. Moreover, in places where the author needs to examine particular groups of migrants, the sample size is small enough to cause some discomfort.

Brown appears aware of most of the problems he faces in conducting this analysis, and his attempts to overcome them are admirable. The basic story he presents is that migration does influence behavior, but in fairly subtle ways. Partisanship is less apt to be changed than it is to be attenuated for those who move to an area dominated by the other party. That is, a Democrat who relocates from a Democratic area to a place where the Republicans are strong is likely to move toward becoming a political independent. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that "Citizens with higher levels of political information are more likely to adapt to their immediate political environment than those with lower levels of information about politics and government" (p. 121).

Given the complexity of the task undertaken by Brown, it is not surprising that one can quibble with his research strategies and techniques. The definition of a migration (a move that crosses a county boundry) is apt to be reconsidered by others examining this question, as are the particular quantitative methods em-

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ployed (which to the author's credit he describes in detail in the appendices). The book does not settle the question of how mobility influences political behavior, but it does advance our understanding of it. Brown's careful and thoughtful work should direct students of American political behavior to explore this interesting and understudied subject.

PEVERILL SQUIRE
*University of Iowa*

The Politics of Federal Reorganization: Creating the U.S. Department of Education *by Beryl A. Radin and Willis D. Hawley. New York, Pergamon Press, 1988. 253 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $14.95.*

Alternative subtitles for this book might have been: "There is no tooth fairy" or "There is no such thing as a free lunch." The story told is one of institutional and political sensitivity to organizational change. It teaches again that rational argument cannot overcome rational self-interest. As Radin and Hawley show, strategies for change must accommodate the realities of existing commitments even when objective analysis shows that these commitments do not produce the best policy results. Panglossian assessments of reorganization do not typically emanate from within the agency in question or its clientele.

Radin and Hawley weave a tale that is interesting and instructive. Their well-written and organized account is essentially a detailed chronology of events from the past efforts to create a cabinet-level department of education to President Jimmy Carter's decision to try again and subsequent policy activities involved in proposing, approving, and implementing the reorganization. Such significant reforms truly do include all politics – the committing effect of elections, the translation of priorities as words into proposals as deeds, the growing intensity of response as promise becomes reality, the access for interests provided by representation in Congress, the subtleties of organizing once the mandate is real, and the challenges of managing in an altered and uncertain environment. One can only wonder that reorganizations of this magnitude happen at all, though one can then appreciate why, once accomplished, they won't soon be undone. Even a president with a strong mandate, like Ronald Reagan, failed to deliver on his promise to kill the new department.

The book is more than a story told by the calendar of events, however. The authors seek to accomplish other goals as well. First, they identify the goals of reorganization and judge the extent to which these goals are realized. The goals were: greater symbolic status for education at the national level, a political advantage for the president who had promised to make this change, greater efficiency and effectiveness, and improved public education. Not surprisingly, I suppose, the more achievable goals – increased symbolism and political advantage – were at least partially met. The less measurable goals – the other three – were, sure enough, less measurable.

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Second, the story is fitted into a policy process framework that contributes to an understanding of how that process works. It enables the authors to produce interesting conclusions about agenda setting, formulation, adoption, and implementation. It also produces crosscutting observations and conclusions about executive branch politics, how analysis and politics intersect, the usefulness of the iron triangle concept (less useful in this case), and the larger issue of the federal role in education policy. While their discussions of each of these themes is tantalizing, that of the cultures of analysis and politics is particularly so. It is reminiscent of the distinctions between planning and politics as played out in Chicago housing policy, described by Edward Banfield and Martin Meyerson over thirty years ago. And its relevance is ever more apt as analysts increasingly populate the halls of politics on Capitol Hill.

Finally, the authors provide an all-too-brief section offering lessons for the future. The lessons for analysts and reorganizers are general in nature and reflect, for the most part, the authors' conclusions about the political and policy processes of reorganization.

This third exercise leads me to comment on the value of policy process analyses of this type. Works that focus on policy issues are enormously beneficial. Even taken within the policy area in question, education in this case, we learn much about how government works on a continuing agenda issue. Those who can tell us about education, or energy, the economy, or the environment, for that matter, have a larger contribution to make than is typically implied, or often intended, by the term "case study." Still, as my shelf of such studies gets longer and longer, it seems that some day we will need to make something of the accumulated wisdom contained within these volumes. Here we have a reorganization study. Other works examine substantive policy initiative or change, intergovernmental connections, crosscutting budget decisions, etc. Generalizations occur to one as the studies are read. Surely it is time to draw them together more systematically so as to know better what we have learned.

CHARLES O. JONES
*University of Wisconsin-Madison*

Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice *by Larry M. Bartels. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1988. 374 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $14.95.*

Presidential nominations have changed dramatically over the past two decades and have brought us quadrennial party reform committees, anguish and speculation by political analysts, and candidate as diverse as George McGovern and Ronald Reagan. At last, in Larry Bartels book they have brought us distinguished and imaginative scholarship.

*Presidential Primaries* is first of all a work of political *science*; that is, it is devoted

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to developing a theoretical explanation of the contemporary system of presidential nominations. Bartels's basic premise, itself not original, is that current presidential nominations result from the momentum that candidates develop from important, especially early, primary victories. Momentum derives its importance for such familiar factors as candidate strategies, "horse-race" journalism, and party rules changes shifting power from party insiders to primary electorates. Bartels's special contribution is to transform momentum from a description of candidates' desires to an explanation of voters' behavior.

Voters in primaries, according to Bartels, are affected by three variables: the information they have about the candidates (including both familiarity and evaluation); their political predispositions (such as demographic memberships and issue positions); and their expectations about the nominating contest itself (including the current and predicted standing of the various contenders).

Importantly, these are dynamic variables, changing over the course of the primary months. As voters come to know more about the candidates, Bartels provides comforting data that "learning in the campaign involves more than superficial familiarity with the candidates' names. As information increases . . . the public come increasingly to evaluate candidates on their political merits" (p. 94). Bartels then tests different explanations of momentum. He concludes that the evident influence of one state's results on successive balloting is not the result of simple cue-taking or contagion. Rather, it significantly reflects strategic choices, as voters line up behind a candidate who is both close to their own views and still viable.

After elaborating these concepts and applying them to national data, Bartels analyzes three forms of recent presidential nominations: "momentum triumphant" (Carter, 1976); "trench warfare" between an incumbent president and a dominant challenger (Ford vs. Reagan, 1976 and Carter vs. Kennedy, 1980); and "coming up short," the failure of an insurgent against an early front-runner (Bush vs. Reagan, 1980 and Hart vs. Mondale, 1984). His analysis features a series of original measures, including an estimate of the likely results if these nominations had been decided by a one-day national primary. Thus, Carter would have lost in 1976, and Bush would have won in 1980.

Overall, Bartels is satisfied that "a sequential nominating process much like the one that now exists is capable, in principle, of providing an attractive compromise" between openness and deliberation (p. 289). Yet he is concerned that momentum may develop too quickly, particularly in cases when an unknown candidate emerges quickly from a field of unknowns, before public learning has begun. Skeptical of most reforms, including a national primary, he suggests longer intervals between primaries.

*Presidential Primaries* is now clearly the leading book on this subject, yet it also has flaws. While Bartels's measures are creative and reasonable, they ultimately do not measure an independent political reality, such as a legislative rollcall. Rather, they are subjective efforts to capture a shifting and uncertain concept such as the objective probability of a particular candidate's nomination. Bartels also must rely for much of his analysis on the National Election Studies (NES) surveys of

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primary voters, which have many problems of small samples, incomplete panels, and overly-long periods of interviewing.

More basically, Bartels's optimistic evaluation of the current nominating process is not clearly established. The sequential system, as he shows, gives great weight to those states that make their decisions first. While these particular voters, from Bartels's data, do appear to vote like persons with similar profiles, Iowa and New Hampshire remain demographically and politically different from other electorates – particularly in the Democratic Party. The early focus on these states inevitably deprives other voters of a significant role in choosing presidential candidates, and also deprives even the early states of the chance to reconsider their initial decisions. John Dewey taught us that democracy is about talk. The present system continues to stop the conversation of America too soon.

GERALD M. POMPER
*Rutgers University*

Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Control of Administration *by Martin Shapiro. Athens, The University of Georgia Press, 1988. 195 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $10.00.*

Martin Shapiro acknowledges that "administrative law has long been either unknown by students of politics or known as an impenetrable body of legal-doctrinal esoterica" (p. ix). His clear description of the relationship between administrative agencies and the courts that review them should solve the first problem of ignorance of administrative law. Moreover, he avoids the impenetrable aspects of the field by eschewing a ponderous treatment of the esoterica. Rather, Shapiro focuses on the general ideas from which the doctrines of administrative law have evolved, and he presents his study with an admirable sense of organization, clarity of expression, and lightness of style.

This study addresses the now-familiar critique of judicial review as an undemocratic tool of an unelected judiciary that has become the final arbiter in constitutional disputes. Within the context of administrative law, Shapiro refines and narrows the question: If we set judges to protect us from bureaucrats, how are we to protect ourselves from judges? Or as the title states the conundrum: Who guards the guardians?

In search of a plausible response, Shapiro examines the moral philosophies (utilitarianism and postconsequentialist ethics) and political theories (pluralism and "rationality") that have framed the debate over administrative law. He posits that "discourse" is the central means for discovering values in the new era of postconsequentialist ethics. He then argues that the increasing demand for administrative deliberation and the use of judicial review to require administrators to deliberate are symptomatic of the injection of ethical and moral discourse into the administrative process. While the change in ethical foundations of policy making

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produced the demand for deliberation, a concomitant political movement away from pluralism toward rationality resulted in an emphasis on "synoptic" decision making—that is, the gathering of all facts, the consideration of all alternatives and their possible consequences, and the choice of policies with the highest probability of achieving agreed goals at least cost.

Ultimately, Shapiro's thesis turns on his description of the two fashionable schools in contemporary administrative law—deliberation and synopticism. The former's reliance on prudence as a basis for decision making produces conflicts with the latter's focus on scientific management. The judiciary has heightened the tension between the two schools and has compounded the issue of who guards the guardians by its demand that agencies engage in synoptic processes. Synopticism was supposedly nondiscretionary (that is, purely rational and scientific). Therefore, judicial review of synoptic decision making was billed as equally nondiscretionary.

Shapiro argues that this turn of events produced the worst of all possible worlds. Judges forced agencies to present their decisions as rational, technical, and synoptic; thus they drove any prudential elements of bureaucratic decision making underground. The guardians were not really even guarding us from the most important aspect of the decision-making process.

The author maintains that the judiciary has begun to recognize that its emphasis on synopticism was driving judges out of the judicial review business. He believes that judges, therefore, have initiated a swing of the pendulum away from synoptic judicial review and toward the prudential variety. Who guards the guardians is still the operative question, but it has taken on a less urgent tone, for "prudentialist review asks a bit less of the judges" (p. 162). It requires that a judge determine whether an agency reached *a* correct policy, not whether it reached *the* correct policy.

In his theoretical arguments, Shapiro has made a timely contribution to our understanding of the foundations of and current trends in administrative law. More generally, his learned study enhances the debate over judicial review. His book will be a welcome addition to law and graduate school classes in administrative law, constitutional theory, and public policy.

BARBARA A. PERRY
*University of Central Florida*

Curbing the Courts: The Constitution and the Limits of Judicial Power *by Gary L. McDowell. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1988. 214 pp. $27.50.*

The most significant basic issue underlying the decisions of the United States Supreme Court since 1954 has been the matter of judicial activism. Conservative critics of the Warren Court charged it with wholesale amending of the Constitu-

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tion in the name of interpretation. In time, liberals charged Reagan Supreme Court nominees with intending to destroy established constitutional precedent. But the basic question remains: how much latitude should the courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court, have in declaring legislative and executive acts in violation of the Constitution? For Gary McDowell, the judicial role should be minimal. Painstaking research presented in the book shows that the Framers intended a role for the Court that was much more restrictive than has developed over these two hundred years. This least dangerous branch of government was to be restrained by limited jurisdiction and by the words and plain meaning of the Constitution itself. But that has not been the case. Instead, the Court has expanded the rights of individuals by expansive reading of constitutional provisions such as the due process and equal protection clauses. McDowell sees this development as the exercise of legislative power. And McDowell sees the increase in the jurisdiction of the courts through expansions in the procedures of standing, class actions, intervention, declaratory relief, consent decrees, and equitable remedies as further violations by the Court of the intent of the Founding Fathers. His book makes a formidable argument that the best form of constitutional development requires the judiciary to try to determine the intent of the Founding Fathers rather than to create constitutional rights on the basis of personal preferences. In his presentation of constitutional scholarship, and in the defense of judicial restraint as the overwhelming conclusion of that scholarship, *Curbing the Courts* is at its best.

The book is at its weakest when it suggests that the remedy for judicial activism is for the Congress to use its power under Article III of the Constitution to assert control over the jurisdiction of the courts. Rather than have the legislature act as it has historically by curbing the courts' jurisdiction by excluding substantive areas of the law, McDowell wants the Congress to restructure the procedure governing the jurisdiction of the federal courts. He wants the legislature to recover some of the basic responsibilities of setting the rules of judicial administration that were gradually ceded to the courts by Congress. The book's logic is clear. There is no doubt that a strict reading of Article III leads to the conclusion that limits on the jurisdiction of the judiciary were clearly in the hands of the Congress. But time and practice make the effort to restore legislative authority in that area virtually impossible. We have grown accustomed to an independent judiciary, one whose independence envisages self-control as the basic remedy for its own excesses. And we are used to a Supreme Court whose sense of its role now includes the broad jurisdiction and extensive system of remedies that McDowell asks the Congress to circumscribe. The controversy over Reagan nominees Robert Bork and Ginsburg, which is not discussed in the book, makes it abundantly clear that we have ceded generous grants of political power to the Supreme Court, notwithstanding how carefully individual Supreme Court justices choose to adhere to the letter of the Constitution. The body politic expects the Supreme Court to act without fear that its responsibilities and its authority will be minimized by legislative tinkering with its jurisdiction. For all the seriousness of its scholarship, McDowell's

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desire to have the legislature assert a significant jurisdictional role over court affairs would not be seriously considered in the Congress of today.

FRANK J. MACCHIAROLA
*Columbia University*

No Longer Disabled: The Federal Courts and the Politics of Social Security Disability *by Susan Gluck Mezey. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1988. 195 pp. $37.95.*

This is a study of efforts by the Social Security Administration (SSA) to terminate disability benefits for a large number of recipients in order to scale down the costs of an increasingly expensive government program. For many years after its establishment in 1954, the disability payment system was a growth enterprise. But by the 1970s there was increasing concern about its costs, and in 1980 Congress enacted legislation requiring SSA to conduct periodic review of its disability awards to make certain that they were still justified.

While this legislation was passed in 1980, its full effects were not felt until President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, and SSA began the review process in earnest. Between March 1981 and November 1983 the agency conducted over one million such reviews and terminated disability awards in 45 percent of the cases it investigated. The standards it used in making such decisions brought it into increasing conflict with the courts. And in 50 percent of the cases that were appealed to the courts, the agency's decisions were overruled. Judges generally interpreted the law as requiring that the medical situation of claimants show improvement between the time of an initial award and the time of the review before an award could be terminated.

SSA for its part took a very hard line in its response to these defeats in the legal arena. If followed a policy of "nonacquiescence" with respect to these judicial rulings, refusing to incorporate the standard the court had decreed into its own decision-making procedures. It continued, for example, to look at the question of whether the initial disability award had itself been justified. Hence, each individual whose benefits were teminated had to go to court to get them restored. The conflict between the agency and the courts that this policy of nonacquiescence created was eventually resolved by Congress, which in 1984 passed legislation requiring the agency to use the standard the courts had promulgated in making its disability decisions.

This book has dimensions that will interest a variety of readers. Most important of all, it is a study of conflict between an administrative agency and the courts that grows not out of constitutional issues but from sharply conflicting interpretations of a law that Congress has enacted. It also illustrates the ample power that administrative discretion can confer upon an executive agency, although the SSA's

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use of its discretion in this case may be less an example of its power than of its willingness to defer to the Reagan White House, which was highly interested in cutting down on the size and cost of the welfare state.

In addition, the book raises again the old question of whether administrative agencies rather than the courts should interpret statutes on the grounds that, as Mezey puts it, "their accountability to the president makes them more democratic than the appointed-for-life judiciary" (p. 8). In this case the courts could equally well point out that they were acting to protect democracy by preventing a bureaucracy from assuming power that Congress never intended it to have. The case also reveals the extent to which—the Reagan rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding—the welfare state has come to enjoy solid support from Republicans as well as Democrats. When Congress decided this dispute in favor of the courts, it did so by a nearly unanimous vote.

Finally, the book highlights the dilemma in which administrative law judges can find themselves, when the agencies by which they are employed are pursuing policies that the courts hold to be illegal. Steeped as they were in a conception of their role as guardians of the law, the judges working for the SSA during this period were obliged to adhere to agency policies and hand down decisions about whose legitimacy they had serious question. The same dilemma confronted U.S. attorneys, some of whom refused to defend the agency in cases in which "there is not a defense available that we can assert in good faith" (p. 134).

FRANCIS E. ROURKE
*Johns Hopkins University*

Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law *by Robert E. Mutch. New York, Praeger, 1988. 217 pp. $42.95.*

"Campaign finance legislation . . . addresses as a matter of public policy a vital concern of political theory, the proper role of wealth in democracy" (p. xv). But after carefully tracing the history of legislation, litigation, and administrative regulation of campaign finance in the United States, Robert Mutch is not optimistic that legislation can do so. "The history of campaign finance law offers little reason to believe that legislation can drive interested money out of politics. Partly this is because any law can be evaded. . . . But the deeper reason is that no law can weaken the resolve of the powerful forces behind that money to influence federal elections" (p. 191).

In reaching this conclusion, the author employs legislative committee hearings, the *Congressional Record*, the literature of history and political science, archives, lawyers' briefs and judicial decisions, and two dozen interviews to reconstruct the tale of campaign finance regulation from the 1830s to the present. Along the pathway of history are little known nuggets. The first campaign finance bill was

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offered unsuccessfully by the Whigs in 1839 to end Democratic assessments of federal customs house employees. Public financing was not first proposed by President Theodore Roosevelt, but by Democratic Congressman William Bourke Cockran, a Tammany chieftan, in 1904. Along the way it was endorsed by an odd assortment of political figures, including William Jennings Bryan, William Gibbs McAdoo during his term as Woodrow Wilson's secretary of the Treasury, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and Harry Truman's attorney general, J. Howard McGrath. The 1939 Hatch Act, prohibiting political activity by federal workers, was largely the work of anti-New Deal Democrats whom FDR had attempted to purge in 1938 and Vice President John Nance Garner, former Speaker of the House, who wanted to advance his own candidacy for president by preventing federal employees from helping FDR's third term bid in the 1940 Democratic convention.

Partisan or regional advantage often influences legislative posture on campaign finance regulation. But Mutch also recognizes the "interplay between ideology and practical politics" and the existence of "genuine philosophical differences." Hence, southern Democrats opposed the extension of campaign finance laws to primaries not only because primaries were the only effective contests in their region, but also from a longstanding commitment to states' rights. Republicans have generally opposed public financing, not only because they garner more private money, but also because of their distrust of governmental expenditure and regulation.

Mutch characterizes the litigation over contribution and spending limits in *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, as "one of the oldest conflicts in Anglo-American political thought, that between liberty and equality" (p. 53). The egalitarian argument is familiar: democracy means one person, one vote; and this equality in voting is defeated if the wealthy can spend huge sums to enlarge their own voting power by influencing others. The libertarian argument is more complex. Expenditures are speech, because many forms of expression are costly. To limit expenditures is to limit the quantity of speech and perhaps its diversity. Moreover, money is only one of many unequally distributed political resources, and to limit campaign expenditures limits the wealthy but leaves other groups with different political resources unrestrained. Mutch plainly favors the equalitarian approach; but he masterfully presents the libertarian arguments of Robert Bork, John Bolton, Ralph Winter, and the Supreme Court majority.

Mutch's volume closes with the warning that campaign finance abuses are reappearing. The current consensus is to loosen and stretch campaign regulations, partly because the beneficiaries of the law are scattered and have relatively little influence, while those restricted by the law are in Congress or hold other positions of political influence. The collection and expenditure of "soft money," unreported and unlimited, to influence federal elections will bring money and perhaps dirty money back into the system. These abuses, together with the light thrown on campaign funds by disclosures under the Federal Election Campaign Act, may stimulate a new wave of reform. The 1907–1911 and 1973–1976 bursts of reform legislation both occurred because of public outrage, spurred by public interest organizations,

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about campaign finance abuses. Whether or not history will repeat itself, as Mutch suggests, it is surely worth reading as chronicled in his useful, if occasionally overdrawn, volume.

DAVID ADAMANY
*Wayne State University*

John L. Lewis, Labor Leader *by Robert H. Zieger. Boston, Twayne Publishers, 1988. 220 pp. $24.95.*

Such labor notables as John L. Lewis are no longer among us. Indeed, few youngsters can even recall the names of such greats as David Dubinsky, Walter Reuther, Sidney Hillman, or Philip Murray, among others. Certainly, Lewis stands out among the most famous. Over four decades he dominated the labor scene of those talented chiefs who organized the unorganized, converting the workforce into a political influence on the national scene.

Miners constituted one of the toughest and most exploited groups. By sheer dint of energy and skill, Lewis's autocratic style galvanized them into a meaningful collective voice. The struggle, however, involved Lewis in a number of continuous crusades because of several factors. One was the generally unsympathetic American environment—a society fashioned more by the myth of individual effort than group endeavor. Second, American labor itself was dominated by the craft unions, separating workers by their special skills. Dominating the movement, the craft leadership was unwilling to share power or even permit innovative organization along lines demanded by the impact of industrialism. Consequently, along with auto, steel, and other industrial workers' chieftains, Lewis had no alternative but to craft a new type of unionism, the Congress of Industrial Organization.

Labor historian Robert Zieger has created a fair and balanced biography of the man and his union, identifying Lewis's extraordinary talents as well as his failings as a leader. The author's coverage is as wide as it is deep—detailing the personal influences of family on Lewis, his relationships with the AFL and other labor leaders, his short-lived alliance with President Franklin Roosevelt, and his use of Communists to aid his organizing efforts and his rupture with them following the twists and turns of Soviet policies.

In this solid piece of historical research, Zieger explains why it took so charismatic a personality as Lewis to bring to Americans' notice the appalling plight of miners. Admittedly, Lewis proved least capable as an administrator or financial overseer. But he understood his workers, their terrible work place, and the need for health care and safety supervision. The daily dangers miners confronted became news only when an accident or some disaster dominated headlines. Persistently, Lewis pressed for good pensions and disability insurance—demands that became priorities on labor's agenda thirty years later.

Until the New Deal, many of organized labor's leadership remained cool to gov-

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ernmental involvement in labor affairs. They prefered the voluntary strategy and the utilization of collective bargaining as a way of winning good wages, hours, and working conditions. Lewis, however, was one among very few who continued to keep a distance from government, generally fearful and always suspicious of government involvement as inviting repressive policies. It was he who stood firm against the loyalty oaths required of labor leaders under the Taft-Hartley Act.

By the post-World War II period, Lewis's influence had plummeted. A new unionism was underway—the public service worker. For the 1960s the country confronted a new militancy and determination from government workers. After that decade, no longer could one identify a single labor leader as prominent and dominating as John L. Lewis. Nor for that matter could one imagine other opportunities for unionizing workers on the American scene. At the very least, Zieger's work on Lewis, his fine research endeavors, and his useful bibliographical essay can stand as a monument for all those brave men and women who joined the ranks of the organized and made the nation more caring, kinder, and gentler.

JEWEL BELLUSH
*New York University*

Referendum Voting: Social Status and Policy Preferences *by Harlan Hahn and Sheldon Kamieniecki. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1987. 170 pp. $35.00.*

Despite the renewed interest in direct democracy techniques, the academic literature remains sparse and uneven. Hahn and Kamieniecki set out to help rectify this situation. They aim to show the importance of social class in determining the vote, *why* social class is important, and the (potential) utility of referendum voting as a means of redressing political imbalance. After plowing over familiar and not particularly fertile ground in the first two chapters, the authors begin the empirical analysis. The major data source consists of all available voting statistics from forty American cities during the 1955-1970 time period. Precinct returns are combined with block statistics in order to perform aggregate correlation analysis. Social status is operationalized in terms of the median value of owner-occupied dwellings.

When compared with outcomes for partisan elections, those for referenda are, not surprisingly, much more driven by class than by partisan factors. What is particularly useful about the basic findings is the distinction between expenditure and non-expenditure issues, and subcategories thereof. In general, the higher the social status, the greater the support for expenditure items and "liberal" social issues; but the breakdown by particular types of issues shows considerable variance. These tendencies have been observed before, but *Referendum Voting* gives perhaps the most comprehensive set of relevant findings.

Variations in outcomes exist according to the degree of governmental reformism, though whether reformism exerts an independent impact or whether the same forces

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leading to reformism also lead to tempering the class-vote relationship is uncertain. Breaking newer ground, the authors demonstrate that greater social heterogeneity in the community tends to intensify the linkage between social class and voting patterns. This is a promising lead, but its importance is qualified by the brief explication and the methodologically worrisome fact that the community heterogeneity measure is apparently derived from the same basic information as is the measure of precinct social status.

The most significant effort at theorizing occurs in trying to explain how social status works. Posed against the largely discredited "public-regarding" thesis is the "decreasing scarce resources" thesis which, the authors argue, ". . . recognizes that social classes may endeavor to advance their ostensibly non-economic interests or life styles through activities in the public as well as the private sector" (p. 47). While I am inclined to support this nonaltruistic interpretation, the limitations of aggregate data weigh heavily here. Inferences about motivations and values underlying such behavior need more grounding in survey or experimental evidence, neither of which are available in the present study nor, for that matter, is the field very well developed in that respect.

As advocates, the authors argue that referenda offer a way in which the less powerful segments of the polity can circumvent the prevailing structures of power. There are at least three problems with this argument. First, it is never convincingly demonstrated that representative processes and public policies are better served by direct rather than representative democracy. Second, most of the evidence offered in this book indicates, *ceteris paribus*, that greater participation by the less advantaged might well result in fewer shared benefits for everyone. Finally, radical restructuring of the content and execution of referendum elections would be necessary to change this situation. If, as the authors contend, the deck is stacked in favor of the upper social strata, it is difficult to see how this radical restructuring will occur.

M. KENT JENNINGS
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The Islamic Question in Middle East Politics *by Alan R. Taylor. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1988. 150 pp. Cloth $29.95; paper, $14.95.*

The greater prominance of Islamic norms and values in the conduct of politics in Muslim societies from Indonesia to Morocco over the course of the past decade has precipitated much discussion among social scientists regarding the provenance, as well as the ultimate direction of this seeming anomaly in the expectations of the prevalent theories. Much thinking has gone into formulating a comprehensive model for studying the various manifestations of Islamic revivalism. While im-

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portant conclusions have been reached in this regard, Islam's new and vociferous claim to politics has thus far evaded such a constriction.

Alan Taylor's study is a case in point in this regard. He has sought to bring together disparate approaches to the study of Islamic history and the mainstream theories concerning political development in the Arab Near East. He has formulated an all-encompassing heuristic model for the examination of the roots of Islamic revivalism and assessed the balance sheet of a decade of revivalist activism in Muslim societies of the Middle East. The book begins with an overview of the salient themes of Islamic history, religious thinking, and social ethos. The author's treatment of the Islamic world view depicts Islam as essentially a political religion, one which having witnessed irrevocable historical decline has now set out to reclaim its place in the order of things. While this line of reasoning accurately reflects the position of the revivalists, it falls short of presenting a complete picture of the issues at hand, and it causes a lopsided emphasis on historiography in analyzing them.

Taylor then argues that the roots of revivalism should be sought in the vicissitudes of the nationalist ideologies and movements in the Middle East. He examines the rise and fall of nationalist movements and traces their failure to the absence of a liberal ethos. Taylor's formulation, however, faces three problems at this juncture. First, he does not address the role of European imperialism and the challenge of Israel in eschewing the evolution of nationalism in the Middle East. Second, he does not convincingly relate the fall of nationalism to the rise of Islam, and the reader is left wondering why the passing of the one necessitated the rise of the other. Finally, Taylor's analysis is hard pressed to fit the cases of Turkey and Iran into its scheme of events. For the former is a working democracy, free of a serious revivalist challenge, and the latter has been primarily concerned with the resolution of the religion-state conflict.

In Taylor's view the political failure of nationalism in the Middle East, compounded with Islam's inability to formulate a "reformation" process, has left Muslim societies at the mercy of the revivalist movements, who in the absence of a liberal tradition have come to espouse tyrannical theocracies. Taylor's accurate depiction of life in Iran under the Islamic Republic confirms his conclusion that Islamic revivalism is predicated on the use of force and has therefore failed to create a viable liberal political order.

The task for the future, therefore, rests with a reformation of Islam, combined with a cultural rather than political approach to revivalism. Here, Taylor relies heavily on the assumption that traditional Islam is an ossified body of thought, susceptible to the threat of revivalism and incapable of responding to Islam's crisis of identity. The only solution open to Muslims, argues Taylor, is a process of religious reform. Taylor's approach is thought-provoking, but not free of inhibiting problems. To begin with, Taylor does not contend with the reasons for the previous failures of Islamic reform. Second, the author does not address the viability of neotraditional approaches to Islamic thought, which, as is evident in Turkey today,

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have done much to resolve the crisis confronting Islamic thought, while stemming the tide of revivalism. Finally, the author assumes that religious reform is the equivalent and harbinger of liberalism. Such is not necessarily the case; religious reform can itself serve as a catalyst for revivalism and politicization of religious thought.

Part of the problems confronting Taylor's conclusions rise from his reliance on secondary sources, which have no doubt compelled him to rely on the old approaches to the Middle East and Islam. Moreover, he has, as a result, based much of his observations on the experiences of the Arab Near East. Despite the author's extensive treatment of Iran and Turkey, the intellectual premises of the book are drawn from the religious and political history of the Arabs. While Taylor raises important questions regarding the roots as well as achievements of Islamic revivalism, the aforementioned problems create reservations regarding a number of his conclusions.

SEYYED VALI REZA NASR
*Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism *by Muhammad Y. Muslih. New York, Columbia University Press, 1988. 277 pp. $30.00.*

This is a straight-forward, dispassionate study of the emergence of Palestinian nationalism among the Arabic-speaking urban elite in the dozen fateful years from 1908 to 1920. The period saw the Young Turk Revolution, World War I, the Arab Revolt, the Balfour Declaration, Faysal ibn Husayn's short-lived Arab regime in Damascus, the French conquest of Damascus, the partition of the Fertile Crescent between Britain and France, and the installation of a British Jew as the first high commissioner of Palestine. Muslih argues that Palestinian nationalism was not merely a reaction to the Zionist challenge, as previous studies have maintained, but also a result of the fragmentation of the pan-Arab movement in Faysal's Damascus along Syrian, Iraqi, and Palestinian lines.

The book applies Albert Hourani's influential concept of a "politics of notables" to the Palestinian case. The notables were a provincial, city-based aristocracy, who owed their prominence to property, education, and appointments in the Ottoman imperial system. They were the indispensible intermediaries between the local population and the Turkish (or later, British) officials representing the distant imperial capital.

Muslih accepts and applies specifically to Palestine Ernest Dawn's thesis that prior to the outbreak of World War I hardly any advocates of Arabism in greater Syria and Iraq actually sought independence and that most Arabs remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire until its collapse in 1918. After 1918 Arabism succeeded Ottomanism as a universalist ideology, while overlapping and competing with regional nationalisms—Palestinian, Syrian, and Iraqi.

Muslih finds that older notables from the leading Palestinian Arab families re-

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mained loyal to Ottomanism until the collapse of 1918, then came to prefer a local Palestinian to a larger Arab nationalism. Some younger notables from the same families, most of whom had not held prominent posts in Ottoman service, were more inclined to support the British-backed Arab Revolt led by Sharif Husayn of Mecca and his sons Abdallah and Faysal. These Palestinian "Sharifians" obtained posts in Faysal's post-war regime in Damascus and pushed to have Palestine included as part of his greater Syrian Arab Kingdom. Both the older advocates of a Palestinian identity and the younger pan-Arabists opposed Zionist and French plans for the area. Both worked for independence but were willing to come to some temporary accommodation with the British if necessary. Once the French seized Damascus and Faysal fled into exile, both generations of Palestinian leaders relegated Arabism to the background and focused on specifically Palestinian problems.

Earlier studies touching on the topic relied mainly, aside from published sources, on British and Israeli archives. Muslih has tracked down important unpublished memoirs and private papers of Palestinian politicians and has rounded these out with interviews of surviving leaders and their relatives. The book does not break new methodological or theoretical ground. Its virtue is that it brings hitherto scattered or inaccessible sources to bear on a carefully defined problem, the development of a specifically Palestinian national consciousness just after World War I. Though he has his ideological preferences, Muslih keeps a cool head in a field where this is notoriously difficult. *Origins* deserves a prominent place on any shelf of books on Palestinian and Arab nationalism or the early phases of the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

DONALD MALCOLM REID
*Georgia State University*

Political Change in the Third World *by Charles F. Andrain. Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1988. 296 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $16.95.*

This book is designed to be a text for use in courses of the same name. Its first several chapters outline a theoretical typology of political systems and what is said to be a "theoretical explanation of political change"; the remaining chapters apply this theory to five cases: Vietnam, Cuba, Chile, Nigeria, and Iran. This is not a bad format in principle; many teachers, including this reviewer, use combinations of theory and case studies in introductory courses on comparative politics and political development.

Unfortunately, there are two major problems with this book. What is called the "theory" is in fact little more than an elaboration of David Apter's old fourfold table of cognitive evaluation (sacred vs. secular) and structural differentiation (pyramidal vs. heirarchical). Not only is this framework recapitulated uncritically, suggesting that there has been no development in development studies in

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the last two and a half decades, but it is very seriously distorted in the elaboration. Moreover, in at least one instance—Iran—the case analysis is profoundly flawed. Let me take each of these issues in turn.

Andrain begins by dividing the world of political systems into four: folk, bureaucratic-authoritarian, reconciliation, and mobilization. As he explains in a footnote, "I have substitued the term 'folk' for Apter's 'theocratic system' mainly because theocracy refers to a system where religious officials exercise dominant political power. Even before the twentieth century few such systems existed. Political anthropologists, however, have located numerous folk societies" (p. 12). Readers who remember Apter's framework will recognize that this definition of theocracy is a serious misreading of Apter's Weberian distinction between the transcendental values of tradition and the empirical ends of modernity. If Apter's construct is worth preserving at all, it is worth doing so faithfully and intelligently. Second, the notion that simply because more folk societies have been observed than theocracies the former category can *replace* the latter is absurd. Just as theocracy means something quite specific in Apterian terms, folk society means something quite specific to most anthropologists; these are not interchangeable categories.

This is but one example of the sloppy conceptualization characteristic of the theoretical framework of the book. It serves as a useful illustration, however, because it is one of the places the empirical analysis of Iran founders. Andrain argues that the post-revolutionary regime in Iran subscribed to "a theocratic folk culture." As he describes it in the chapter on Iran, "folk systems thrived in nonindustrial societies where people hunted wild game, gathered berries, fished, herded cattle, and grew crops for their subsistence needs. These societies were homogeneous, nondifferentiated, and decentralized. No administrative state maintained political order. Instead, sacred shared values and peer-group pressures supplied social harmony" (p. 254). Never since the beginning of recorded history has Iran resembled this description. Indeed, to reduce the traditional Persian world of sumptuous imperial courts, Persian carpets, Persian miniatures, and Persian poetry and literature—to say nothing of Shi'i Islamic theology and civilization—to gathering berries is not only ludicrous, it makes the attachment of Iranians to their history and culture completely incomprehensible.

If it is among the purposes of social science inquiry and education to illuminate rather than obscure the causes and consequences of political change, this effort does not meet that standard. There are much better works of theory and analysis; as a result, despite the convenience of having both in one volume here, I cannot recommend this book.

LISA ANDERSON
*Columbia University*

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Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan *by Thomas G. Paterson. New York, Oxford University Press, 1988. 317 pp. $24.95.*

Paterson is an historian whose earlier work centered on the origins of the cold war. Hence eight of these fourteen essays are devoted to the Truman administration, while only three primarily concern events after 1970. The majority were previously published over a span of about eighteen years. As might be expected, there is little new information in these chapters even though the author revised them to reflect recent scholarship and current events. However, unlike other similar collections, there is a unifying theme and a consistency of analysis.

In his preface, Paterson tells us that he wrote these essays to explore "why and how" a succession of American presidents and their advisers "perceived, exaggerated, and devised policies to meet the Communist threat" (p. xi). In fact, circumscribed by the first chapter, "Red Fascism: The American Image of Aggressive Totalitarianism," originally published in 1970, and the last chapter, "Ronald Reagan, Central America, and the Legacy of Vietnam," published in 1988, each essay clearly emphasizes the way in which the Communist threat was *mis*perceived and the often disastrous policies that resulted from this misperception.

In addition to the several chapters that discuss the now familiar policies of the Truman administration in Europe and Asia, there is a valuable essay on the early cold war critics (focusing in particular on the career of Senator Claude Pepper) and one on Harry Truman's successful management of public opinion and Congress. Another chapter concentrates on the way in which the obsessive concern with Communist aggression blinded Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles to the realities of revolutionary nationalism in the Middle East.

Two of the most interesting chapters are on people rather than policies. "George F. Kennan and the Soviet Threat" presents a rather unflattering view of this architect of containment. Paterson contends that the evolution of Kennan's views after the demise of Stalin has masked the fact that Kennan, as policymaker, was as much a cold warrier as other members of the Truman administration. Similarly, "John F. Kennedy and the Communist Threat" is a useful corrective to the dominant literature of flattering memoirs. Paterson raises a provocative question rarely asked: If Kennedy were such a great president, why were his thousand days so riddled with crises and potential disasters? The answer lies in Kennedy's exaggeration of the Communist threat and his enthusiastic desire for action. Kennedy, he writes, fervently "believed in Cold War dogmas himself and gave them a new vigor." As a result, Kennedy "helped make the world a more dangerous place than when he took office" (p. 210).

The final chapters on the failure of congressional oversight of the CIA and "Ronald Reagan, Central America, and the Legacy of Vietnam" are perhaps the least successful in the book, even though Reagan's restoration of the Communist menace as "evil empire" serves as a fitting conclusion to Paterson's theme.

In spite of the fact that many of the essays are no longer as fresh and revisionist as when originally published, this is a book to be read for its point of view. Given

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the recent nostalgia for the "successes" of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, it is refreshing to find one historian who has not changed his mind.

ANNA KASTEN NELSON
*Tulane University*

Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites; Conflict and Collaboration *by Mordechai Abir. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1988. 247 pp. $38.50.*

This is a carefully written, highly readable examination of politics in modern Saudi Arabia. The first part on elites and what the author calls the ruling class in Saudi Arabia covers the emergence of the Saudi state in the first half of the 1900s and the consolidation of the elite coalition behind the house of Saud. The second part on modernization and political reform covers the postwar political history of the state, ruler by ruler. The chapters that cover a set political history do so in clear chronological order, offering the newcomer a concise summary of political events and the familiar reader a quick refresher. The chapters on specific topics (education, the new middle class) are also presented chronologically. While they thus make for somewhat repetitive reading cover to cover, they do have the advantage of standing on their own.

Much of the book covers familiar territory. There is little in the way of seriously new research. Because Abir could not go to Saudi Arabia, he relies heavily on secondary works, dissertations, and newspapers. Research access is not always possible (few of us can get into the nineteenth century) and Abir does rely on those who did go to Saudi Arabia. Still, because the book offers little new material, it must rest on its new organization of existing material. Research limitations place a necessarily greater burden on the theoretical framework.

The author's framework, however, flows straight from the modernization literature of the early 1960s. It posits an inexorable connection between capital accumulation or culture contact, social mobilization (urbanization, education, etc.), and an increase in demands for political participation from newly mobilized groups led by a newly educated, urbanized elite. This process, through which all states go, leads from the traditional to the modern world. Saudi politics may be inaccessible; the modernization literature is not. The major criticisms of this literature are that it is based on inaccurate assumptions about the nature and even existence of traditional society (the Third World is more different than similar) and inaccurate assumptions about the historical process of political change that occurred in the West. Empirically and logically, two decades of writing have shown that modernization theories do not work. A generation of scholars spent their professional lives trashing this literature. If it is to be rehabilitated, this must at least be done with the critiques in plain view.

Abir does not seem aware of these critiques. He is certain that a process of modernization is occuring and that from this process a mobilized new middle class

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is emerging, which must be growing politically. Because he is an honest scholar he admits from time to time that his own research is unable to locate such a class, and that those who would form such a group are in fact decreasing in political power. But he is ultimately unable to reject the modernization structure. If the new middle class is not coherent, then it will be in the future. If it is not politically powerful today, it will be tomorrow. He resolves the recurrent tensions between his framework and his evidence by calling them paradoxical and ironic. Although Saud was conservative, he paradoxically allied himself with the western-educated elite; paradoxically, the ulama who once opposed modern education came to control it; ironically Faysal's modernizing reforms lost him supporters. Abir realizes that oil enabled the rulers to deflect political opposition, but he seems unaware of the rentier state literature that attempts to explain why this is so.

There are other, more minor problems. Abir devotes much attention to classes and the new middle class without ever defining them. He is vague on the mechanisms through which the potential solidarity of groups is realized. His habit of transliterating every Arabic term can be distracting. The book is useful as a descriptive historical narrative of Saudi Arabian politics, but it is not a particulary useful contribution to a deeper understanding of those politics.

JILL CRYSTAL
*University of Michigan*

China's Political Reforms: An Interim Report *by Benedict Stavis. New York, Praeger, 1988. 158 pp. $35.95.*

Given the extensive debate within China on political and economic reform, any interim report that evaluates the results of the reform process to date (the book was completed befor the landmark 13th Party Congress of October 1987) is welcome. Moreover, Stavis promises more. He taught political science at Fudan University in Shanghai during the fall semester of 1986 and thus was there in December when tens of thousands of Shanghai's students participated in massive demonstrations. As Stavis notes in his preface, "My students went from my lectures on comparative politics to the streets, demanding democracy and human rights" (vii). The book, much of which was written in Shanghai from September 1986 to January 1987, has been penned in part "to share with others the good fortune of being in the right place at the right time" (viii). Upon returning home, Stavis combed through documentary materials from the Chinese press to supplement "the insights and perspectives that came from extensive personal contact in China" (viii).

Given this build-up, it is disappointing to report that the book is essentially a very conventional, albeit useful, account of the reforms, similar to the volumes produced by those who rely solely on library research at home. Thus, the text frequently contains extensive quotations from the Chinese press—primarily from pre-

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viously translated sources—setting out a variety of views on a variety of reform issues.

While one can certainly benefit from reading the book, the reader comes away a bit frustrated. There are at least two basic and interrelated problems. First, Stavis is not particularly forthcoming concerning his discussions and experiences in China. Even in his best chapter—on the student demonstrations—where he reveals more of his personal experiences, there is a sense of missed opportunities. For example, we are told that "student posters made virtually no reference to the Democracy Wall Movement of 1980. . . . *Apparently* that movement and its leaders did not loom large in students' consciousness" (p. 100, emphasis added). What *did* the students think about the earlier movement? If Stavis discussed such questions with anyone, he has not revealed their views. The problem recurs on less sensitive issues as well. He will often cite a press report (for example, that defense lawyers are not taken seriously). But we get virtually no indication that he took advantage of his stay to ascertain public attitudes toward the law. Stavis is confronted with a problem that has become increasingly common now that foreign scholars have been allowed to study, teach, and do research in China. Working closely with one's academic counterparts and Chinese students, how should the researcher deal with personal sources? Stavis appears to be overly protective.

Having opted essentially for a documentary approach, Stavis's second problem stems from his reluctance at times to go beyond the most readily accessible press reports, including publications such as *China Daily* and *Beijing Review* which are intended for foreigners. On issues where a healthy skepticism might be in order—for example, the strict rules against nepotism in choosing cadres and the increasing importance of minor parties—he is too often content to set out the official press position. While usefully countering the official press, on occasion with speculation provided by Hong Kong publications, he does not make sufficient use of diverse sources from the Chinese press; nor does he probe the attitudes of those around him. It is interesting to note that the Chinese attitude surveys he cites are almost exclusively from *China Daily*, despite the existence of far more revealing surveys in social science journals.

STANLEY ROSEN
*University of Southern California*

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## Reference Books and Source Materials Received

Arms Control and Disarmament, Defense and Military, International Security, and Peace: An Annotated Guide to Sources, 1980–1987 *by Stephen E. Atkins. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-CLIO, 1989. 411 pp. $65.00.*

Chinese Politics, Documents and Analysis, vol. 2: Ninth Party Congress (1969) to the Death of Mao (1976) *edited by James T. Myers, Jurgen Domes, and Milton D. Yeh. Columbia, S.C., University of South Carolina Press, 1989. 451 pp. $59.95.*

Documents of American Constitutional & Legal History, vol. 1: From Settlement through Reconstruction *edited by Melvin I. Urofsky. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1989. 550 pp. $39.95.*

Documents of American Constitutional & Legal History, vol. 2: The Age of Industrialization to the Present *edited by Melvin I. Urofsky. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1989. 514 pp. $39.95.*

The Executive Branch of the U.S. Government, A Bibliography *compiled by Robert Goehlert and Hugh Reynolds. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1989. 380 pp. $49.95.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 59: 1919 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1988. 674 pp. $52.50.*

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# Correspondence

*To the Editor:*

I was appalled to read the review by Lisa Anderson of a recent book of which I am the editor, *Qaddafi's Green Book: An Unauthorized Edition* (Buffalo, N.Y., Prometheus Books, 1988), in the Fall 1988 issue of *Political Science Quarterly.* Her review is filled with errors and misrepresentations, cheap shots, and outright lies; it is defamatory, malicious, and scurrilous; it consists of smears, and slanders.

Space restriction precludes a detailed, point-by-point discussion, so I can cite only a few glaring examples.

Ms. Anderson dismisses my introduction as "brief" and "mostly silly." My introduction is, in fact, almost thirty book pages, constituting almost one-quarter of the entire book—hardly "brief" by any standard. *The Los Angeles Times* syndicated review of my book, widely reprinted, said, "Christman's introduction competently captures the contradictions in Qaddafi's thinking." And *Library Journal* said, "Christman deserves thanks for making [the book] available, with his helpful introduction." *The San Diego Union* said, "This tome will surely acquire value as a collector's item. It should be required reading."

Ms. Anderson claims to "expose" my book as "fraud," without any evidence or even explanation. Not content to defame my work, Ms. Anderson defames my motivation in bringing out the book as "irresponsible" and "reprehensible" and an effort to "cash in." I have dedicated some thirty years to editing some twenty books that make available important source material about national and international politics, and shudder to think how little money I have made in so doing, considering the time and work involved.

Ms. Anderson is indignant that I refuse to suppress the fact that Qaddafi (or his translator) uses the term, "the final solution." She calls my book "an insult"; it is her review that is "an insult"—particularly to victims of the Holocaust.

Ms. Anderson asserts that "it is apparent that Christman knows virtually nothing about Qaddafi's intellectual life." Simply on the basis of her characterization of Qaddafi as an "intellectual," I am quite prepared to be judged on which of us is "mostly silly."

HENRY M. CHRISTMAN



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*Dr. Anderson replies:*

It is apparent that what I took for a cynical effort to profit from the widespread sensationalizing of Libya and Qaddafi in the United States during the 1980s was not that at all. This book is instead a well-intentioned effort to make readily available at a substantial price a text that many Americans are not aware is readily available for free. The usefulness of this service is considerably diminished by the many errors in the editor's introduction, however, and the suggestion that other non-specialists are unaware of the misinformation is not reassuring.

Since among the many works with which Mr. Christman is credited on the book's dust jacket are several on the Eastern bloc and East-West relations, it can charitably be inferred that in this instance he ventured out of his area of expertise. Should he do so again, I strongly urge that he avail himself of the willingness of many specialists to read and review manuscripts written by and for non-specialists before they are published. This is particularly important for editors who do not read the original language of the text on which they provide commentary, as is the case here, and it has spared many a writer the acute embarrassment of seeing their errors pointed out in print.

LISA ANDERSON

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


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


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


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
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


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